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ABSTRACT

TIME (CHRONOS) IN ARISTOTLE‘S NATURAL PHILOSOPHY
AND OF TIME‘S PLACE IN EARLY NATURPHILOSOPHE (1750-1800)

By
Chelsea C. Harry
May 2013

Dissertation supervised by Ronald M. Polansky
In what sense, if any, is time related to nature? In this dissertation, I argue that
Aristotle‘s Treatise on Time (Physics iv 10-14) must be read in light of his foregoing
discussion of nature (phusis) in Physics i-iv 9. Thus, Aristotle‘s definition of time
(chronos) in Physics iv 11, that time is the number (arithmos) of motion (kinesis) with
respect to before and after (219b1), is highly contextualized and as such must be
understood as not only derivative of both Aristotle‘s definition of nature, as the inner
capacity for motion and rest (192b13-22), and of his explanation of kinêsis, but also
parallel to his analyses of the infinite (apeiron), place (topos), and void (kenos). What is
more, I bring attention to the fact that Aristotle‘s understanding of nature is shaped
fundamentally by the distinction he makes in the Physics and elsewhere (Metaphysics iv)
between potentiality (dunamis) and actuality (entelecheia). With this in mind, I

iv

distinguish between the potential for time and actual time in Aristotle and conclude that
the human being, along with actual motion, is both the necessary and sufficient condition
for actual time on his account. Time, for Aristotle, then, results from an interaction
between two or more parts of nature. It is not an a priori substance to be examined qua
itself. My conclusions, therefore, offer a solution to those who read Aristotle‘s Treatise
on Time as a confused inquiry, i.e. one that switches back and forth between a theory of
knowledge and a theory of reality and combines what many believe to be Aristotle‘s
characteristic realism with idealism. Finally, I use these conclusions to show a likeness
between the account of time I attribute to Aristotle and what I suggest to be a return to
thinking about time as derivative of a theory of nature in early Schellingian
Naturphilosophie.
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DEDICATION

For Wolfgang.
And, for my parents, who taught me to make the most of time.
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Introduction: The Study of Nature and the Nature of Time

―Aristotle’s Physics is the hidden, and therefore never adequately studied, foundational
book of Western philosophy.‖1

Aristotle‘s Physics was the dominant work on natural science in the West until
Newton‘s Principia, published in 1687.2 This is not to say, however, that it was widely
read or commonly understood. Instead, except for in the cases of a few Hellenistic and
Medieval commentators, it fell into relative obscurity. Even Aquinas‘s great commentary
on the work was most likely completed using a kontamination, or mixture of various
translations, for lack of any standard or widely read translation (Aquinas 1961, xix). It is
thus not too surprising that since the Physics really never received much recognition,
following, or acclaim, once the paradigm of nature for which it argued was supplanted in
the seventeenth century—ultimately by the Newtonian model, but Newton‘s work was
helped along by Copernicus, Descartes, Kepler, and Galileo—it became seemingly
antiquated.3
The question as to whether Aristotle‘s Physics is a work of philosophy or a work
of science has not been, and really cannot be, properly addressed. But, whereas
philosophers still glean important lessons from ancient texts, scientists largely consider
older works of science to be passé. Even in the philosophical community, however, as
1

Martin Heidegger (Heidegger 1998, 185). Emphasis is his.
See for example Tim Maudlin‟s exceptionally clear discussion on the birth of physics
(Maudlin 2012, 1-4).
3
Maudlin (Maudlin 2012, 4) explains: “Abandoning Aristotle‟s spherical universe entails
abandoning his basic physical principles and rethinking the form that the laws of physics
can take. This task was undertaken by Sir Isaac Newton.”
2

1

Lambros Couloubaritsis (Couloubaritsis 1997, 2-4) argues, interest in Aristotle‘s
philosophy of nature is relatively recent, having received little attention until the mid-late
twentieth century. At this time, a series of commentaries sprung up (Maison, 1945,
Solmsen, 1960, Wieland (1962), 1972, Heidegger, 1967), spearheaded by Sir David
Ross‘s 1936 monograph, now considered the standard work on the Physics. More
recently still, scholarship in ancient philosophy has seen a renewed interest in Aristotle‘s
treatment of time in the Physics (Physics iv 10-14). And, it is the account of time that is
now calling attention to other parts of the work.
This is to say that recent contributions to the growing literature on Aristotle‘s
Treatise on Time (Physics iv 10-14) have focused on the importance of considering this
section in light of arguments made in other sections of the work. For example, in Ursula
Coope‘s recent publication, Time for Aristotle’s Physics IV.10-14, she admonishes her
reader that familiarity with Aristotle‘s account of change, and in particular, Aristotle‘s
argument that change is divisible, is required to understand his account of time (Coope
2004, 5-9). Similarly, Tony Roark‘s manuscript, Aristotle on Time: A Study of the
Physics attempts an ―hylomorphic interpretation‖ of Aristotle‘s account of time (Roark
2011, 1-8). He argues that time is ―a combination of matter (hule) and form, or shape
(morphe)‖ (Roark 2011, 1) analogous in structure to the natural substantial beings
Aristotle investigates in the Physics.
I agree that reading Aristotle‘s Treatise on Time in the greater context of the
Physics is fruitful. But, more specifically, I argue that understanding Aristotle‘s analytic
of time requires that it be read in the context of his foregoing arguments about nature,4

4

Most recently, in Nathanial Stein‟s paper, “Aristotle and the Whittling Argument,” read
2

motion, and the terms of motion in the Physics. Aristotle‘s Treatise on Time responds to
the commonly held ideas (endoxa) about time to argue for a consistent definition of time
and of its principles (archai) in light of his account of nature (phusis). Simplicius, among
other early commentators, believed the eight books of the Physics to be an amalgamation
of two original texts, one on nature and one on motion (kinêsis). On one account of this
division, it is possible that the time section was in fact the end of the work on nature (See
Ross 1936 on the possibility that the work concerning motion began with book five).
This seems right, as Aristotle‘s allusions to time in Physics v-viii align with only one of
the two types of time, i.e. infinite time, 5 he names at the beginning of his Treatise on
Time (218a1); whereas, what I designate as his analytic of time, in his Treatise on Time,
focuses on another type of time, i.e. time taken.
Aristotle redefines nature in the first four books of the Physics, seemingly
unseating what has been argued to be the Platonic conflation of nature with being (see
Grant 2006). According to Aristotle‘s definition, phusis is an archē, an inner principle,
of motion (kinêsis) and rest (stasis) (192b13-22). Thus, Aristotle‘s interest in natural
objects becomes an interest in explaining change. The apparent search for the archē of
time, then, cannot lead us to think that Aristotle had it in mind to develop a theory of time
qua time. Instead, it is only because Aristotle is ultimately interested in the simplest

at the 2012 meeting of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy (SAGP), he argues that
reconciling Aristotle‟s puzzles of time (Physics iv 10) may be approached by
contextualizing them and looking to the way he approaches similar puzzles in Physics i.
5
Coope (Coope 2005, 9-13) sets up her argument about how to read Physics iv 10-14
discussing the sense in which time is, like change, continuous. Yet, the support for the
idea that time in Aristotle is continuous seems to come from Physics viii. The notion that
time is analogous to kinêsis in being continuous only works if we are talking about the
rather nebulous notion of “infinite time,” which, as we will discuss shortly, seems
relegated as a topic to Physics iv 10, Physics v-viii and De Caelo.
3

elements (stoikeia), primary conditions (aitia), and first principles (archē) of nature
(184a9-16), as a principle of motion and rest, that he takes up a discussion of time at all.
This is to say that Aristotle‘s time section is derivative of what he says about change, and
change only because it is so fundamental for the study of nature.6
Aristotle‘s definition of time, ―number of motion in respect of ‗before‘ and
‗after‘‖ ὰριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον (219b1), depends on (1) what he
means by number, (2) what he means by motion, and (3) what he means by before and
after. Thus, one gets the sense that it is not possible to understand what Aristotle is trying
to say about time without first understanding what he has to say more generally about
nature. This is the intended result of a portion of the dissertation that follows—an
examination of the first four books of his most general work on nature, the Physics, and
research to include the Metaphysics, the Categories, the Nicomachean Ethics, De
interpetatione, and works on more narrow topics: De anima, De sensu, De memoralia. I
hope to show the thematic thread running through the Physics, that the dialectic between
potentiality and actuality underlies not only Aristotle‘s theory about first principles of

6

Aristotle‘s approach to the science of nature (θύζεσο ἐπηζηήµεο), then, reclaims in a
sense the Pre-Socratic approach. The first philosophers attempted to provide reasonable
explanations for the ways natural things exist. For the Milesians, the aim was to
understand an underlying element to explain nature in its various manifestations, i.e. to
ask what is the unifying element of the multiplicity around us. The answers to this
question varied, e.g. for Thales it was water (De caelo ii 13), for Anaximander it was an
indefinite principle (apeiron), and for Anaximenes it was aer (Simplicius, 24.26-25.1).
Yet, the idea that nature comes from and exists as a single underlying material element,
or element of change and rest, dominates. Plato‘s physics, on the other hand, is less
certain, told in the Timaeus as only a likely tale (38c). The notion of material change, as
opposed to the steadfast form or Idea (eidos), inherent in nature called into question the
possibility for veracity at all in an account of nature. Thus, at the heart of Plato‘s physics
is something rather immaterial. Instead of studying the nature of natural beings, it
provides a conjecture about the entire picture. A theory of nature, then, is not a study of
individual bodies subject to change; rather, it gives an account of the whole.
4

nature, but also his emphasis on accidental change, i.e. the locomotion, alteration,
increase, and decrease of substantial beings, as the defining capacity for natural objects
and the way he defines this type of motion and terms related to it.
To be clear, motion is an actuality (entelecheia) of the potentiality (dunamis) for
the acquisition by a substantial being of an accidental form, the infinite is never actual
and always a potential for continuous division or addition, place is a boundary occupied
by a body, and void either does not exist in any modality, or—on some readings—it
exists in potentiality as rarefaction. Because, as Klein argues in his book Greek
Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra, the Greek concept of number was not a
symbolic expression, but a discreet reality, the arithmos of time has to be a name for that
which actually exists. As Aristotle famously writes in Physics iv 11, ―time, then, is what
is counted, not that which we count‖ (219b8-9). What actually exists are natural objects
beginning (―before‖) and completing (―after‖) motion. But, time, is the number of this; it
is an attribute of motion (see primarily 223a16-20 but also 221b19-22).7 What does not
actually exist, unless it is enumerated, is time. The potential for enumeration always
exists for discreet pluralities, but without someone or something to name the plurality, the
numeral is a mere potentiality.
In Physics iv 14, Aristotle famously claims that the counting of time is dependent
on nous (223a25). Commentators have argued about how to interpret the meaning of
7

Coope (Coope 2005, 31 n. 1) does not think the translation of πάζνο at 223b17, as
―attribute‖ in the ROT should connote ―property.‖ Instead, she prefers what she admits
to be an awkward rendering in English, i.e. ―something of change,‖ which, as she
explains, is said better in French, i.e. ―quelque chose du changement.‖ I will keep the
word ―attribute,‖ substituting it sometimes with ―term,‖ which fits better with the way
Aristotle talks about the infinite, place, void, and time in his discussion of kinêsis in
Physics iii 1. I do not think that time for Aristotle is simply something of change, but that
which is derived from kinêsis.
5

―nous‖ here. Did Aristotle mean God, the intellective faculty of soul, or—as nous is
sometimes understood more generally—the perceptive faculty of soul? On my reading,
―nous‖ here means broadly the working together of sense and intellection in that, as we
see in De anima, the faculties of intellect require sensation. This is important to
Aristotle‘s definition of time in particular because in order to number motion, one
requires both the faculty of sense by way of a body to perceive external change (kinêsis)
from before the acquisition of accidental form to after and the intellective capacity to
count or number it. Whereas, super human beings lack both a readiness for thinking—
because super human being is pure activity and lacks all potentiality (see Metaphysics xii
7-9, Polansky 2011, Gabriel 2009) in addition to a perceiving body, sub-human beings
lack intellective capacity to count or number. Thus, I argue that human beings, along
with the actual existence of external accidental change of natural objects, are the
necessary and sufficient conditions for actual time in Aristotle‘s account.
Richard Sorabji (Sorabji 1983, 90) acknowledges commentators have long been
confused by Aristotle‘s claim that the existence of time requires countability and thus
someone to count.8 He believes that Aristotle is mistaken about this, but reconciles the
apparent confusion pointing to Aristotle‘s intentions and preoccupations. While I do not
necessarily agree with Sorabji when he says that Aristotle‘s definition of time is wrong, I
agree with his assessment that readers of Aristotle‘s Treatise on Time need to, ―turn our
attention away from time to the notion of possibility and to such related modal motions as
countability‖ (his emphasis). Sorabji‘s point clearly supports a contextualized reading of
Aristotle‘s Treatise on Time, and it turns us to one of Aristotle‘s primary interests in his

8

Cf. Physics iv 14, 223a25
6

natural philosophy—potentiality. I add to Sorabji‘s critique and suggest that the
confusion he cites on the part of commentators has led to a general misunderstanding of
Aristotle‘s method and goals in the Physics. Namely, it is sometimes claimed that
Aristotle‘s Physics in general, and the Treatise on Time in particular, is a confused
inquiry—part metaphysics and part epistemology. 9 On such a reading, Aristotle can be
understood in such a way that it looks like he thinks time is actually existing, i.e. ―is
real,‖ with or without the potentiality for perception and intellection in the world, i.e.
without ―someone to count.‖ I consider this reading to take Aristotle‘s Treatise on Time
out of its intended context and to impose on his work a bifurcation between a study of
reality and a study of knowledge, i.e. a difference between what is and what we can
know, which does not apply in Aristotle‘s time.
Sorabji looks at Aristotle‘s use of aesthesis in four works to justify the claim that
Aristotle is concerned with possibility in the Physics generally, so too in the Treatise on
Time. Like Sorabji, I emphasize the role of potentiality in Aristotle‘s general account of
nature in the Physics, but I do so by calling attention to the key role of the interplay
between potentiality (dunamis) and actuality (entelecheia) in Aristotle‘s treatments of the
principles of nature, kinêsis, the infinite (apeiron), place (topos), and void (kenos). Thus,
I argue that Aristotle‘s conclusions about time are analogous to Aristotle‘s conclusions
about the infinite, place, and void, i.e. that they are derived from his theory of nature
generally. On this reading, time for Aristotle emerges as an actualized potentiality, which

9

Many thanks to Professor Theodore Scaltsas for bringing this to my attention and for
taking the time to talk it through with me. Professor Scaltsas is one such proponent of
reading Aristotle‟s Treatise on Time as part metaphysics and part epistemology. While I
argue against this position, I appreciate very much his willingness to challenge my
reading of Aristotle.
7

exists as actual or ―real‖ as a result of an interaction between two or more parts of
nature.10 The parts of nature that can relate in such a way as to bring about actual time
require conditions for the actualization. It is then up to the philosopher to argue for what
those conditions may be. In this way, temporality is never an a priori or fixed presence; it
is not a container, a continuum, or a copy of eternity. What we know of time is the same
thing as what time actually is.
It has been likewise popular for readers of Aristotle‘s Treatise on Time to label
him with a certain epistemological orientation. Namely, Aristotle has been called an
―idealist‖ as a response to misunderstanding the role of nous, or the requisite ―counter,‖
in his Treatise on Time. This characterization of Aristotle thus sets up another
polarization of his position, against the typical portrayal of Aristotle as ―realist,‖ 11 but—
more importantly—reducing Aristotle‘s dynamic work to anachronistic and overly
simplified terms. Nevertheless, labeling Aristotle in this way opens up the possibility to
assume a univocal relationship between Aristotelian ―idealism‖ and eighteenth and
nineteenth century German ―Idealism.‖ Kant‘s transcendental idealism is generally
accepted as the precursor for German Idealism, and it is Kant‘s work that seems to have

10

The question as to whether time is “real” or “unreal” for Aristotle is a question about
whether or not time is an existing self-subsistent being (νὐζίαλ αὐηὸ ὂλ) for Aristotle.
Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou argues in her paper, “Is Time Real for Aristotle?” delivered
at the 5th International Symposium on the Issue of Time in Aristotle at the Aristotle
University of Thessaloniki (May 2012), that time is indeed real for Aristotle and requires
no interaction between parts of nature to make it so. Inwood (in Judson 2003, 177) also
holds this view. However, Inwood limits his study to an investigation of the puzzles of
time in Physics iv 10 and does not treat Aristotle‟s provocative discussion about time and
the soul in Physics iv 14.
11
Consider, for example, the famous portrayal of Aristotle in Raphael‟s fresco School of
Athens (1509-1511). Aristotle‟s hand is pointing out, suggesting that for Aristotle truth is
known empirically, contrasted with Plato‟s hand, which is pointing up, suggesting that
for Plato truth is relegated to the realm of the intelligible.
8

first appropriated Aristotle‘s conclusions about natural philosophy. Because (1) I take
Aristotle‘s account of time to be one that comes out of a particular philosophy of nature,
(2) Immanuel Kant‘s account of time in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft is often read to be
an appropriation by Kant of what some consider an Aristotelian idealism—on account of
the role of nous in his account—with regard to the Treatise on Time, and (3) for Kant,
time cannot be derived from nature, I argue for dissimilarity in the two accounts. Kant‘s
theory of time is a partial rejection of Newtonian space-time, the consequence of which
according to Kant renders time contingent, foreclosing the possibility that conclusions
based on temporal succession can be necessary or certain (B54). For Kant, time is both
an a priori intuition, a capacity that allows for—instead of being derived from— human
experience of the natural world and a category, which sequences the experiences in order
that they be cognized.
But, though Kant‘s account of time argued for something fundamentally different
from what Aristotle proposed, Kant did provoke a school of thought that seems to have
returned to what I consider to be an Aristotelian paradigm, i.e. an approach that
developed a theory of time from a theory of nature and emphasized the role of
potentiality in both. Early German Naturphilosophie (1750-1800) sought to understand
nature as an interrelated and integral system. 12 The approach was a simultaneous
rejection of Cartesianism and of Kantian category distinction from Kant‘s critical works;
12

My reading of early German Naturphilosophie, and in particular the early Schelling
and his relationship with the Kantian critical philosophy, is indebted to Prof. Dr. Claudia
Bickmann‟s seminar on “Schelling—Realist or Idealist?” at Universität Köln during the
2011 Summer Session. Dr. Bickmann helped me to see that it would be an
oversimplification of the goals and methods of early Naturphilosophie to consider it
either “idealist” or “realist.” A dynamic conception of nature, which includes human
beings as a part of the dynamism, is necessarily neither and both “idealism” and
“realism.”
9

mind (Geist) and matter are not two differentiated entities, nor are time and space and
attributes of matter given to experience by way of consciousness. Thus, a theory of time
derived from such a theory would have had to be the result of an interaction among the
distinct yet undifferentiated parts of nature; time could not have been considered an
independent being that was a part of nature. Instead, it had to be the name for a type of
actualization that comes out of the system of nature.
In the latter part of my dissertation, therefore, I use what I have determined to be
both (1) the conflation of a theory of knowledge and a theory of reality in Aristotle‘s
Physics and (2) an emphasis on the important role potentiality plays in Aristotle‘s natural
philosophy to make a comparison between his Treatise on Time and what seems to be the
beginnings of a theory of time as an actualized potentiality in early Schellingian
Naturphilosophie. Thus, my investigation explores more generally the relationship
between time concepts and the way they are sometimes derived from philosophies of
nature.
In the end, despite various scientific inaccuracies the Physics might present as
true, we might have an important lesson to recover from Aristotle‘s philosophy of nature,
or, if not a lesson, at least some questions to pose. Namely, do concepts of time often
correlate and/or come out of contemporaneous philosophies of nature, or are studies of
time better left to be studies of time qua time, i.e. studies that take time to be a study in
itself, of itself? If they do not often correlate, then should they? Is time a being of nature
qua itself, or is it an attribute of the natural world? In short, what is time‘s place in
nature? In this dissertation, I argue that theories of time that come out of theories of
nature, dynamic concepts about natural beings and the ways they exist and interact,

10

necessarily make actual time into a result of an interaction between human beings and
other beings in the world and eliminate the possibility that time is a thing qua itself, i.e. a
self-subsistent being.
The five chapters will develop as follows:
In the first chapter I conduct a careful reading of Physics i 1 in an effort to
emphasize the importance of acquiring a sense for the scope, goals, and method of
Aristotle‘s project as preparatory to reading subsequent arguments in the work. In
particular, I will propose that, contrary to the typical polarized readings of this section,
Aristotle‘s method in the Physics is necessarily a combination of dialectic and
demonstration. I will then continue my reading of book 1, highlighting the
potentiality/actuality distinction in Aristotle‘s account of natural change, gignomenon and
kinêsis, in substantial natural beings. I will suggest that this distinction is quite important
for Aristotle‘s conclusions about the principle of natural beings in Physics ii (192b13-22)
and that understanding these conclusions entail the potentiality/actuality distinction is
preparatory to a correct reading of the definition of motion Aristotle advances in Physics
iii 1 (201a10-11) and to his subsequent explanations of the infinite (iii 4-8), place (iv 15), void (iv 6-9), and especially time in the Physics. This all will be with an eye to
showing that Aristotle‘s Treatise on Time is a parallel account to his foregoing studies of
nature, its principles, motion, the infinite, place, and void. Ultimately, I aim to show here
the extent to which the time section is highly contextualized and must be read in light of
Aristotle‘s conclusions in the earlier chapters of the Physics.
In the second chapter I provide a reading of Physics iv 10-11 with the aim of
showing that Chronos here has to do with time as an attribute of motion, as an interval,

11

i.e. the type of time that, as Aristotle describes at 218a1, ―is taken.‖ I argue that
Aristotle‘s actual analytic of time begins at 219a1-3 with his claim that time is an
attribute of motion (kinêsis). I trace the development of his analytic from this starting
point until he both defines chronos at 219b1 and then, after some argument, reaffirms his
definition at 220a25. I attempt to show, by way of a proposal that the ―now‖ for Aristotle
is not only (1) non-temporal, as Coope (Coope 2005, 29) has suggested, but also (2) a
name for existing self-subsistent natural beings undergoing kinêsis, that the best reading
of this analytic is to understand Aristotle‘s position on time to be that time is only ever
potentially real, and by consequence only ever potentially a continuum, unless it is
apprehended as such. This claim rests on the assumption that nothing is actually named
or referred to unless it is perceived. I support this reading by contrasting the way
Aristotle dismisses that time could be a self-subsistent being composed of real parts in
chapter 10 and then argues that time is in some sense continuous, i.e. presumably a whole
composed of parts, in chapter 11. For Aristotle, time that is actually taken as a whole, or
continuum, has to be dependent on (1) kinêsis and (2) something to apprehend the kinêsis
insofar as time‘s ―parts‖ are only ever potentially existent, requisite on the (1)
apprehending and (2) naming of beings undergoing kinêsis.
In the third chapter I argue that Aristotle‘s question about the relationship
between time and the soul in Physics iv 14 is not an epistemological one. Rather,
Aristotle accounts for the apparition of actualized or ―real‖ time given that it is an
attribute of kinêsis. Time for Aristotle, in the sense that it is ―taken‖ (ιακβαλόκελνο),
requires some sort of ―taker,‖ or more precisely, since time is an arithmos of kinêsis for
Aristotle, it requires someone or something to observe the non-temporal before and after
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and thus to ascertain the number of the kinêsis. This is not to say that time cannot exist
potentially insofar as kinêsis can exist independently of its apprehension, but only that
time requires additional conditions in order to be actualized. I offer two arguments in
defense of the view that (1) the kinêsis of natural beings along with (2) human beings are
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of real or actualized time in
Aristotle‘s account. I will discuss in particular the relationship between number
(arithmos) and nous in Physics iv 14 and Aristotle‘s account of sensation in De sensu
436a-437a. Namely, I suggest that the existence of number requires not only (1) a
readiness for thinking, which can actually count/number (arithmeiton) or measure
(metreiton), as opposed to simply marking (orizei) kinêsis, but also (2) a body by which
to sense perceive that which can be counted. These of course are in addition to the being
undergoing kinêsis.
In the fourth chapter I argue that Kant‘s theory of time, as it is advanced in the
Critique of Pure Reason, is an unnecessary adulteration of Aristotle‘s Treatise on Time.
Kant taints what I argue to be the two most original and salient aspects of Aristotle‘s
theory—the absence of a mind/body distinction and a way to understand time that
emerges from a certain understanding of natural beings and their principles—in an effort
to reinterpret the Aristotelian categories. Unlike Aristotle, Kant develops a theory of
time divorced from a theory of nature.
In the fifth and final chapter I try to show the implicit Aristotelian influence on
Schelling‘s early nature philosophy. I suggest, though the results are inconclusive, that
even while Schelling still appears to be defending the critical philosophy, he does so in a
paradigm fundamentally contrary to Kant‘s and indeed to Fichte‘s. Though the
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differences between the Aristotelian and Schellingian nature philosophies are many, I
suggest a point of comparison between the two. Namely, both suggest to us a
philosophy of nature whence the principles and terms of nature derive, or emerge coequal to, and are thus not argued for outside of this philosophy of nature, qua themselves.
I conclude that Schelling returns us to a pre-Cartesian understanding of time as an
actualized potentiality between more than one aspect of nature, i.e. he implicitly argues
for a theory of time that derives from his theory of nature. I use chapter two of his
Abhandlungen zur Erlaeuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre (1796/1797) to
propose that Schelling‘s ideas about nature depend fundamentally on interactions
between potentiality and actuality, form and matter, and subject and object.
As an appendix to the dissertation, I provide a translation of chapter two of
Schelling‘s Abhandlungen, as it is currently unavailable in English.
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Chapter 1: Time in Context

In this chapter, I continue in the vein of recent commentators who read Aristotle‘s
Treatise on Time as a contextualized account of time. In fact, I argue that Aristotle‘s
time section is not just related to, but entirely dependent on, the preceding arguments for
motion, infinity, place, and void, and indeed on Aristotle‘s definition of nature and his
search for the principles, archai, of natural objects, in the same work (Physics i-iv 9).13
I depart from the literature, however, as I do not read Aristotle as a philosopher
concerned about time—in questions about time or in delimiting the being of time 14—but
as a natural scientist interested in the being of natural things, whose ways of being
demand a discussion of time. 15
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See also Bolton page 2 (in Judson 2003) on the importance of a contextualized
understanding of the Treatise on Time.
14
Aquinas (Aquinas 1961, 2) seems to be making a similar claim, though not explicitly,
when he writes that natural science ―deals with those things which depend on matter not
only for their own existence, but also for their definition.‖ According to Aquinas‘s prior
argument, subjects like number, magnitude, and figure depend on matter for their
existence but not for their definition. By deduction, since time is a number for Aristotle,
it would not be a proper subject qua itself for natural science.
15
Roark calls Aristotle a philosophical optimist because Aristotle is willing to define
time (Roark 2011, 11). Without intending to take anything away from Aristotle, I would
disagree with Roark on this point. Aristotle is in fact not defining time as the abstract
concept we have come to know in contemporary discourse. Why would Aristotle‘s
naturalist account of time as the number of the motion of natural things be over-reaching?
He had no motive for saying any more about time than his project warranted. Similarly,
Coope defends her study of Aristotle‘s account of time, insisting that while Aristotle‘s
problems with time are not our problems, she notes that he asks different questions than
those of the ―modern philosopher,‖ understanding his questions could help us to better
understand our own assumptions and problems with time (Coope 2008, 4-5). In
addition, Coope seems to take the opposite approach to what I suggest here when she
insists that Aristotle was not interested in the beings in time.
15

Thinking backward, time (chronos) is an attribute of motion or change, (kinêsis),
for Aristotle (219b1-2). Aristotle‘s interest in time and in that which is required in order
that there be motion, e.g. infinity, place, and void (200b12), come from his interest in
motion itself, and motion only because he sought in the Physics comprehensive
understanding of the fundamental principles of natural beings. His analysis of time, then,
comes from his interest in the study of natural being. If we can read Aristotle‘s account
of time in this way, then we will be able to see that his account of time cannot be an
account of time qua time.
I will begin with a careful reading of Physics i 1 in an effort to emphasize the
importance of acquiring a sense for the scope, goals, and method of Aristotle‘s project as
preparatory to reading subsequent arguments in the work. In particular, I will propose
that, contrary to the typical polarized readings of this section, Aristotle‘s method in the
Physics is necessarily a combination of dialectic and demonstration. I will then continue
my reading of book 1, highlighting the potentiality (dunamis) /actuality (entelecheia)
distinction in Aristotle‘s account of natural change, gignomenon and kinêsis, in
substantial natural beings. I will suggest that this distinction is quite important for
Aristotle‘s conclusions about the principle of natural beings in Physics ii (192b13-22) and
that understanding these conclusions entails that the potentiality/actuality distinction is
preparatory to a correct reading of the definition of motion Aristotle advances in Physics
iii 1 (201a10-11) and to his subsequent explanations of the infinite (iii 4-8), place (iv 15), void (iv 6-9), and especially time in the Physics. Namely, Aristotle is going to argue
that the natural scientist must think radically differently about the ontological status of
motion and the terms of motion, i.e. they are not self-subsistent natural beings. The
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following chapter will thus be divided into the following subsections: (1) Physics: Scope,
Access, Goals, and Method; (2) Nature and its Archai; (3) The Role of Kinêsis in Nature;
(4) From Kinêsis to Chronos.

I.

Physics: Scope, Access, Goals, and Method
Aristotle‘s Physics is a book about nature (θύζηο, phusis). It is an inquiry into

nature itself, but this means an inquiry into the objects of nature in so far as these objects
seem to reveal what nature is, i.e. the principle of their motion.
The first line may be one of the most important in the entire work, as it introduces
the scope of the project. Aristotle tells us in i 1, ―When the objects of any inquiry (πάζαο
ηὰζ µεζόδνπο), in any department, have principles (archai), causes (aitia), or elements
(stoikeia), it is through acquaintance with these that knowledge and understanding is
attained‖ (184a10-12). It is apparent from the start that Aristotle‘s goal is not a subjective
objective to overcome skepticism; rather, he is searching for comprehensive
understanding. 16 Such comprehensive understanding is by way of getting to know the
principles, causes, and elements of the subject of inquiry. If nature generally, i.e. nature
qua nature, is Aristotle‘s subject, then such an acquaintance seems rather implausible. A
project with such a large scope seems rather Platonic. 17 Instead, it seems that his real
subject must be the nature of the various natural beings. The objects of nature can be
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According to Aquinas (1961), Physics i 1 is a preface to the rest of the work.
Elsewhere, Aristotle explicitly distances himself from Platonic-style natural
philosophy. See 203a16 and Meta 1001a12 on this point. As Ross points out,
Pythagoreans and Plato were “thought of as being a priori theorists rather than genuine
students of nature” (Ross 1936, 545).
17

17

investigated, probed, and analyzed for the grasp of the natural principle involved in each
kind of natural being.
Aristotle continues, announcing that the first task in the present inquiry, which he
names a science of nature (θύζεσο ἐπηζηήµεο), will be to ―determine what relates to its
principles‖ (184a15-16). The question here at the beginning of the Physics is not only
about the scope of inquiry, but also about access to the subject. To know the principles,
one must make a determination about what concerns them. Aristotle‘s point here is
subtle, but if acquaintance with the principles, causes, and elements of natural beings is
the scope, and if comprehensive understanding is the goal, the natural scientist must have
both (1) the potentiality for perception of that which concerns the principles of nature,
and (2) a faculty of judgment in order to acquire knowledge of them.
Scope and access must be buttressed by a clear method. Aristotle famously
outlines a method, but what exactly he intended to convey is disputed. He will gather
knowledge of these principles moving ―from what is better known to us to what is better
known by nature‖ (Πέθπθε δὲ ἐθ ηλ γλσξηκσηέξσλ ἡκῖλ ἡ ὁδὸο θαὶ ζαθεζηέξσλ ἐπὶ ηὰ
ζαθέζηεξα ηῇ θύζεη θαὶ γλσξηκώηεξα) (184a16). On one reading, ―what is better known
to us‖ may mean endoxa, or those ideas that are commonly held. On this reading, the
method Aristotle proposes is dialectic (see also Topics viii 5), and the ideas about nature
whence he would be starting would have been those advanced by his predecessors, e.g.
Plato, the atomists, the sophists, and the Eleatics. 18 On another reading, ―what is better

18

See Hussey (1983), Owen (1986), and Irwin (1988), all proponents of this view.
Hussey explains that “endoxa” need not mean exclusively ideas commonly held: “His
method is the method of dialectic, by which (in theory at least) the philosophical inquirer
started from the accumulated material of common-sense intuitions, previous opinions of
philosophers, and observed facts relevant to the subject, and ascended by a process of
18

known to us‖ is that which is more readily perceived. 19 The discrepancy over
interpreting this passage is pertinent because the way one understands Aristotle‘s method
grounds the way one reads the rest of the work. When there has been little or no attention
to Physics i 1, and instead an interest only in later books, this essential topic is left
unacknowledged. Is Aristotle primarily a philosopher concerned with adjudicating the
ideas of his predecessors,20 or is he a natural scientist, looking for clear demonstration of
the nature of natural beings? Having left this question unanswered, and indeed unasked,
some modern readers have supposed that Aristotle‘s Physics is inconsistent in method—
changing between metaphysics of nature and an epistemology.
As was aforementioned, the potential for perception and judgment are both
pertinent to achieving the goals Aristotle has laid out. If sense perception is indeed
integral to the project, he is going to acquire knowledge of the nature of natural beings at
least in part by way of demonstration. Consider, for example, Aristotle‘s general account
of perception and knowledge in De anima ii 5 (417b17-28) where he asserts that
scientists must have access to external perceptibles in order to acquire knowledge of
things generally. Because there is no one place to start an inquiry into nature when the

rational criticism and generalization to the correct account of the subject, which would
usually be enshrined in a definition of the central term” (ix).
19
See Bolton (in Judson 2003), for a very well argued take on this view. For Bolton,
Physics i 1 is a parallel account to Posterior Analytics ii 19. According to these accounts,
“the conclusion of our reasoning and our inquiry gives us a principle which explains (and
gives us a firm delineation of) the perceptible phenomena which we use to reach it. But
no rule of general dialectic or of any type of dialectic which Aristotle discusses is
designed to guarantee conclusions of this sort. So if dialectic does reach conclusions of
this type it is accidental and not due to the method of dialectic itself” (13).
20
In an effort to laud the development of the scientific method in the sixteenth century,
modern physicists oversimplify Aristotle‟s project stating that he had no method of
demonstration and relied entirely on dialectic to obtain conclusions about nature.
19

subjects of the inquiry exist external to the scientist, 21 with what the scientist begins her
inquiry—with endoxa or confused perceptions—should not be a disjunction. Instead, it
seems that it should be a conjunction; the two are perhaps inextricable in natural science.
Aristotle provides further detail about his method. These paragraphs are
notoriously difficult to interpret because Aristotle uses the terms universal and particular
equivocally. Since he has just insisted that we begin with things more knowable to us, he
then qualifies this point saying: ―For the same things are not knowable relatively to us
and knowable without qualification‖ (νὐ γὰξ ηαὐηὰ ἡκῖλ ηε γλώξηκα θαὶ ἁπιο)
(184a18).22 Read one way, ―knowable relative to us‖ refers to the natural scientist‘s
access to external perceptibles. The scientist obtains knowledge about universals,
meaning genera, by experience with different kinds. The external perceptibles we
encounter through sense perception are the particular instantiations of universals whence
we acquire general knowledge. 23 Read another way, ―knowable relative to us‖ refers to
the ideas commonly held prior to this investigation. How we read Aristotle‘s proposition
here affects how we understand his subsequent conclusion. If he formerly intended to
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Being a self-subsistent natural being herself, the natural scientist could be a subject to
herself, but this is not likely what Aristotle had in mind.
22
Aquinas (1961) explains the difference between knowable to us and knowable by
nature/without qualification with an appeal to the fact that humans begin from potency
and from a point of view of science and nature‟s telos is something to be learned. I
disagree with Aquinas on this point. It seems a Christianized reading of Aristotle here,
separating humans from the natural order, and especially from God. Aquinas‟s
conclusions may be the first source of commentary reading Aristotle as part epistemology
(studying what we can know) and part metaphysics (studying what is).
23
This passage could be misread to suggest that Aristotle is differentiating what is
possible for us to know, or an epistemology, and what is, a metaphysics. This is not the
case. He is not insinuating that there is, to use a Kantian term, a noumenal aspect of
nature that escapes our grasp. Instead, he is introducing his understanding of knowledge
acquisition as (1) perception of particular instantiation of a genus (2) knowledge of
universal (genera) from experience with the particular.
20

say that we garner knowledge of genera by way of experience with kinds, his conclusion
that his method will: ―advance from what is obscure by nature, but clearer to us (ἐθ ηλ
ἀζαθεζηέξσλ κὲλ ηῇ θύζεη ἡκῖλ δὲ ζαθεζηέξσλ), towards what is more clear and more
knowable by nature (ἐπὶ ηὰ ζαθέζηεξα ηῇ θύζεη θαὶ γλσξηκώηεξα)‘‘ (184a19-21), means
that the scientist will begin with the individual natural beings whose general nature she
wants to know better. If, however, Aristotle meant that we begin with ideas commonly
held, then the conclusion announced about his method entails working from the ideas of
predecessors. In this case, the method does not clearly involve scientific observation or
investigation.
Aristotle adds here that we will get at the first principles by starting with ―rather
confused masses‖ (ηὰ ζπγθερπκέλα κιινλ) (184a22), or, as Ross renders it, ―the
confused data we start with‖ (Ross 1936, 15), and by subsequent analysis, we will
achieve the anticipated elements and principles (ὕζηεξνλ δ‘ ἐθ ηνύησλ γίγλεηαη γλώξηκα
ηὰ ζηνηρεῖα θαὶ αἱ ἀξραὶ δηαηξνῦζη ηαῦηα) (184a22). Again, one could understand
―confused masses‖ to mean either endoxa or first perceptions and ―analysis‖ to refer to
dialectic or demonstration. But, what Aristotle writes next points us to the latter
explanation. He clarifies that we first come to know universals (θαζόινπ) and then
particulars. Of course, universal is used here in a sense different from the one just
discussed, i.e. universal as genera. Here, universal refers to a whole, and that is
contrasted with particular, meaning part of the whole. These universals, or wholes, are
better known to sense than particulars (Δηὸ ἐθ ηλ θαζόινπ ἐπὶ ηὰ θαζ‘ ἕθαζηα δεῖ
πξντέλαη· ηὸ γὰξ ὅινλ θαηὰ ηὴλ αἴζζεζηλ γλσξηκώηεξνλ, ηὸ δὲ θαζόινπ ὅινλ ηί ἐζηη·
πνιιὰ γὰξ πεξηιακβάλεη ὡο κέξε ηὸ θαζόινπ) (184a23). What is better known to us,
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then, is what is better perceived by us; and, wholes are perceived before parts. To
illustrate this point, Aristotle uses the example of the child first associating the name
―father‖ with all men and then later determining that only one of those men is his own
father. Similarly, a child learns ―dog,‖ ―cat,‖ ―chair,‖ ―table,‖ and only over time learns
what distinguishes one instance of these universals from another. The demonstrative,
―that cat‖ or ―this chair‖ develops into a more specific identification: ―the adirondack
chair my grandfather owned‖ or ―the black labrador retriever named Wolfgang.‖ Even as
adults, when we first experience objects, we do not immediately distinguish among
various instantiations of them. We see a starling for the first time, and subsequent
sightings of different starlings are indistinguishable from the first.
For Aristotle, this fact is explained analogously by the difference between names
and definitions. Names, he clarifies, do not differentiate among wholes themselves,
whereas definitions differentiate wholes into particulars, i.e. a definition associates a
species with a genus and also differentiates the species from other kinds of the genus.
Therefore, our perceptions do not immediately differentiate among that which is of the
same kind. It is our analytical abilities that organize and categorize. But, this is not just a
point about language. For Aristotle, the confused perceptions we first notice are
compounds (184a23).24 We see the whole, the parts together as one, and then later we
perceive the detail. With regard to the science of nature, we will come to know nature by
intentionally analyzing our immediate perceptions in order to learn about particulars not
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As Aquinas (Aquinas 1961, 5-6) points out, that Aristotle formerly said confused and
not compound is significant, as he is using universal equivocally: integral sensible,
universal intelligible, universal sensible.
22

immediately clear to us. Following the logic here, then, in order to know the first
principles of nature, we will analyze our perceptions of natural beings.
This is the end of the first chapter of book 1 and so too of the discussion of scope,
access, goals, and method. On my reading, then, Aristotle‘s method in the Physics is
more complex than the ones either of the two usual positions attribute to him. 25 Further,
holding him to one or the other is likely a false dichotomy. It seems clear that he was a
natural scientist setting out to demonstrate the nature of natural beings in so far as this is
consistent with his aforementioned scope, goals, and requisite access to the subject of
inquiry. But, it does not seem likely that he would not have found it necessary to engage
with the commonly held ideas at his time. In fact, I would suggest that he had an onus to
contend with the ideas of his predecessors. He was arguably the first natural scientist
because he was not simply providing conjecture about nature. But, in being the first, the
scope of his project took on an implied second dimension, i.e. he needed to show that his
new way of explaining nature was valid. This is not to say that Aristotle would have
denied the importance of thinking through ideas logically, but just that he set himself
apart from his predecessors because he saw the parallel importance of justifying scientific
conclusions with demonstrable evidence based on experience. Drawing attention to this
debate in Physics i 1 and attempting a non-polarized reading of it establishes certain
expectations with regard to Aristotle‘s arguments in later books. It prepares us not only
for Aristotle‘s complementary use of dialectic and demonstration, but also prevents us
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Aquinas (Aquinas 1961, 3) believes that already in the first line of the work we see
Aristotle wedging a difference between understanding and science, disclosing the
importance of both definitions and demonstrations to natural science.
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from reading these later arguments in modern terms, i.e. as ―metaphysics‖ at one turn and
then as ―epistemology‖ at another.
Aristotle will now begin his explorations to uncover the principles of the nature of
natural beings. Already in the next chapter we will see him switching between
demonstrations from experience, beginning with confused perceptions, and dialectic,
beginning with endoxa. Having now suggested that Aristotle‘s method is not strictly in
one vein or the other, I will point out his movement between them in my following
discussion of his arguments.

II.

Nature and its Archai
After establishing the scope, goals, access, and method for natural science,

Aristotle sets out to know the principles of nature of natural beings. I will now present a
reading of the rest of Physics i in an effort to highlight the potentiality/actuality
distinction in Aristotle‘s account of natural change, gignomenon and kinêsis, in
substantial natural beings. The role potentiality and actuality have to play in Aristotle‘s
observations of and conclusions about the nature of natural beings are important to
correctly reading his later discussions of the infinite, place, void, and especially time.
Aristotle works up to a discussion of potentiality/actuality by way of an investigation into
the principles of the nature of natural beings.
He begins in Physics i 2 with a significant assumption; one that has been
supposed prior to his announcement in Physics i 1 that his goal is to determine what
relates to the principles of the nature of natural beings; 26 namely, that there is in fact a
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Aristotle made a quick switch from the hypothetical to the actual at the start of this
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principle of natural science. Aristotle states: ―There must be either one principle or more
than one‖ (Ἀλάγθε δ‘ ἤηνη κίαλ εἶλαη ηὴλ ἀξρὴλ ἢ πιείνπο) (184b14-15). Determining
whether the principle is one or more will not be a matter of analyzing perception, but of
weighing the logic of various endoxa. 27 Either, the principle is one and unchanging, a
view attributed to Parmenides and Melissus, or the principles are more than one and
subject to change, various examples of which are advanced by the natural philosophers.
If the principles are more than one in number, then they are either limited in number or
unlimited in number, and they are either all the same or different in kind. These are not
propositions based on experience. Rather, they are based on logical possibilities. But,
this is not to suggest that Aristotle will conduct the entire examination as a conversation
with the endoxa. Rather, these are the positions with which he must contend before he
can use perceptibles to try and establish a different view. On this point, Aristotle writes:
Now to investigate whether what exists is one and motionless is not a contribution
to the science of nature. For just as the geometer has nothing more to say to one
who denies the principles of his science—this being a question for a different
science or for one common to all—so a man investigating principles cannot argue
with one who denies their existence. For if what exists is just one, and one in the
way mentioned, there is a principle no longer, since a principle must be the
principle of some thing or things…To inquire therefore whether what exists is one
in this sense would be like arguing against any other position maintained for the
sake of argument…We, on the other hand, must take for granted that the things
that exist by nature are, either all or some of them, in motion—which is indeed
work: “when the objects of an inquiry…have principles…it is through acquaintance with
them that knowledge and understanding is attained” to “in the science of nature…our first
task will be to try to determine what relates to its principles” (184a10-16).
27
Bolton (in Judson 2003) argues that Aristotle‟s use of endoxa here does not undermine
his promised engagement with perceptibles in Physics i 1. I agree with his conclusion
that engaging with the endoxa in Physics i 2 is complementary to his otherwise
demonstrative methodology. Specifically, Bolton supposes Aristotle to be exercising the
following point: “the natural scientist cannot use a scientific, that is a demonstrative,
argument to refute someone who denies that the natural world of changing things exists.
In natural science it is an indemonstrable first principle that the natural world of changing
things exists…one can only refute this denial dialectically, or peirastically” (15).
25

made plain by induction (Ἡκῖλ δ‘ ὑπνθείζζσ ηὰ θύζεη ἢ πάληα ἢ ἔληα θηλνύκελα
εἶλαη· δῆινλ δ‘ ἐθ ηῆο ἐπαγσγῆο) (184b26-185a14).
Aristotle thus belies the endoxa by arguing that the scope of his project requires a
method of investigation different from the one used by his predecessors. Aristotle
reemphasizes here that the subject of his inquiry is natural beings. These beings are
known by perception and understood by analysis and discrimination. Perception allows
the natural scientist to observe that natural beings are in motion. It is perception that
allows for Aristotle‘s brand of natural science, no longer an a priori science. And, it is
perception that allows for the situation Aristotle describes above; relying on perception as
opposed to speculation creates a situation whereby he is talking past the theories of the
endoxa. If he cannot debate with the endoxa on their own terms, he has to rely instead on
an alternative method. With regard to the principles of the nature of natural beings,
Aristotle tells us that the principles are clearly more than one. Surely, we could
pontificate about various possibilities for the number of principles of nature, but
induction settles the score when it shows us that there must be more than one.
According to Ross (Ross 1936, 487), in our current chapter divisions, it is in
Physics i 5 that we get the beginning of Aristotle‘s analytic of the first principles. 28
Starting with 188a19, I will trace Aristotle‘s entire analytic in the rest of Physics i.
Aristotle defends the point that the principles must be at least two. In so doing, he
concludes that contraries (ηἀλαληία) are the principles, reinvoking the endoxa to show
that both Parmenides and Melissus, and the natural philosophers, allow for this to be the
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I will continue to highlight that Aristotle reserves his own thoughts on the various
topics of natural science until after having contended with the endoxa. We will see this
pattern in his subsequent discussions of nature, motion, the infinite, place, void, and time.
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case. 29 It is in this chapter that we see Aristotle really moving between his proposed
method of progressing from first perceptions or wholes to discriminating parts and
weighing endoxa. He begins showing that the monists agree that contraries are principles
because they posit fire and earth. Aristotle likens this to a commitment to principles of
hot and cold. Likewise, he cites a belief in the dense and rare and then the atomist belief
in the full and empty (188a20-25). After establishing that all agree contraries are
principles, Aristotle clarifies what this means. Namely, he writes that ―the principles
must come neither from one another nor from anything else, and everything else must
come from them‖ (δεῖ γὰξ ηὰο ἀξρὰο κήηε ἐμ ἀιιήισλ εἶλαη κήηε ἐμ ἄιισλ, θαὶ ἐθ
ηνύησλ πάληα· ηνῖο δὲ ἐλαληίνηο ηνῖο πξώηνηο ὑπάξρεη ηαῦηα, δηὰ κὲλ ηὸ πξηα εἶλαη κὴ
ἐμ ἄιισλ, δηὰ δὲ ηὸ ἐλαληία κὴ ἐμ ἀιιήισλ) (188a26-28). And, these are the primary
contraries. Aristotle then announces what will be a turn to logical considerations. We
will determine the need for primary contraries not by way of considering what is the case
in our perceptions, but by thinking through what would or would not make sense to
conclude about the character of contraries.
Aristotle uses examples from experience. He has us think about the qualities of
paleness and knowing music and asks rhetorically how it could be possible that the latter
come from the former (188a36). He uses what his reader would readily admit from
experience to demonstrate the difference between logical contraries and logical
complements. White does not come from any not white, he writes, and what he means is
that white does not simply come from not white. For example, a mean person is not
white, but it is not not-white, which is reserved for a color other than white, especially the
29

See Ross (Ross 1936, 487) for evidence that Aristotle probably mistook what was said
in Parmenides‟s poem for Parmenides‟s own views.
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contrary, black. Aristotle explains further that the ―white‖ can come from an
intermediary of it and its contrary, in this case black. But, white does not come from a
complement, i.e. a non-color in this case, something merely non-white. He continues, but
it is unclear whether he is speaking from experience, or if he is explaining in terms of
what makes sense. Nothing changes into something categorically different, except by
chance. White does not turn into mean or musical; it changes into its contrary or
something between the two (188b4-8). Rather, the thing—such as a pale person—may
become musical or mean.
But, this is not the only sense in which one contrary becomes another. When we
are talking about a change from white to not white, we convey a change in predication of
a substantial being. But, we can also talk about general not being changing into being.
Ross (1936, 489) calls these contraries ―the thing produced,‖ i.e. harmony (ἡξκνζκέλνλ)
and ―that from which it is produced,‖ i.e. disharmony (ἀλάξκνζηνλ). Aquinas explains
that these contraries are called primary contraries because in order for the latter to be
principles, they would require principles themselves (Aquinas 1961, 48). 30 To illustrate
this point, Aristotle discusses compound being that comes to be from a state in which it
was not. A house is built from materials that when grouped together as they lie on the
ground are ―not a house.‖ But, this is quite different from a bunch of chemistry
equipment lying on the ground, which also constitute things that are not a house, but now
in a complementary sense. They have no possibility of ever being a house. For Aristotle:
It does not matter whether we take attunement, order, or composition for our
illustration; the principle is obviously the same in all, and in fact applies equally
to the production of a house, a statue, or anything else. A house comes from
certain things in a certain state of separation instead of conjunction, a statue (or
30

See also Aristotle on this point at 189a30-35.
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any other thing that has been shaped) from shapelessness— each of these objects
being partly order and partly composition (Δηαθέξεη δ‘ νὐζὲλ ἐπὶ ἁξκνλίαο εἰπεῖλ
ἢ ηάμεσο ἢ ζπλζέζεσο· θαλεξὸλ γὰξ ὅηη ὁ αὐηὸο ιόγνο. Ἀιιὰ κὴλ θαὶ νἰθία θαὶ
ἀλδξηὰο θαὶ ὁηηνῦλ ἄιιν γίγλεηαη ὁκνίσο· ἥ ηε γὰξ νἰθία γίγλεηαη ἐθ ηνῦ κὴ
ζπγθεῖζζαη ἀιιὰ δηῃξῆζζαη ηαδὶ ὡδί, θαὶ ὁ ἀλδξηὰο θαὶ ηλ ἐζρεκαηηζκέλσλ ηη ἐμ
ἀζρεκνζύλεο· θαὶ ἕθαζηνλ ηνύησλ ηὰ κὲλ ηάμηο, ηὰ δὲ ζύλζεζίο ηίο ἐζηηλ)
(188b15-20).
The two senses of contrary here, and thus the two senses of change that have emerged,
will foreshadow Aristotle‘s later discussion of accidental formal change and substantial
change.31 On the one hand, we see him developing a theory about accidental formal
change. When something, e.g. the pale person, is white and undergoes qualitative change,
it becomes not white, meaning it moves either closer to its contrary, black, or it moves
completely to black. There is a principle of accidental change, but the substance is
already in place. For example, the person is now unmusical and then musical. On the
other hand, above we see Aristotle describing a principle of moving between contraries
where the contraries signal generation and corruption, instead of accidental formal
change. Here, we see that the coming into being of a complex substance requires both
the material components and then imposition of the form. And, certain forms require
certain materials, or the substance cannot come into being. Aristotle concludes that
everything coming to be naturally is either a contrary or a product of contraries (188b2426). In all cases, as Aristotle works to show, contraries are the source of change.
As Aristotle goes on to note, his predecessors would not have disagreed that the
archai are contraries. Yet, while most of his predecessors have asserted what they
believed to be principles as contraries, what exactly the contraries end up being varies
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This distinction may indicate Aristotle‟s early thoughts on the difference he will make
in Physics v between kinêsis, usually rendered “motion” but generally meaning accidental
or predicative change, and metabole, which includes kinêsis but also substantial change,
i.e. generation and corruption.
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widely (188b37-189a2). And again, we see a distinction being made between confused
perception, here called ―the order of sense‖ (θαηὰ ηὴλ αἴζζεζηλ) and logical reasoning,
or, ―the order of explanation‖ (θαηὰ ηὸλ ιόγνλ). Aristotle assigns the coming to know via
explanation to the universal and the coming to know of the particular to the order of
sense: ―The universal is more knowable in the order of explanation, the particular in the
order of sense: for explanation has to do with the universal, sense with the particular‖ (ηὸ
κὲλ γὰξ θαζόινπ θαηὰ ηὸλ ιόγνλ γλώξηκνλ, ηὸ δὲ θαζ‘ ἕθαζηνλ θαηὰ ηὴλ αἴζζεζηλ ὁ κὲλ
γὰξ ιόγνο ηνῦ θαζόινπ, ἡ δ‘ αἴζζεζηο ηνῦ θαηὰ κέξνο) (189a5-9). Of course, Aristotle is
using universal and particular equivocally again. Here, he uses the same sense of
universal that we saw in his general account of perception and knowledge from De anima
ii 5, i.e. universal as genera. We come to know universal as genera through experience
with particulars, or kinds; we distinguish the form from the material. This sense of
universal is obviously different from the meaning Aristotle intended when he said in i 1
that the child first calls all men father. In this case, we only know the confused whole
until we discriminate it into parts.
When Aristotle is talking about endoxa, he differentiates among those
predecessors who named the principles as contraries more knowable by sense and those
that are more knowable by explanation. Thus, Aristotle himself is separating theories
that have arrived at principles by way of different methods. The theories that have
unobservable unified concepts as principles—Plato‘s great and small, for example, or
Empedocles‘s love and strife—have based their physics on universal principles that
allow us to account for the whole. The theories that have basic observable phenomena
as principles— Anaximenes‘s account of the dense and the rare, for example—allow us
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to conjecture something about the whole based on experience of whatever is in front of
our senses. For Aristotle, these accounts are analogous; both are providing a scheme for
the order of things in nature. But the nature of the accounts marks a difference among
them, and it signals the difference I am working to highlight in Aristotle‘s own
treatment. While Aristotle sees a value and a necessity in contending with physics based
on theory, his analytical work is based on what can be perceived.
Aristotle concludes this discussion, clear that the archai are contraries. His view
has been justified using appeals to experience as well as rational explanation. In addition,
he has corroborated his claim with the wide range of endoxa from his time. So, he begins
a new discussion with a follow-up question. Even if the principles are contraries, are
they two or more than two (ρόκελνλ δ‘ ἂλ εἴε ιέγεηλ πόηεξνλ δύν ἢ ηξεῖο ἢ πιείνπο
εἰζίλ) (189a11)? He proceeds to argue that they are more than two, but finite in number.
This portion of Aristotle‘s argument is quite important because it is here that he
introduces both the idea of an unchanging element of nature, ὑπνθείµελνλ, which
Aristotle will develop later when he defines nature as a principle of motion, and the issue
of multiple causes, which Aristotle will famously develop in Physics ii. As Aristotle
begins to suggest that the principles are more than two, yet finite, he uses examples
where it is unclear if he is speaking from experience or from a point of view of logical
necessity. He says, for example that, ―it is difficult to see how either density should be of
such a nature as to act in any way on rarity or rarity on density‖ (189a22-23). He then
supports this view invoking a second example from the endoxa: neither can love and
strife gather one another up and make something out of each other. It seems apparent
that there must be some ―third thing‖ (ὑπνηηζέλαη ηη ηξίηνλ) (189a25).

31

Recall that

Aristotle has been discussing contraries in two different ways: as true contraries, e.g.
white and black, and as primary contraries, e.g. what Ross calls ―the thing produced‖ and
―that from which it is produced.‖ Thus, this third thing is going to mean something
different for each of these sets of contraries.
Aristotle wants to posit a third thing, similar in the vein of Pre-Socratic
philosophers of nature (189b1-2). More than three would be inefficient because we
would end up with more than one contrary, and we would thus require an intermediary
for both. But, he will not do that here. First, he provides his own account, retracing his
arguments from endoxa and effectually supplanting them with arguments from confused
perceptions. He will now turn to the ―natural order of inquiry,‖ i.e. from common
characteristics to particular cases (ἔζηη γὰξ θαηὰ θύζηλ ηὰ θνηλὰ πξηνλ εἰπόληαο νὕησ
ηὰ πεξὶ ἕθαζηνλ ἴδηα ζεσξεῖλ) (189b31-33).
Now, we see Aristotle writing explicitly about the difference between what are
commonly called in the literature, ―accidental‖ and ―substantial‖ change, which we noted
just earlier that he had been foreshadowing in his differentiation between primary
contraries and true contraries. Here he talks about change in terms of gignomenon
(becoming) and not in terms of kinêsis or metabole. This is an important distinction
because Aristotle is still at the early stages of his inquiry. He is still deriving the archai
and has not yet introduced language of motion and change. Aristotle first discusses
becoming in the sense of predicative change. This seems to be the type of becoming
easily observed with the senses, e.g. the pale person becoming tanned or the man
becoming musical.
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When we talk about a man becoming musical, Aristotle asks whether we are
talking really about the man becoming musical, about the non-musical becoming musical,
or about the non-musical man becoming a musical man. He then wishes to point out that
in the first two instances, i.e. the man becoming musical and the non-musical becoming
musical, what becomes is simple; whereas, in the third instance, i.e. when the nonmusical man becomes musical, what becomes is complex (θακὲλ γὰξ γίγλεζζαη ἐμ ἄιινπ
ἄιιν θαὶ ἐμ ἑηέξνπ ἕηεξνλ ἢ ηὰ ἁπι ιέγνληεο ἢ ηὰ ζπγθείκελα. ιέγσ δὲ ηνῦην ὡδί. ἔζηη
γὰξ γίγλεζζαη ἄλζξσπνλ κνπζηθόλ, ἔζηη δὲ ηὸ κὴ κνπζηθὸλ γίγλεζζαη κνπζηθὸλ ἢ ηὸλ κὴ
κνπζηθὸλ ἄλζξσπνλ ἄλζξσπνλ κνπζηθόλ. ἁπινῦλ κὲλ νὖλ ιέγσ ηὸ γηγλόκελνλ ηὸλ
ἄλζξσπνλ θαὶ ηὸ κὴ κνπζηθόλ, θαὶ ὃ γίγλεηαη ἁπινῦλ, ηὸ κνπζηθόλ? ζπγθείκελνλ δὲ θαὶ ὃ
γίγλεηαη θαὶ ηὸ γηγλόκελνλ, ὅηαλ ηὸλ κὴ κνπζηθὸλ ἄλζξσπνλ θκελ γίγλεζζαη κνπζηθὸλ
ἄλζξσπνλ) (189b36-190a4). There is a difference between the first two instances,
however. Aristotle is quick to point out that while both are instances of simple things
becoming, in the first instance, the simple thing remains; whereas, in the second instance,
the simple thing is destroyed. This is to say that the man himself remains in the
qualitative change from non-musical to musical. The substance remains with the
acquisition of the accidental form. The quality of non-musical, however, does not remain
in the change to musical. For this reason, Aristotle concludes that there must always be
an underlying third thing that is itself becoming. In addition to the contraries—one that
survives while the other does not, and one that is potentially existent while the other is
actually so—there must be a thing that is not a contrary, which survives all becoming so
that there is something that withstands alteration (ἐάλ ηηο ἐπηβιέςῃ ὥζπεξ ιέγνκελ, ὅηη
δεῖ ηη ἀεὶ ὑπνθεῖζζαη ηὸ γηγλόκελνλ) (190a13). Aristotle notes that the form is one
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numerically but more than one (θαὶ ηνῦην εἰ θαὶ ἀξηζκῶ ἐζηηλ ἕλ, ἀιι‘ εἴδεη γε νὐρ ἕλ)
(190a15), as there is both the substance and the accident. This third thing is the natural
substantial being, i.e. the person becoming tanned after having been previously pale, or
the man becoming musical from having been previously not musical.
But, talking about accidental or predicative change is not the only way to speak
about change. This is where Aristotle is going to correlate his earlier discussion of
different types of contraries with a discussion of different types of coming to be.
Aristotle differentiates the way we commonly speak about becoming: sometimes we say,
―come to be‖ (γίγλεζζαη) and sometimes we say, ―come to be so-and-so‖ (ηόδε ηη
γίγλεζζαη) (190a31-32). Our language correlates to the difference between substantial
and accidental change, respectively. Substances ―come to be‖ without predication, but
they ―come to be so-and-so‖ with regard to a change in quality, quantity, relation, time,
or place (190a34-36 and cf Categories). This means that the becoming in the first
instance is a generation; whereas, the becoming in the other cases is a motion from a
privative to a positive form. Aristotle‘s point here is that with accidental change, a
subject or substantial being is always presupposed. It is crucial to see where he is going
with this and what he is beginning to build here. It may seem that this is an obvious
point, but it has been overlooked by those who single out Aristotle‘s treatise on time and
other later topical sections of the Physics. Without substantial being, accidental change,
which has to do with alterations, quantities, place, relation, and time, does not exist.
Of course, as Aristotle adds, substances come to be from something too. The
implication here is that something never comes from nothing. But, this point, which is a
challenge to Parmenidean monism, does not undermine the distinction between
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substantial becoming and accidental change. Both types of becoming require something
whence they emerge. Aristotle reminds us, for example, that both animals and plants
come originally from seed (ὅηη δὲ θαὶ αἱ νὐζίαη θαὶ ὅζα [ἄιια] ἁπιο ὄληα ἐμ
ὑπνθεηκέλνπ ηηλὸο γίγλεηαη, ἐπηζθνπνῦληη γέλνηην ἂλ θαλεξόλ. ἀεὶ γὰξ ἔζηη ὃ ὑπόθεηηαη,
ἐμ νὗ ηὸ γηγλόκελνλ, νἷνλ ηὰ θπηὰ θαὶ ηὰ δῶα ἐθ ζπέξκαηνο) (190b3).32 There is a
material whence the form comes to be. But, the real difference here is that the latter is
conditional on the former having already occurred. Kinêsis (usually rendered ―motion‖),
which is a type of metabole (usually, ―change‖), requires substantial natural being. In
order for substance to exist, it must have come to be by way of generation, which is
another kind of metabole. Aristotle makes this point when he explains that, ―everything
comes to be from both subject and form‖ (ὅηη γίγλεηαη πλ ἔθ ηε ηνῦ ὑπνθεηκέλνπ θαὶ ηῆο
κνξθῆο) (190b19-20). The subject is the substance, which is composed of substantial
matter and form, and the form is the accidental form. He reminds us of the musical man.
The musical man is a complex thing; it is composed of a man, which is a subject, and the
quality of musicality, the accidental form.
Thus, based on his own account, Aristotle is able to conclude that the archai are
sometimes two and sometimes three (190b29-30). On the former account, it is the
contraries themselves, the privative and the positive accidental form, which are the
principles of nature. On the latter account, the underlying subject of change is taken into
account.
Having touched on the idea of privative form, Aristotle is ripe to discuss the place
of non-being in the fundamental principles. He acknowledges the ancient quandary that
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570a3-10, GA iii 11, 763a24-763b5), but it is not discussed here.
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it is impossible to understand the paradox of becoming: either a thing becomes from what
is or from what is not. If something is not, nothing can come from it, and if something is,
it already exists and can no longer come to be. Aristotle seems to return to a common
sense argument based on experience—not confused perceptions, but analyzed and clear
perceptions—that subjects can ―be‖ in various ways. He uses the example of a doctor
who exists already as a doctor, but he becomes other things apart from his identity as
doctor (191b1-2). He turns gray, not as a doctor, but as a dark haired thing. He builds a
house, not as a doctor, but as a house builder. With these examples, Aristotle shows that
the Pre-Socratic paradox of becoming is a problem not based on common sense or
experience. Instead, it is based on a strict logic of non-contradiction, which ignores or is
ignorant of the way natural beings actually exist. This is remedied by two important
distinctions Aristotle makes with regard to the being of nature. On the one hand, there is
this important difference between substance, or subject, and accidental form. I can exist
as a woman and yet become many different things: wife, dog-owner, student, teacher,
house-rehabber, etc. The predicates do not come from nothing; they come from their
contraries, which Aristotle names a privative form. On the other hand, Aristotle notes a
second explanation, which he has entertained in both Metaphysics iv 7 and viii,
concerning the difference between being actually and being potentially.
It is certainly not a coincidence that Aristotle spends so much time partially
defending, but largely contending, with the endoxa. There was something basic that his
predecessors got right: there is an interplay between contraries at the heart of nature‘s
fundamental principles. But, what they did not get right was the absolute necessity of
positing ―the negative part‖ or privative form at the heart of all accidental change, and
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thus of the nature of natural beings.

Aristotle is able to grasp what they did not because

he has been willing in part to demonstrate his conclusions about the principles of the
nature of natural beings based on experience. Aristotle explains the oversight of his
predecessors:
Now we distinguish matter and privation, and hold that one of these, namely the
matter, is not-being only in virtue of an attribute which it has, while the privation
in its own nature is not-being; and that the matter is nearly, in a sense is,
substance, while the privation in no sense is. They, on the other hand, identify
their Great and Small alike with not being, and that whether they are taken
together as one or separately. Their triad is therefore of quite a different kind from
ours. For they got so far as to see that there must be some underlying nature, but
they make it one-for even if one philosopher makes a dyad of it, which he calls
Great and Small, the effect is the same, for he overlooked the other nature. For the
one which persists is a joint cause, with the form, of what comes to be—a mother,
as it were. But the negative part of the contrariety may often seem, if you
concentrate your attention on it as an evil agent, not to exist at all (ἡκεῖο κὲλ γὰξ
ὕιελ θαὶ ζηέξεζηλ ἕηεξόλ θακελ εἶλαη, θαὶ ηνύησλ ηὸ κὲλ νὐθ ὂλ εἶλαη θαηὰ
ζπκβεβεθόο, ηὴλ ὕιελ, ηὴλ δὲ ζηέξεζηλ θαζ‘ αὑηήλ, θαὶ ηὴλ κὲλ ἐγγὺο θαὶ νὐζίαλ
πσο, ηὴλ ὕιελ, ηὴλ δὲ νὐδακο νἱ δὲ ηὸ κὴ ὂλ ηὸ κέγα θαὶ ηὸ κηθξὸλ ὁκνίσο, ἢ ηὸ
ζπλακθόηεξνλ ἢ ηὸ ρσξὶο ἑθάηεξνλ. ὥζηε παληειο ἕηεξνο ὁ ηξόπνο νὗηνο ηῆο
ηξηάδνο θἀθεῖλνο. κέρξη κὲλ γὰξ δεῦξν πξνῆιζνλ, ὅηη δεῖ ηηλὰ ὑπνθεῖζζαη θύζηλ,
ηαύηελ κέληνη κίαλ πνηνῦζηλ θαὶ γὰξ εἴ ηηο δπάδα πνηεῖ, ιέγσλ κέγα θαὶ κηθξὸλ
αὐηήλ, νὐζὲλ ἧηηνλ ηαὐηὸ πνηεῖ ηὴλ γὰξ ἑηέξαλ παξεῖδελ. ἡ κὲλ γὰξ ὑπνκέλνπζα
ζπλαηηία ηῇ κνξθῇ ηλ γηγλνκέλσλ ἐζηίλ, ὥζπεξ κήηεξἡ δ‘ ἑηέξα κνῖξα ηῆο
ἐλαληηώζεσο πνιιάθηο ἂλ θαληαζζείε ηῶ πξὸο ηὸ θαθνπνηὸλ αὐηῆο ἀηελίδνληη ηὴλ
δηάλνηαλ νὐδ‘ εἶλαη ηὸ παξάπαλ) (192a4-15).
Being and becoming are logically straightforward terms, but they are easily equivocated
and/or oversimplified when not discussed in terms of what is possible and/or not possible
for actual natural beings. In natural beings there are two senses of not-being, which
necessarily exist as part of the being of natural beings. On the one hand, the underlying
nature, or matter, of natural substantial beings, i.e. of the subject undergoing change, is
always ―not-being‖ in the sense that it is always ―not-x,y,z‖ where x,y,z represent various
qualitative predicates that it is only in potentiality but not in actuality. The man is not
musical, but in not being musical, he is potentially musical. In this sense, not being is not
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actual non-existence in a substantial sense. Rather, not-being in this sense signifies a
potentiality for that which is not-yet. The other sense of not-being is in the privation
itself, which is half of the contrary and one of the principles or archai of the nature of
natural beings. The privative form has no substantial existence. It is only when the
privative form is understood in conjunction with the underlying subject, i.e. with the
matter, that it becomes for the matter not-being with the potential for being.
Aristotle further discusses the relationship between matter and privative form
(192a25-33). Namely, he explains that the privative form is contained in the matter, and,
as such, it both (1) comes to be and ceases not to be, i.e. in the sense that the privative
form, when in the matter, is a potentiality for the positive form and this potentiality
allows for the matter to constantly become what it is not-yet, and (2) it does not come to
be and cease to be, i.e. substantially it remains what it is. Regarding the sense in which it
does not come to be and cease to be, Aristotle explains that if it did substantially come to
be and cease to be it would require a primary substratum, an underlying thing, itself.
Since he defines matter as ―the primary substratum of each thing, from which it comes to
be without qualification, and which persists in the result‖ (ιέγσ γὰξ ὕιελ ηὸ πξηνλ
ὑπνθείκελνλ ἑθάζηῳ, ἐμ νὗ γίγλεηαί ηη ἐλππάξρνληνο κὴ θαηὰ ζπκβεβεθόο) εἴηε
θζείξεηαη, εἰο ηνῦην ἀθίμεηαη ἔζραηνλ, ὥζηε ἐθζαξκέλε ἔζηαη πξὶλ θζαξῆλαη) (192a3334), it would not be possible that matter required a matter since the character of matter to
provide this substratum is precisely what makes it special. Aristotle concludes this
discussion asserting that an investigation into the first principle of form is outside of the
scope of a science of nature (πεξὶ δὲ ηῆο θαηὰ ηὸ εἶδνο ἀξρῆο, πόηεξνλ κία ἢ πνιιαὶ θαὶ
ηίο ἢ ηίλεο εἰζίλ, δη‘ ἀθξηβείαο ηῆο πξώηεο θηινζνθίαο ἔξγνλ ἐζηὶλ δηνξίζαη, ὥζη‘ εἰο
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ἐθεῖλνλ ηὸλ θαηξὸλ ἀπνθείζζσ) (192a36-192b1). We might assume that this is precisely
because the scientist has no empirical access to this subject, and natural science, as
Aristotle has ably demonstrated to us, requires not just explanation, but demonstration.
He then reaffirms the scope of his inquiry: the natural, i.e. perishable, forms (πεξὶ δὲ ηλ
θπζηθλ θαὶ θζαξηλ εἰδλ) (192b1). Put another way, Aristotle‘s subject here is
natural beings in so far as they undergo accidental change.
In sum, Aristotle has set up three absolutely crucial points in Physics i: (1)
becoming is a general term that we need to differentiate. Aristotle will do this primarily
in Physics iii 1 and in iv; (2) being is a general term that needs to be understood in terms
of substantial and accidental form, or in terms of potentiality and actuality; (3) in order to
understand these important distinctions in natural beings, we have to heed the external
stimuli that puts our perceptual faculties into motion. Otherwise, we could find ourselves
making perfectly valid or sound arguments in the order of explanation that immediately
do not follow when tested in the order of sense. Likewise, we need the order of
explanation to flesh out our immediate and confused perceptions, lest we be unable to
distinguish specific instantiations of a kind.
The final line of Physics i leads Aristotle‘s reader nearly to a re-beginning of the
work. When Aristotle has finished his treatment of the archai, he announces that it is
time for a ―fresh start‖ (δησξίζζσ ἡκῖλ νὕησο πάιηλ δ‘ ἄιιελ ἀξρὴλ ἀξμάκελνη ιέγσκελ)
(192b4). He begins Physics ii with one of the most important definitions in the entire
work. Aristotle defines nature, and he establishes for his reader what exactly sets apart a
natural object—the subject of investigation—from a non-natural object. The difference
between natural objects and non-natural objects is a difference in cause: natural objects
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come into being by way of ―natural‖ causes, and non-natural objects come into being by
way of other causes (Τλ ὄλησλ ηὰ κέλ ἐζηη θύζεη, ηὰ δὲ δη‘ ἄιιαο αἰηίαο) (192b9).
Natural objects have an inner principle of motion and rest with regard to the possibilities
for accidental change: (1) with respect to place, (2) with respect to quality, (3) with
respect to quantity (ηνύησλ κὲλ γὰξ ἕθαζηνλ ἐλ ἑαπηῶ ἀξρὴλ ἔρεη θηλήζεσο θαὶ ζηάζεσο,
ηὰ κὲλ θαηὰ ηόπνλ, ηὰ δὲ θαη‘ αὔμεζηλ θαὶ θζίζηλ) (192b13-22). Nature is something that
inheres in something, and by this Aristotle means this principle of motion and rest, i.e. of
contraries and the substance to which these contraries are predicated. Nature, then, is the
capability for self-locomotion, alteration, and increase/decrease, but this is only so
because the being with these capabilities is a natural substantial being, a subject. Nature
is two-fold. And, to investigate it, the physicist must attend both to the underlying
subject and also to the way it changes (kinêsis).

III.

The role of Kinêsis in Nature
In Physics iii, Aristotle‘s reader begins to reap the benefit of understanding

Aristotle‘s emphasis on scope, access, and method as well as the potentiality/actuality
distinction in the very being of natural beings in Physics i and how that led him to his
definition of nature as an inner principle of motion and rest in Physics ii. The subject of
motion, (θίλεζηο, kinêsis), in Physics iii clearly comes directly and inextricably out of
Aristotle‘s previous discussions. Aristotle writes: ―Nature is a principle of motion and
change, and it is the subject of our inquiry. We must therefore see that we understand
what motion is; for if it were unknown, nature too would be unknown‖ (πεὶ δ‘ ἡ θύζηο
κέλ ἐζηηλ ἀξρὴ θηλήζεσο θαὶ κεηαβνιῆο, ἡ δὲ κέζνδνο ἡκῖλ πεξὶ θύζεώο ἐζηη, δεῖ κὴ
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ιαλζάλεηλ ηί ἐζηη θίλεζηο ἀλαγθαῖνλ γὰξ ἀγλννπκέλεο αὐηῆο ἀγλνεῖζζαη θαὶ ηὴλ θύζηλ)
(200b12-14). If the scientist aims to know better the subject of her inquiry, i.e. the
nature of natural beings, and if the nature of natural beings is an inner principle of motion
and rest, then she ought to investigate what motion or accidental change (kinêsis) is and
just how it happens.
In addition to a discussion of kinêsis, Aristotle likewise intends to study those
things that may be related to or conditions of kinêsis. Aristotle explains, ―When we have
determined the nature of motion, our next task will be to attack in the same way the terms
which are involved in it‖ (δηνξηζακέλνηο δὲ πεξὶ θηλήζεσο πεηξαηένλ ηὸλ αὐηὸλ ἐπειζεῖλ
ηξόπνλ πεξὶ ηλ ἐθεμῆο) (200b15). 33 These terms involved with motion are thus
involved with natural beings insofar as it is the nature of natural beings to move. He will
deal with the infinite (ἄπεηξνλ) because ―motion is supposed to belong to the class of
things which are continuous (δνθεῖ δ‘ ἡ θίλεζηο εἶλαη ηλ ζπλερλ); and the infinite
presents itself first in the continuous—that is how it comes about that ‗infinite‘ is often
used in definitions of the continuous; for what is infinitely divisible is continuous.‖ After
the infinite, Aristotle will deal with three additional terms, place, void, and time (ηόπνπ
θαὶ θελνῦ θαὶ ρξόλνπ) because they ―are thought to be necessary conditions of motion‖
(ἄλεπ…θίλεζηλ ἀδύλαηνλ εἶλαη) (200b16-21).34 It may be the case that Aristotle‘s claims
about the relationship between motion and the infinite, place, void, and time, and thus his
claim that he should treat these topics in his physics, are presuppositions from the
33

The sense of this passage is that Aristotle will attempt to deal with the things that come
after kinêsis insofar as they become topics for physics because kinêsis is a topic for
physics. “Terms,” as the ROT calls these things, is not a perfect way of talking about
them. Nevertheless, for lack of a better name, I will refer to them as terms.
34
A more literal translation here would be simply that without place, void, and time,
motion is impossible (ἀδύλαηνλ).
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endoxa. Ross (Ross 1936, 534) explains, for example, that, ―It is not Aristotle‘s own
opinion that motion implies a void; he does not believe in the existence of a void…the
implication of a void is one of the endoxa, since it was insisted on by the atomists.‖
Judging by the language alone, this conclusion is not clear. Aristotle uses the term,
―δνθεῖ‖ to suggest a relationship between kinêsis and things that are continuous, but this
could simply mean ―it seems‖ based on first perceptions and is not necessarily a reference
to what others believed. But, when we consider both (1) the likelihood that Aristotle‘s
approach to investigating kinêsis will be parallel in method to his investigation of the
archai, which did begin with an examination of the endoxa, and (2) some of Aristotle‘s
predecessors did indeed espouse the relationship among motion and continuity, and
motion, the infinite, place, void, and time, we might conclude that the impetus for
Aristotle to treat the topics of the infinite, place, void, and time is indeed to contend with
the endoxa. Accordingly, he will proceed to temper their explanations with
demonstrations in order to come up with what appear to be the true conclusions.
Before moving on to speak first about kinêsis, Aristotle explains that the infinite,
void, place, and time are all common to the present inquiry and asserts that they will each
be dealt with in turn (δῆινλ νὖλ ὡο δηά ηε ηαῦηα, θαὶ δηὰ ηὸ πάλησλ εἶλαη θνηλὰ θαὶ
θαζόινπ ηαῦηα, ζθεπηένλ πξνρεηξηζακέλνηο πεξὶ ἑθάζηνπ ηνύησλ) (200b21-24). Hussey
(1983, 56) thinks that Aristotle intends to include kinêsis here as those things common to
the study of nature. For Hussey, Aristotle needed to justify the inclusion of these topics
in his general work on nature. But, given that Aristotle has just asserted the certain
relationship between nature and motion at 200b12-14, there seems no need to justify a
discussion of kinêsis, in particular. We have just supposed the other topics to be a carry
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over from the endoxa; Aristotle will later show us which of these are indeed appropriate
for inclusion in his physics.
Aristotle introduces his discussion of kinêsis with a characterization of three
different ways things exist: ―(1) what exists in a state of fulfilment only (ἔζηη δὴ [ηη] ηὸ
κὲλ ἐληειερείᾳ κόλνλ), (2) what exists as potential, (3) what exists as potential and also in
(ηὸ δὲ δπλάκεη θαὶ ἐληειερείᾳ), one being a ‗this‘, another ‗so much‘, a third ‗such‘, and
similarly in each of the other modes of the predication of being‖ (ηὸ κὲλ ηόδε ηη, ηὸ δὲ
ηνζόλδε, ηὸ δὲ ηνηόλδε, θαὶ ηλ ἄιισλ ηλ ηνῦ ὄληνο θαηεγνξηλ ὁκνίσο) (200b25-28).
We see at the start, then, how Aristotle‘s emphasis on the interplay between potentiality
and actuality in the being and becoming of natural objects is going to have immediate
application in his inquiry into the nature of kinêsis. Notice, though, that the second
category above, ―(2) what exists as potential‖ does not exist in the Greek. 35 Ross (1936,
534-535) explains ―the absence of the first ηὸ δὲ δπλάκεη as due to haplography‖; the
scribe simply forgot to write the phrase again. If we can explain the exclusion of the
phrase, and if Aristotle really did intend to distinguish a category of things that are just in
potential, Ross notes that this is a departure from his general doctrine. This is to say, that
what we see here is Aristotle deliberately adapting his general doctrine of potentiality, i.e.
that the nature of potentiality is to be fulfilled, to his physics. Ross suggests that Aristotle
does this in preparation to explain the infinite and the void. I will later argue that
Aristotle‘s allowance here will help to explain his theory of time as well. Since Aristotle
will shortly present us with his definition of kinêsis, Ross (Ross 1936, 535) believes it
relevant that Aristotle here opposes the unchangeable and the changeable: ―ηὸ κὲλ

35

According to the apparatus, ηὸ δὲ δπλάκεη does appear in the commentary tradition.
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ἐληειερείᾳ κόλνλ is that which is always actually what it ever is, in respect of substance,
size, quality, and the other categories (b27-28); ηὸ δὲ δπλάκεη θαὶ ἐληειερείᾳ is that
which passes from a state of potentiality to one of actuality in any of these respects.‖ The
difference between the two, then, is that the changeable is in part potentiality. Recall that
Aristotle previously emphasized the aspect of non-being in matter, insofar as matter has
the potential to change in any number of ways.
The differentiation Aristotle makes between the unchangeable and the changeable
then brings him to discuss the nature of kinêsis. Kinêsis is not a substantial being itself
with principles, elements, and causes to demarcate. Instead, he explains, ―there is no
such thing as motion over and above the things. It is always with respect to substance or
to quantity or to quality or to place that what changes changes‖ (νὐθ ἔζηη δὲ θίλεζηο παξὰ
ηὰ πξάγκαηα κεηαβάιιεη γὰξ ἀεὶ ηὸ κεηαβάιινλ ἢ θαη‘ νὐζίαλ ἢ θαηὰ πνζὸλ ἢ θαηὰ
πνηὸλ ἢ θαηὰ ηόπνλ) (200b32). Kinêsis is nothing over and above the natural beings; it
describes the principle way of being for natural beings—as both dunamis and
entelecheia. Motion is that which nature does, by its very definition. And, it is our
observation of motion that alerts us to the nature of natural beings. The wording Aristotle
holds onto in Physics i, of a more general notion of becoming (gignomenon), exists over
and above nature, but kinêsis in this context does not. When Aristotle famously defines
motion in Physics iii first as ―The fulfilment of what exists potentially, in so far as it
exists potentially, is motion‖ (ἡ ηνῦ δπλάκεη ὄληνο ἐληειέρεηα, ᾗ ηνηνῦηνλ, θίλεζίο ἐζηηλ)
(201a10-11), then as ―It is the fulfilment of what is potential when it is already fully real
and operates not as itself but as movable, that is motion‖ (ἡ δὲ ηνῦ δπλάκεη ὄληνο
<ἐληειέρεηα>, ὅηαλ ἐληειερείᾳ ὂλ ἐλεξγῇ νὐρ ᾗ αὐηὸ ἀιι‘ ᾗ θηλεηόλ, θίλεζίο ἐζηηλ)
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(201a27-29), and finally as, ―the fulfilment of the movable qua movable‖ (ἡ θίλεζηο
ἐληειέρεηα ηνῦ θηλεηνῦ, ᾗ θηλεηόλ) (202a7-8), he is not describing an abstract concept
only tangentially related to nature.
How to understand Aristotle‘s use of the term entelecheia in the definition of
kinêsis is debated in the literature, i.e. what Aristotle meant to convey in defining motion
(in part) as dunamis ontos entelecheia. Deciding what entelecheia means here is crucial
to recognizing the emphasis Aristotle is placing on potentiality in his definition of kinêsis.
Entelecheia was traditionally translated, ―actualization‖ (see for example Ross 1936,
537). This translation renders the first definition of kinêsis: ―The actualization of what
exists potentially, in so far as it exists potentially.‖ For Kosman (Kosman 1969, 40),
―‗Actualization‘ is an inelegant and in many ways misleading rendering of entelecheia‖
and understanding entelecheia in this way leads to, ―two independent and unhappy
accounts of Aristotle‘s definition of motion. On one account, Aristotle is under-stood to
be defining motion as the actualization (process) of a poten-tiality into an actuality; on
the other, he is understood to be defining motion as the actuality (product) of a
potentiality to be in motion‖ ( Kosman 1969, 45). According to Kosman (Kosman 1969,
46), the way out of the traditional and problematic reading of entelecheia in Aristotle‘s
definition of motion is to, ―construct an account more svelte which (1) recognizes that
Aristotle‘s definition talks about the actuality of a potentiality, (2) recognizes that
potentiality as a potentiality to be, e.g. the potentiality of bricks and stones to be a house,
but (3) yields motion and not its result, i.e., the act of building and not the house which is
its product.‖ Sachs (Sachs 2010, 8), who agrees with Kosman, also illustrates the
importance of highlighting the potential aspect of kinêsis: ―The growth of the puppy is
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not the actualization of its potentiality to be a dog, but the actuality of that potentiality as
a potentiality.‖ The emphasis here is on potentiality as a kind of being, an actual state of
being. Kosman (Kosman 1969, 56) wants us to understand Aristotle‘s definition of
motion therefore as: ―the functioning, the full manifesting of a potentiality qua
potentiality, or more precisely, the functioning of a being which is potential as that
potential being.‖ Aristotle‘s definition of kinêsis calls attention to the realness of
potentiality—when something is in motion, it is actually a potentiality and not only a
process of becoming something else.36
In his discussion of the definition of kinêsis (201a10-202b29) Aristotle elaborates
on the relationship between potentiality/actuality in natural beings, emphasizing the
character of potentiality in the ways these beings exist, and explains the relationship
between the mover and the moveable in kinêsis. He demonstrates these concepts with
three paradigmatic examples, (1) the subject of sickness and health, (2) the house being
built, and (3) the simultaneity of teaching and learning. He begins then with the
potentiality/actuality relationship: ―the same thing can be both potential and fulfilled, not
indeed at the same time or not in the same respect, but e.g. potentially hot and actually
cold‖ (ἐπεὶ δ‘ ἔληα ηαὐηὰ θαὶ δπλάκεη θαὶ ἐληειερείᾳ ἐζηίλ, νὐρ ἅκα δὲ ἢ νὐ θαηὰ ηὸ αὐηό,
ἀιι‘ νἷνλ ζεξκὸλ κὲλ ἐληειερείᾳ ςπρξὸλ δὲ δπλάκεη) (201a20-21). Highlighting the
aspect of potentiality, so crucial to kinêsis, Aristotle solves the Pre-Socratic problem of
non-contradiction. The fire can be hot and cold at the same time, for example, if we
understand it to be potentially one and actually the other. Aristotle is harking back to his
argument in Physics i 5 where he defended the Pre-Socratic claim that principles are
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Broadie (1982), Hussey (1993), and Coope (2008) all defend this view as well.
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contraries. Here, he advances this defense, but he now shows explicitly (previously, he
referenced Meta. theta) that contraries can exist simultaneously, given that they are
understood to exist in two different potencies. When the fire is actually hot, it is
potentially cold. But, the implication here is that it is not at rest being hot; rather, it is in
motion on its way to being cold. It is actually hot, but it is also actually potentially cold.
It is this reasoning that allows Aristotle to connect his arguments about kinêsis to
his argument from Physics i 7 about the fundamental principles of nature. If the archai of
natural objects are three, and if nature is an inner principle of motion and rest, then he
needs to show that the principles somehow require kinêsis. After all, kinêsis is so
integrally important to nature that it is only by way of kinêsis that one knows the nature
of natural beings and yet only by way of things that kinêsis exists. When he is explaining
the definition of kinêsis, then, it is no surprise that Aristotle shows contraries to
exemplify perfectly the way kinêsis works with the principle of non-contradiction. He
demonstrates this point with the first of three paradigmatic examples in this section:
To be capable of health and to be capable of illness are not the same; for if they
were there would be no difference between being ill and being well. Yet the
subject both of health and of sickness—whether it is humour or blood—is one and
the same (δῆινλ δ‘ ἐπὶ ηλ ἐλαληίσλ ηὸ κὲλ γὰξ δύλαζζαη ὑγηαίλεηλ θαὶ δύλαζζαη
θάκλεηλ ἕηεξνλ-θαὶ γὰξ ἂλ ηὸ θάκλεηλ θαὶ ηὸ ὑγηαίλεηλ ηαὐηὸλ ἦλ—ηὸ δὲ
ὑπνθείκελνλ θαὶ ηὸ ὑγηαῖλνλ θαὶ ηὸ λνζνῦλ, εἴζ‘ ὑγξόηεο εἴζ‘ αἷκα, ηαὐηὸλ θαὶ ἕλ)
(201a33-201b2).
Again, we see the three principles, which were argued for in Physics i: two contraries and
the underlying subject. Whatever is said to be healthy or ill stays the same, but the
qualities of actual health and potential illness are two, i.e. they are not the same. To be
actually one and potentially the same are two separate qualities. If they were two parts of
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the same quality, then Aristotle could have been content calling the contrary principles,
―one‖ instead of ―two.‖
The potentiality exists as an actuality itself, not as an actualization. Aristotle
demonstrates this in terms of his famous house-building example (201b6-15):
For each thing of this kind is capable of being at one time actual, at another not.
Take for instance the buildable as buildable. The actuality of the buildable as
buildable is the process of building. For the actuality of the buildable must be
either this or the house. But when there is a house, the buildable is no longer
buildable. On the other hand, it is the buildable which is being built. The process
then of being built must be the kind of actuality required. But building is a kind of
motion, and the same account will apply to the other kinds also (γὰξ ἕθαζηνλ ὁηὲ
κὲλ ἐλεξγεῖλ ὁηὲ δὲ κή, νἷνλ ηὸ νἰθνδνκεηόλ, θαὶ ἡ ηνῦ νἰθνδνκεηνῦ ἐλέξγεηα, ᾗ
νἰθνδνκεηόλ, νἰθνδόκεζίο ἐζηηλ (ἢ γὰξ νἰθνδόκεζηο ἡ ἐλέξγεηα [ηνῦ
νἰθνδνκεηνῦ] ἢ ἡ νἰθία ἀιι‘ ὅηαλ νἰθία ᾖ, νὐθέη‘ νἰθνδνκεηὸλ ἔζηηλ νἰθνδνκεῖηαη
δὲ ηὸ νἰθνδνκεηόλ ἀλάγθε νὖλ νἰθνδόκεζηλ ηὴλ ἐλέξγεηαλ εἶλαη) ἡ δ‘
νἰθνδόκεζηο θίλεζίο ηηο. ἀιιὰ κὴλ ὁ αὐηὸο ἐθαξκόζεη ιόγνο θαὶ ἐπὶ ηλ ἄιισλ
θηλήζεσλ).
The actuality of the process of building exists simultaneously with, yet is different from,
the potentiality for the materials to become a house. In the process of building, the house
does not fully exist in actuality; it is as yet incomplete. The house exists in potentiality
even in the building materials, and the process of building with these materials is the
actuality of this potentiality.
In the background here is another distinction between the relations that make
motion possible, namely the relationship between the mover and the moveable. Without
both, there can be no kinêsis. We know that natural objects are capable of kinêsis, for
motion means nothing over and above these objects. For this reason, Aristotle writes that
―motion is in the moveable. It is the fulfillment of this potentiality by the action of that
which has the power of causing motion‖ (202a12-15). The potentiality for kinêsis, is
always already in that which can be moved.

When there is motion, there is an actuality
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of this potentiality, which aligns with the actuality of that which moves the moveable.
The actuality of the potentiality for what can be moved and the actuality of that which
moves are thus simultaneous but in the sense that they are two sides of one coin, i.e. they
are both directed toward one end. Aristotle indicates this unusual relationship between
mover and moved when he writes (202a15-20):
…and the actuality of that which has the power of causing motion is not other
than the actuality of the mover (θαὶ ἡ ηνῦ θηλεηηθνῦ δὲ ἐλέξγεηα νὐθ ἄιιε ἐζηίλ);
for it must be the fulfillment of both (ἐληειέρεηαλ ἀκθνῖλ)…Hence there is a
single actuality of both alike, just as one to two and two to one are the same
interval, and the steep ascent and the steep descent are one—for these are one and
the same, although their definitions are not one (ἀιι‘ ἔζηηλ ἐλεξγεηηθὸλ ηνῦ
θηλεηνῦ, ὥζηε ὁκνίσο κία ἡ ἀκθνῖλ ἐλέξγεηα ὥζπεξ ηὸ αὐηὸ δηάζηεκα ἓλ πξὸο
δύν θαὶ δύν πξὸο ἕλ, θαὶ ηὸ ἄλαληεο θαὶ ηὸ θάηαληεο ηαῦηα γὰξ ἓλ κέλ ἐζηηλ, ὁ
κέληνη ιόγνο νὐρ εἷο ὁκνίσο).
Again, Aristotle puts himself in a situation where he seems to be advocating a logical
impossibility, contrary to what the endoxa would have argued. He goes on to explain,
however, that while there is a sense in which the action of the mover (agent) and the
moveable (patient) are one and the same, they are fundamentally different. The difference
lies in the source, i.e. the potentiality and actuality for moving something lies in the
agent, and the potentiality and actuality of movement lies in the patient. And the source
relates directly to the sense in which Aristotle means actuality here. Namely, actuality of
two things can be the same in any given instant, if actuality is meant in two different
senses. This is the same argument we saw Aristotle advancing in Physics i 7 with regard
to contraries. He is playing with the principle of non-contradiction in that he is showing
that there is a fundamental difference in being between potential and actuality.
Aristotle appeals to the example of teaching and learning (202b3-10). Teaching
requires a relationship between someone teaching and someone being taught. The
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teacher has a potentiality to teach and the learner has the potentiality to be taught. In this
scenario, the teacher is the agent, and the learner is the patient. When the teacher actually
teaches the student, the effect is that the student actually learns something. To say that
teaching and learning is the same does not mean that to learn and to teach are the same
thing; rather, the teaching and the learning are occurring simultaneously. The learning is
happening because the teaching is happening, but the teaching could not be happening if
the potential for learning were not already in the learner, nor if the learner were absent.
Learning happens in so far as the agent/patient relation between teacher and student
exists in actuality.
Aristotle rounds out his discussion of kinêsis with a sample definition of
qualitative motion: ―alteration is the fulfillment (entelecheia) of the alterable as alterable
(or, more scientifically, the fulfillment of what can act and what can be acted on, as
such)‖ (202b24-26). He then concludes that all kinds (e.g. quantitative, locomotive) of
motion will be defined in a similar fashion.

IV.

From Kinêsis to Chronos
In Physics iii 4 Aristotle turns to the first common term thought to be associated

with kinêsis, the infinite (ἄπεηξνλ, apeiron). He will then go on to discuss place, void,
and time. As he transitions from his discussion of kinêsis to his investigation of these
topics, he echoes his statements at 200b21-24 that these subjects are of concern to the
science of nature. He confirms that his support for this comes from the tradition; all
previous natural philosophers had considered the infinite to be not only a topic of their
study, but also a principle of beings (ζεκεῖνλ δ‘ ὅηη ηαύηεο ηῆο ἐπηζηήκεο νἰθεία ἡ
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ζεσξία ἡ πεξὶ αὐηνῦ πάληεο γὰξ νἱ δνθνῦληεο ἀμηνιόγσο ἧθζαη ηῆο ηνηαύηεο θηινζνθίαο
πεπνίεληαη ιόγνλ πεξὶ ηνῦ ἀπείξνπ, θαὶ πάληεο ὡο ἀξρήλ ηηλα ηηζέαζη ηλ ὄλησλ)
(202b30-203a4).
It is crucial to understand Aristotle‘s study of the infinite, as it will be with all
subsequent topics thought to be related to motion, within the context of his previous
arguments. Aristotle has essentially argued that natural science must take account of the
principle role potentiality plays in the being of natural self-subsistent beings. Whereas,
this fact may have eluded an a priori philosopher of nature, Aristotle has used examples
from empirical experience to show that potentiality, while not always actualized, is actual
(entelecheia) in nature. If we do not understand the interplay between potentiality and
actuality, we are at a loss for understanding the archai of nature, the distinction between
Aristotle‘s three types of beings—actuality only, potentiality only, and that which is both
potentiality and actuality (cf. 200b25-28), the definition of kinêsis, and so too, the
important distinction between moveable and moved. If we miss the relative novelty of
what he has been arguing regarding potentiality and actuality, especially that he sets
himself apart from the endoxa in the emphasis he places on potentiality—both that there
are beings that are just potentiality and that the potentiality inherent in the matter of
natural beings allows them to be what they are, i.e. to change, then we fall into the trap of
the Pre-Socratic physicists who saw only contradiction in the face of topics where
something could exist alongside its contrary. What Aristotle is going to show here is that
these terms thought to be associated with, and perhaps conditions (cf. 200b20) of kinêsis,
thought to be so crucial in the study of nature, exist largely, if not always as is the case
with infinity and void, as potentiality. He is going to steer us away from thinking of the
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infinite, place, void, and time as being in some sense self-subsistent natural beings
(νὐζίαλ αὐηὸ ὂλ) themselves.
Aristotle will treat the infinite first precisely because it was previously thought to
be an archē of beings, and if motion, place, void, and time are all beings, then we might
believe them to be infinite beings. Aristotle will oppose the view that the infinite is an
archē of beings and argue that the infinite is in fact nothing ―real‖ at all. Likely due to its
relative importance for understanding the other terms thought to be associated with
kinêsis, Aristotle‘s treatise on the infinite is the longest when compared with his treatises
on place, void, and time.
His treatment of the infinite begins with a line of questioning that we will find
standard in his entire treatment of the terms of kinêsis: whether or not there is such a
thing as the infinite (202b35-36). 37 This question of course recalls the doctrine of the
endoxa, which has taught that motion, infinity, void, place, and time are all real, i.e.
actual self-subsistent natural beings qua themselves. Aristotle asks whether there is such
a being, for each in turn, as a rhetorical question because he will show that there is not
such a being in the sense that the endoxa has agreed that there is. He will follow up that
question inquiring into the manner of its existence and what it is. 38

37

I think Heinemann (Heinemann 2012, 5) rightly suggests that Aristotle‟s approach here
follows Posterior Analytics ii 1, 89b24-5: ―We seek four things: the fact, the reason why,
if it is, what it is‖ (δεηνῦκελ δὲ ηέηηαξα, ηὸ ὅηη, ηὸ δηόηη, εἰ ἔζηη, ηί ἐζηηλ.). Heinemann
writes, ―Aristotle‘s point in asking the question as to ―if it is‖ is just to secure some
subject matter of inquiry to exist.‖
38
At the start of his discussion of kinêsis, we do not find this question. The question as
to whether motion exists was not asked, since it had been previously established that the
principle of nature was an inner principle of motion and rest (192b13-22). ―Nature is a
principle of motion and change, and it is the subject of our inquiry. We must therefore
see that we understand what motion is; for if it were unknown, nature too would be
unknown‖ (πεὶ δ‘ ἡ θύζηο κέλ ἐζηηλ ἀξρὴ θηλήζεσο θαὶ κεηα βνιῆο, ἡ δὲ κέζνδνο ἡκῖλ
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Aristotle‘s treatise on the infinite, not unlike his previous arguments for (1) the
archai of the nature of natural beings and (2) the definition of kinêsis, begins with the
endoxa, will first consider the explanation of the endoxa and then add demonstration to
arrive at true conclusions about the science of nature.
The Pythagoreans and Plato both held the infinite to be a ―self-subsistent
substance‖ (νὐζίαλ αὐηὸ ὂλ) instead of an attribute of something else (ζπκβεβεθόο ηηλη)
(203a4-5). The Pythagoreans believed that the infinite could be found in natural objects
accessible to the scientist‘s investigation; the Platonists agreed with this general idea and
for the latter it could be found both in these objects as well as in the Forms. For the PreSocratic physicists, the infinite is likened to the divine, reported by Aristotle to have been
thought of as ‗immortal and imperishable‘ (ἀζάλαηνλ θαὶ ἀλώιεζξνλ) (203b13-14).
Aristotle dismisses these ideas and cites five plausible arguments for the existence of the
infinite: (1) from time; (2) from the division of magnitudes; (3) as the source of all
generation and corruption; (4) against ultimate limits, since limits are always relative; (5)
with regard to number, mathematical magnitudes, and that which is outside the
heavens—infinite body (203b15-25). He goes on to show problems present themselves
whether one is arguing for or against the existence of the infinite. First of all, there are
different senses in which the infinite might be said to exist, e.g. as a substance, as an
accident, or as something else altogether. He will begin by arguing against that the
infinite can exist as substance separate from natural objects. The argument, which I have
set out in standard form below, goes as follows (204a8-29):

πεξὶ θύζεώο ἐζηη, δεῖ κὴ ιαλζάλεηλ ηί ἐζηη θίλεζηο ἀλαγθαῖνλ γὰξ ἀγλννπκέλεο αὐηῆο
ἀγλνεῖζζαη θαὶ ηὴλ θύζηλ) (200b12-14). Thus, it was clear that motion exists. Aristotle
needed then to establish in what way it existed.
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Now it is impossible that the infinite should be a thing which is itself infinite,
separable from sensible objects. If the infinite is neither a magnitude nor an
aggregate, but is itself a substance and not an attribute, it will be indivisible; for
the divisible must be either a magnitude or an aggregate. But if indivisible, then
not infinite, except in the sense (1) in which the voice is ‗invisible‘. But this is not
the sense in which it is used by those who say that the infinite exists, nor that in
which we are investigating it, namely as (2) ‗that which cannot be gone through‘.
But if the infinite exists as an attribute, it would not be, qua infinite an element in
substances, any more than the invisible would be an element of speech, though
the voice is invisible. Further, how can the infinite be itself any thing, unless both
number and magnitude, of which it is an essential attribute, exist in that way? If
they are not substances, a fortiori the infinite is not. It is plain, too, that the infinite
cannot be an actual thing and a substance and principle. For any part of it that is
taken will be infinite, if it has parts: for ‗to be infinite‘ and ‗the infinite‘ are the
same, if it is a substance and not predicated of a subject. Hence it will be either
indivisible or divisible into infinites. But the same thing cannot be many infinites.
(Yet just as part of air is air, so a part of the infinite would be infinite, if it is
supposed to be a substance and principle.) Therefore the infinite must be without
parts and indivisible. But this cannot be true of what is infinite in full completion:
for it must be a definite quantity. (Χσξηζηὸλ κὲλ νὖλ εἶλαη ηὸ ἄπεηξνλ ηλ
αἰζζεηλ, αὐηό ηη ὂλ ἄπεηξνλ, νὐρ νἷόλ ηε. εἰ γὰξ κήηε κέγεζόο ἐζηηλ κήηε
πιῆζνο, ἀιι‘ νὐζία αὐηό ἐζηη ηὸ ἄπεηξνλ θαὶ κὴ ζπκβεβε θόο, ἀδηαίξεηνλ ἔζηαη
(ηὸ γὰξ δηαηξεηὸλ ἢ κέγεζνο ἔζηαη ἢ πιῆζνο) εἰ δὲ ηνηνῦηνλ, νὐθ ἄπεηξνλ, εἰ κὴ ὡο
ἡ θσλὴ ἀόξαηνο. ἀιι‘ νὐρ νὕησο νὔηε θαζὶλ εἶλαη νἱ θάζθνληεο εἶλαη ηὸ ἄπεηξνλ
νὔηε ἡκεῖο δεηνῦκελ, ἀιι‘ ὡο ἀδηεμίηεηνλ. εἰ δὲ θαηὰ ζπκβεβεθὸο ἔζηηλ ηὸ
ἄπεηξνλ, νὐθ ἂλ εἴε ζηνηρεῖνλ ηλ ὄλησλ, ᾗ ἄπεηξνλ, ὥζπεξ νὐδὲ ηὸ ἀόξαηνλ ηῆο
δηαιέθηνπ, θαίηνη ἡ θσλή ἐζηηλ ἀόξαηνο. ἔηη πο ἐλδέρεηαη εἶλαί ηη αὐηὸ ἄπεηξνλ,
εἴπεξ κὴ θαὶ ἀξηζκὸλ θαὶ κέγεζνο, ὧλ ἐζηη θαζ‘ αὑηὸ πάζνο ηη ηὸ ἄπεηξνλ; ἔηη γὰξ
ἧηηνλ ἀλάγθε ἢ ηὸλ ἀξηζκὸλ ἢ ηὸ κέγεζνο. θαλεξὸλ δὲ θαὶ ὅηη νὐθ ἐλδέρεηαη
εἶλαη ηὸ ἄπεηξνλ ὡο ἐλεξγείᾳ ὂλ θαὶ ὡο νὐζίαλ θαὶ ἀξρήλ ἔζηαη γὰξ ὁηηνῦλ αὐηνῦ
ἄπεηξνλ ηὸ ιακβαλόκελνλ, εἰ κεξηζηόλ (ηὸ γὰξ ἀπείξῳ εἶλαη θαὶ ἄπεηξνλ ηὸ αὐηό,
εἴπεξ νὐζία ηὸ ἄπεηξνλ θαὶ κὴ θαζ‘ ὑπνθεηκέλνπ), ὥζη‘ ἢ ἀδηαίξεηνλ ἢ εἰο ἄπεηξα
δηαηξεηόλ πνιιὰ δ‘ ἄπεηξα εἶλαη ηὸ αὐηὸ ἀδύλαηνλ (ἀιιὰ κὴλ ὥζπεξ ἀέξνο ἀὴξ
κέξνο, νὕησ θαὶ ἄπεηξνλ ἀπείξνπ, εἴ γε νὐζία ἐζηὶ θαὶ ἀξρή) ἀκέξηζηνλ ἄξα θαὶ
ἀδηαίξεηνλ. ἀιι‘ ἀδύλαηνλ ηὸ ἐληειερείᾳ ὂλ ἄπεηξνλ πνζὸλ γάξ ηη εἶλαη
ἀλαγθαῖνλ.
P1: Whatever is divisible is a magnitude (κέγεζνο) or multitude (πιῆζνο).
P2: If the infinite is neither a magnitude nor a multitude, but substance (νὐζία)
and not accident (ζπκβεβεθὸο), it will be indivisible (ἀδηαίξεηνλ).
P3: If something is indivisible it is not infinite.
Therefore, the infinite cannot exist qua substance.
P1: The infinite is a property in itself of number (ἀξηζκὸs) and magnitude
(κέγεζνο).
P2: There is no number qua itself, nor magnitude qua itself
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P3: There is even less necessity for the infinite to exist qua infinite as for
number or magnitude to exist qua themselves.
Therefore, the infinite cannot exist qua itself, i.e. as substance.
P1: If the infinite is substance and not predicated of a subject, to be
infinite and the infinite are the same.
Therefore, the parts of what is infinite are also infinite.
P1: The parts of what is infinite are also infinite
P2: The same thing cannot be many infinites.
P3: The infinite must be a definite quantity.
Therefore, the infinite will be without parts and indivisible,
so it cannot be an actual thing, substance, or principle.
Since Aristotle concludes that the infinite cannot be an actual thing, substance, or
principle, he next considers that the infinite could exist accidentally, as a predicable
being. Aristotle quickly shows that this is impossible, as that which is accidental cannot
be an archē (ἀιι‘ εἰ νὕησο, εἴξεηαη ὅηη νὐθ ἐλδέρεηαη αὐηὸ ιέγεηλ ἀξρήλ, ἀιι‘ ᾧ
ζπκβέβεθε, ηὸλ ἀέξα ἢ ηὸ ἄξηηνλ) (204a30-31). A principle, as he argued earlier (203b45), is a source and cannot be traced back further to a more primordial source. Thus,
Aristotle successfully contends with the endoxa—in this case the Pythagoreans whose
characterization of the infinite Aristotle shows to be self-contradictory: ―With the same
breath they treat the infinite as substance, and divide it into parts‖ (ἅκα γὰξ νὐζίαλ
πνηνῦζη ηὸ ἄπεηξνλ θαὶ κεξίδνπζη).
Finally, Aristotle wonders whether the infinite could exist in an alternative way,
e.g. ―present in mathematical objects and things which are intelligible and do not have
extension‖ (εἰ ἐλδέρεηαη ἄπεηξνλ θαὶ ἐλ ηνῖο καζεκαηηθνῖο εἶλαη θαὶ ἐλ ηνῖο λνεηνῖο θαὶ
κεδὲλ ἔρνπζη κέγεζνο) (204a35-204b1). There is suddenly a bit of confusion, however,
as Aristotle wants to stick to the aim of his treatise and subject of his inquiry, i.e. to
natural objects. Again, he works to show that there are no natural objects known by
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sense that can increase infinitely.

A body cannot be infinite, if we define body as

―bounded by a surface‖ (204b5-6) and infinite as ―boundlessly extended‖ (204b20), nor
can number since for Aristotle and the Greeks (see Klein 1969), number is not a symbolic
expression, but that which is numerable. 39 A second argument goes as follows, with the
standard form set out below (204b11-24):
The infinite body must be either (1) compound, or (2) simple; yet neither
alternative is possible. (1) Compound the infinite body will not be, if the
elements are finite in number. For they must be more than one, and the contraries
must always balance, and no one of them can be infinite. If one of the bodies falls
in any degree short of the other in potency—suppose fire is finite in amount while
air is infinite and a given quantity of fire exceeds in power the same amount of air
in any ratio provided it is numerically definite—the infinite body will obviously
prevail over and annihilate the finite body. On the other hand, it is impossible that
each should be infinite. ‗Body‘ is what has extension in all directions and the
infinite is what is boundlessly extended, so that the infinite body would be
extended in all directions ad infinitum. Nor (2) can the infinite body be one and
simple, whether it is, as some hold, a thing over and above the elements (from
which they generate the elements) or is not thus qualified. (νὔηε γὰξ ζύλζεηνλ
νἷόλ ηε εἶλαη νὔηε ἁπινῦλ. ζύλζεηνλ κὲλ νὖλ νὐθ ἔζηαη ηὸ ἄπεηξνλ ζκα, εἰ
πεπεξαζκέλα ηῶ πιήζεη ηὰ ζηνηρεῖα. ἀλάγθε γὰξ πιείσ εἶλαη, θαὶ ἰζάδεηλ ἀεὶ
ηἀλαληία, θαὶ κὴ εἶλαη ἓλ αὐηλ ἄπεηξνλ (εἰ γὰξ ὁπνζῳνῦλ ιείπεηαη ἡ ἐλ ἑλὶ
ζώκαηη δύλακηο ζαηέξνπ, νἷνλ εἰ ηὸ πῦξ πεπέξαληαη, ὁ δ‘ ἀὴξ ἄπεηξνο, ἔζηηλ δὲ ηὸ
ἴζνλ πῦξ ηνῦ ἴζνπ ἀέξνο ηῇ δπλάκεη ὁπνζαπιαζηνλνῦλ, κόλνλ δὲ ἀξηζκόλ ηηλα
ἔρνλ, ὅκσο θαλεξὸλ ὅηη ηὸ ἄπεηξνλ ὑπεξβαιεῖ θαὶ θζεξεῖ ηὸ πεπεξαζκέλνλ)
ἕθαζηνλ δ‘ ἄπεηξνλ εἶλαη ἀδύλαηνλ ζκα κὲλ γάξ ἐζηηλ ηὸ πάληῃ ἔρνλ δηάζηαζηλ,
ἄπεηξνλ δὲ ηὸ ἀπεξάλησο δηεζηεθόο, ὥζηε ηὸ ἄπεηξνλ ζκα παληαρῇ ἔζηαη
δηεζηεθὸο εἰο ἄπεηξνλ. ἀιιὰ κὴλ νὐδὲ ἓλ θαὶ ἁπινῦλ εἶλαη ζκα ἄπεηξνλ
ἐλδέρεηαη, νὔηε ὡο ιέγνπζί ηηλεο ηὸ παξὰ ηὰ ζηνηρεῖα, ἐμ νὗ ηαῦηα γελλζηλ, νὔζ‘
ἁπιο.).
P1: The infinite can be either compound, or simple.
P2: If the elements are finite in number, the infinite will not be compound.
P3: The elements must be finite in number.
39

As Ross (Ross 1936, 541) notes, “When Aristotle says (Met. 987b27) that the
Pythagoreans identified real things with numbers, it is not to be supposed that they
reduced reality to an abstraction, but rather that they did not recognize the abstract nature
of numbers. What they were doing was little more than to state that the characteristics of
things depended, to a large extent, on the number and the numerical relations of their
components.” Hussey (Hussey 1983, 88) reminds us that Aristotle is only talking about
positive integers here.
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Therefore, the infinite cannot be compound.
P4: If one element were infinite, the others by now would have ceased.
P5: There is no existent thing alongside the elements, which is itself
infinite.
Therefore, the infinite is not simple either.
Having thus dismissed the possibility that the infinite is either a simple or
compound body, seemingly ruling out that it is any kind of body at all, Aristotle
nonetheless provides additional arguments as to why the infinite cannot be a sensible
body. A sensible body has many things predicated of it: quantity, quality, place, relation.
What is infinite is not predicated in these ways, as categories are limits and the infinite is
by definition unlimited. Finally, he concludes: ―It is plain from these arguments that
there is no body which is actually infinite‖ (ὅηη κὲλ νὖλ ἐλεξγείᾳ νὐθ ἔζηη ζκα ἄπεηξνλ,
θαλεξὸλ ἐθ ηνύησλ.) (206a7-8). Thus, he begins again to consider that infinity exists in
some other way. It must be the case that it does, Aristotle claims, as the consequences of
its non-existence are impossible to imagine (Ὅηη δ‘ εἰ κὴ ἔζηηλ ἄπεηξνλ ἁπιο, πνιιὰ
ἀδύλαηα ζπκβαίλεη): (1) that there is a beginning and end to time; (2) a magnitude will
not be divisible into magnitudes; (3) number will not be infinite (δῆινλ. ηνῦ ηε γὰξ
ρξόλνπ ἔζηαη ηηο ἀξρὴ θαὶ ηειεπηή, θαὶ ηὰ κεγέζε νὐ δηαηξεηὰ εἰο κεγέζε, θαὶ ἀξηζκὸο
νὐθ ἔζηαη ἄπεηξνο. ὅηαλ δὲ δησξηζκέλσλ νὕησο κεδεηέξσο θαίλεηαη ἐλδέρεζζαη,
δηαηηεηνῦ δεῖ, θαὶ δῆινλ ὅηη πὼο κὲλ ἔζηηλ πὼο δ‘ νὔ.) (206a9-11). What this amounts to,
then, is that while, per Aristotle‘s arguments, there is a sense in which the infinite does
not exist, i.e. as a sensible body, substance, or predicate, there is also a sense in which the
infinite does exist. When we consider this in terms of the division of being Aristotle
initially set out—actuality only, potentiality only, and that which is both potentiality and
actuality (cf. 200b25-28)—it seems clear that we can rule out two possibilities. The
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infinite is in no way actuality, neither actuality itself, nor actuality and potentiality.
Therefore, the infinite must exist as potentiality exclusively. 40
The difference between potentiality in the case of the infinite, as opposed to the
ways in which any substantial being can potentially change itself to be predicated by any
contrary from whatever is a current actual predication (e.g. a non-musical man is
potentially musical), is that whatever is infinite will never become actualized. Aristotle
illustrates this point when he admonishes, ―but we must not construe potential existence
in the way we do when we say that it is possible for this to be a statue—this will be a
statue, but something infinite will not be in actuality‖ (Οὐ δεῖ δὲ ηὸ δπλάκεη ὂλ
ιακβάλεηλ, ὥζπεξ εἰ δπλαηὸλ ηνῦη‘ ἀλδξηάληα εἶλαη, ὡο θαὶ ἔζηαη ηνῦη‘ ἀλδξηάο, νὕησ
θαὶ ἄπεηξνλ ὃ ἔζηαη ἐλεξγείᾳ.) (206a19-21). The infinite is only ever actual in
potentiality; there is no point of actualization. Rather, what Aristotle means by ―infinite‖
is similar to the sense of being one intends when saying, ―it is day or it is the games‖
(206a22). Aristotle is thus demonstrating his claim that the infinite is not a substantial
being, principle, or sensible body; it is not a subject, i.e. ―a this‖ (ηὸ ἄπεηξνλ νὐ δεῖ
ιακβάλεηλ ὡο ηόδε ηη), but ―a process of coming to be or passing away‖ (ἀιι‘ ἀεὶ ἐλ
γελέζεη ἢ θζνξᾶ, πεπεξαζκέλνλ) (206a29-33).41 Aristotle thus describes the infinite as
that which, ―has this mode of existence: one thing is always being taken after another,
and each thing that is taken is always finite, but always different‖ (Ὅισο κὲλ γὰξ νὕησο
ἔζηηλ ηὸ ἄπεηξνλ, ηῶ ἀεὶ ἄιιν θαὶ ἄιιν ιακβάλεζζαη, θαὶ ηὸ ιακβαλόκελνλ κὲλ ἀεὶ εἶλαη

40

It is for this reason that one may say that for Aristotle there is a sense in which the
infinite does not exist; see for example Heinemann 2012, 5.
41
Following Ross, 206a29-34 is bracketed in the ROT. Since Ross excises the bracketed
sentence as an alternative version of 206a18-29 (ROT, 351), I refer to the sentence
seemingly out of order to help explain what Aristotle is saying at 206a23-25.
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πεπεξαζκέλνλ, ἀιι‘ ἀεί γε ἕηεξνλ θαὶ ἕηεξνλ.) (206a27-29). In this sense, what Aristotle
describes as infinite seems to name an intrinsic aspect of the nature of natural beings—
there is ever the possibility of accidental change as long as they exist.
Insofar as the infinite is for Aristotle a characterization of a potentiality of a thing,
the infinite, like kinêsis, 42 never exists over and above natural subsistent being. Sorabji
(Sorabji 1983, 210) is right to point out here that Aristotle‘s account of the infinite is
highly original, as it defines the infinite in terms of the finite. According to Sorabji, there
are two upshots to Aristotle‘s argument: (1) ―infinite is connected with a process‖ (his
emphasis) and, (2) ―infinity is always what has something outside of it.‖ This is to say
that the infinite is a potential aspect of the nature of natural being, and as such, always
exists in conjunction with these things. This, as Sorabji notes, is a view antithetical to
those of Aristotle‘s predecessors who thought that the infinite was, ―something which is
so all-embracing that it has nothing outside of it.‖ The ways in which something can be
said to be always, ―taken after another…always different‖ are clearly numerous.
Unsurprisingly, then, we can talk about different sorts of things as being ―infinite,‖ and
we will find that different sorts of things are infinite in likewise different ways (cf.
207b22). For example, kinêsis is called infinite because, in the case of locomotion, the
ground covered is always finite but each time different. Similarly with alteration and
growth, what changes is finite, but there is always more change to come until the
substance ceases to be. Time is said to be infinite in the sense that it is of kinêsis
(207b24).

42

Recall 200b33: “There is no such thing as motion over and above the things.”
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In addition, Aristotle talks about the infinite in terms of ―the potentially infinite,‖
in the sense that beings can be potentially endlessly divided (206b5-6, 206b17-18). If
infinite division is possible, in what sense could this be so? Sorabji (Sorabji 1983, 211)
gives two possible interpretations: (1) Aristotle thinks that these infinite divisions are
actually materially possible, and (2) Aristotle‘s infinity means the recognition of endless
potential division, what Sorabji names ―the finitist view.‖ I am in agreement with
Sorabji, who assigns the latter to Aristotle, arguing that, ―certainly, Aristotle would allow
only a finite number of actually existing divisions.‖ But, Sorabji questions whether or
not this would be the case for ―potentially existing divisions‖ (his emphasis). He allows
that the question is ambiguous, and, after weighing possible replies, concludes that,
―Aristotle cannot there [in the Physics] afford to admit any collections which are more
than finite, if his analysis of infinity is to surmount the problems which it is intended to
surmount.‖
Aristotle‘s account of the infinite is an account of possibility; it controversially
argues for the unreality of the infinite, i.e. a being that is only ever potentiality. It was
covered first because of the Pre-Socratic assumption that it was an archē of other being.
Now that Aristotle has disabused his reader of such a notion, he will move on to a
discussion of the other terms. Let his treatment of the infinite be a paradigm of sorts for
what is to come; Aristotle is defeating the views of the endoxa with an eye to pointing out
the role of potentiality in nature.
Aristotle begins Physics iv with an inquiry into the being of place (ηόπνο, topos)
or magnitude. The first question is expected: whether there is such a thing as place
(208a28). And, this is our indication that Aristotle will now deal with the endoxa.
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Aristotle tells us that people suppose everything is somewhere and nothing is
nowhere. Certainly, as he reminds us, locomotion requires place. In order to change
places, place must exist in some way. So too, it seems that place exists over and above
the things in place because according to the endoxa: (1) the contents of a place can be replaced by different content, e.g. water in a vessel can be emptied and replaced by air
(208b6-7); (2) elements seem to have a proper place, as fire rises and earth descends
(208b9-10); (3) the theory of void requires a theory of place since void is place without
body (208b25). It is interesting to note as well that in Aristotle‘s discussion of proper
place, he makes a distinction between relative place, or position, and proper place, or
power. He says that to us, ―up and down,‖ ―left and right‖ change given our relative
position; whereas, they remain the same in nature. ―Downward,‖ for example, is a force
or power evidenced by the fact that some things by nature move toward the earth, i.e.
down. This is not an epistemological/metaphysical distinction, however, as Aristotle is
only pointing out that our perspective is sometimes at odds with nature‘s perspective.
This echoes his claim from Physics i 1, that some things are clearer to nature, while
others are clearer to us. Part of studying nature, when one is a part of nature, is to
recognize this difference without inappropriately singling oneself out as somehow outside
of the bounds of the investigation.
Other concerns about the possibility that place is a body itself include: (1) if it
were, there would be two bodies in the same place (209a5-7); (2) place is not the cause of
anything else (209a20-22); (3) if everything has a place, then place would have a place
and so on ad infinitum (209a23-25); (4) place has a size, but its size must grow since
there are things in place, which themselves grow (209a26-28). So, Aristotle sets out first
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to say whether place might be matter or form. If it were the former, it would be the
extension itself of the magnitude, and if it were the latter, it would be the limit of the
body in place (209b1-10). He then cites Plato as the only thinker to actually try and say
what place is and not just that it is. According to Aristotle‘s reading, Plato, in the
Timaeus, shows that matter is identical to space because the space that a body is in is the
body itself. 43 Aristotle concludes saying that place is neither matter, nor form. Matter
and form, as we have seen, are inseparable from a natural object. Place, on the other
hand, is separable from the object (209b21-30). This then leads Aristotle to the new
premise that place is a vessel or container. The implication of such a view is that place is
indeed something, and this points Aristotle‘s inquiry to ask what sort of thing it is.
Important to note here is that Aristotle is explicit about the fact that place is something
that, although separable from natural objects themselves, is not a natural object itself.
Instead, it is in some sense an attribute of motion and relation (210a1-4). This will begin
with a look to the meaning of ―in‖ with regard to what it might mean to be ―in‖
something, e.g. ―in place.‖ Aristotle highlights a function of ―in,‖ that as Hardie and
Gaye point out, does not quite capture the Greek preposition, ‗ἐλ,‘ which is in use here.
The sense here is the way we mean ―in‖ when we say, ―in a vessel‖; it usually means
―inside‖ (Πάλησλ δὲ θπξηώηαηνλ ηὸ ὡο ἐλ ἀγγείῳ θαὶ ὅισο ἐλ ηόπῳ) (210a24). Aristotle
brings in examples from experience, which marks a brief turn from what has been mostly
43

As Hussey (Hussey 1983, 105) remarks, this is a careless reading of Plato‟s Timaeus
48e-52d. Aristotle seems to have left out sufficient differences between his idea of
matter (hyle) and Plato‟s receptacle (chóra), thus embellishing the similarities needed for
a proper analogy. Hussey explains, “Aristotle interprets Plato‟s receptacle as playing the
same role as Aristotelian matter…the existence and whereabouts of a piece of
Aristotelian matter are always dependent on those of the body of which it is the matter,
whereas the Platonic receptacle seems to be an independent entity of which the parts
cannot change their relative positions.”
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arguments from the ―order of explanation,‖ in contention with the endoxa to show that a
thing containing other things does not have to be either the form, the matter, or the same
thing as that which is contained (210b7-30). In Physics iv 4, he will go on to explain the
sense in which place is a vessel.
He begins by stating his assumptions: (1) that place is what contains that of which
it is the place, and is no part of the thing; (2) that the primary place of a thing is neither
less nor greater than the thing; (3) that place can be left behind by the thing and is
separable; (4) that all place admits of the distinction of up and down; (5) each of the
bodies carried to its appropriate place and rests there, and this makes the place either up
or down (210b36-211a5). And, then, he returns to the previous point that the topic of
place has come up only because there is motion with respect to place (211a11-12). Since
locomotion is a movement from one place to another, place becomes a topic for the
natural scientist. It is not a topic qua itself; it is requisite for locomotion. Since the
heavens are in constant movement themselves, Aristotle concludes that they must also be
in place. Another type of kinêsis relevant to place is change in quantity, as increase and
diminution require change in size of place.
Aristotle raises a puzzle in which he creates an analogy between place and the
underlying thing, or hypokeimenon, which he discussed in Physics i. Place, he argues
seems to remain as natural objects change place. A vessel has air at point a, which is
replaced by water at point b. The place inside the vessel remains. The analogy is only
partially effective, however, as underlying matter neither separates from the natural
object, nor does it contain the object (211b30-212a2). Place, thus, is ―the boundary of the
containing body at which it is in contact with the contained body‖ (ἀλάγθε ηὸλ ηόπνλ
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εἶλαη ηὸ ινηπὸλ ηλ ηεηηάξσλ, ηὸ πέξαο ηνῦ πεξηέρνληνο ζώκαηνο <θαζ‘ ὃ ζπλάπηεη ηῶ
πεξηερνκέλῳ>) (212a6-7), or, ―the innermost motionless boundary of what contains it‖
(Ὥζηε ηὸ ηνῦ πεξηέρνληνο πέξαο ἀθίλεηνλ πξηνλ, ηνῦη‘ ἔζηηλ ὁ ηόπνο) (212a20). And,
finally, ―If then a body has another body outside it and containing it, it is in place, and if
not, not‖ (Ὧη κὲλ νὖλ ζώκαηη ἔζηη ηη ἐθηὸο ζκα πεξηέρνλ αὐηό, ηνῦην ἔζηηλ ἐλ ηόπῳ, ᾧ
δὲ κή, νὔ) (212a31-32).
Aristotle then retakes up a topic he had suggested earlier; namely, that some
things are potentially in place, while other things are actually in place. Things are
potentially in place when they are parts of a homogenous continuous substance (212b56). They are actually in place when they are separated but in contact (212b6-7). And,
some things are per se in place, while others are accidentally in place. The former
includes all bodies that move from one place to another or bodies that increase or
decrease in size. The latter includes the soul, which since it is contained in a body, is
only ever in place by virtue of the fact that the body is in place.
Aristotle concludes his treatise on place asserting once again that only moveable
bodies are in place. This challenges the view of the endoxa that place is a substantial
being itself. Place exists, but not qua itself. Instead, place serves as the limit of a
moveable body, only potentially existent unless a body exists to help actualize it. Place
can be anywhere, so long as a moveable body is there, too. If something is not movable,
either intrinsically, i.e. natural objects, or by propulsion, e.g. artifacts, then it is not ―in
place‖ (Καὶ ἔζηηλ ὁ ηόπνο θαὶ πνύ, νὐρ ὡο ἐλ ηόπῳ δέ, ἀιι‘ ὡο ηὸ πέξαο ἐλ ηῶ
πεπεξαζκέλῳ. Οὐ γὰξ πλ ηὸ ὂλ ἐλ ηόπῳ, ἀιιὰ ηὸ θηλεηὸλ ζκα) (212b27-30).

64

Aristotle‘s final move in his discussion of place is to suggest that it is an analogue
to matter. First, he starts with a place-whole analogy: ―that which is in place has the
same relation to its place as a separable part to a whole, as when one moves a part of
water or air; so, too, air is related to water, for the one is like matter, the other form—
water is the matter of air, air as it were the actuality of water‖ (θαὶ γὰξ ηὸ κέξνο, ηὸ δὲ ἐλ
[ηῶ] ηόπῳ ὡο δηαηξεηὸλ κέξνο πξὸο ὅινλ ἐζηίλ, νἷνλ ὅηαλ ὕδαηνο θηλήζῃ ηηο [213a]
κόξηνλ ἢ ἀέξνο. Οὕησ δὲ θαὶ ἀὴξ ἔρεη πξὸο ὕδσξ·) (212b36-213a2). We can imagine a
container filled with water. The space inside the container is the whole, and the water is
a separable part of it. When the space is filled with water, the container and the
contained appear to be one. There is no part yet to be filled. But, when some of the
water escapes, there is a vacant part, which is filled with air. As parts of the whole, the
water is potentially air. When any more water escapes, the vacant place will come to
contain air; the water will be re-placed by the air. As both Hardie and Gaye and Aquinas,
in his commentary (Aquinas 1961, 239), instruct, Aristotle will not fully explain the
relationship between the elemental bodies until his more narrow work of natural
philosophy on generation and corruption. Here, he concludes, ―for water is potentially
air, while air is potentially water, though in another way…if the matter and the
fulfillment are the same thing (for water is both, the one potentially, the other in
fulfillment), water will be related to air in a way as part to whole. That is why these have
contact: it is organic union when both become actually one‖ (νἷνλ ὕιε γάξ, ηὸ δὲ εἶδνο,
ηὸ κὲλ ὕδσξ ὕιε ἀέξνο, ὁ δ‘ ἀὴξ νἷνλ ἐλέξγεηά ηηο ἐθείλνπ· ηὸ γὰξ ὕδσξ δπλάκεη ἀήξ
ἐζηηλ, ὁ δ‘ ἀὴξ δπλάκεη ὕδσξ ἄιινλ ηξόπνλ…ἀζαθο δὲ λῦλ ῥεζὲλ ηόη‘ ἔζηαη
ζαθέζηεξνλ. Εἰ νὖλ ηὸ αὐηὸ [ἡ] ὕιε θαὶ ἐληειέρεηα (ὕδσξ γὰξ ἄκθσ, ἀιιὰ ηὸ κὲλ
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δπλάκεη ηὸ δ‘ ἐληειερείᾳ), ἔρνη ἂλ ὡο κόξηόλ πσο πξὸο ὅινλ. Δηὸ θαὶ ηνύηνηο ἁθὴ ἔζηηλ·
ζύκθπζηο δέ, ὅηαλ ἄκθσ ἐλεξγείᾳ ἓλ γέλσληαη) (213a3 and 213a6-9). According to De
Generatione et Corruptione, water is potency to air simply. The air is likewise
potentially water, because water could be added to re-place the air. Water is the matter,
ready at any time to take on the form of air. It is potentially air, and yet it is water. As
water, it has become one with its place in the vessel, i.e. with air.
Aristotle‘s treatise on void (θελόο, kenos) follows his analytic on place quite
naturally. After all, void is thought to be a place without a body (213b31). Aristotle
shows that if body is presupposed to be something tangible, with properties of heavy and
light, then by deduction it appears that there are places with nothing in them (214a1-5).
But, as he has just shown, the elemental bodies are ―in place‖ because they move and
change. If place is a limit of a body, and if bodies that are immoveable are not in place,
and if all moveable bodies are in place, then there can be no place without a body
(216a24-26). The concept of void, in fact, can only exist in a conception where place is
believed to be a thing separate from the bodies it contains. If place is a self-subsistent
natural being itself, then there could presumably be places that exist without containing
anything. These places would be void, i.e. empty. Similarly, if we are basing our
conclusions on experience in the world, we can imagine observing any given space
occupied by many objects. We might say that the areas in the space where objects exist
are filled places; whereas, the places where no objects exist could be considered ―empty
places.‖ This is of course to ignore the air that it in place around the substantial objects.
So, too, it may suggest again that one is thinking of place as something separate from
body, which can be filled or unfilled. Place for Aristotle is a container; but, it is a
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container in which the contained and the container become one. It is the limit of the thing
―in place.‖ Thus, there is no separate void (Ὅηη κὲλ ηνίλπλ νὐθ ἔζηη θερσξηζκέλνλ
θελόλ, ἐθ ηνύησλ ἐζηὶ δῆινλ) (216b20).
After considering the endoxa that has void existing as the source of movement,
(cf. θ δὴ ηλ εἰξεκέλσλ θαλεξὸλ ὡο νὔη‘ ἀπνθεθξηκέλνλ θελὸλ ἔζηηλ, νὔζ‘ ἁπιο νὔη‘
ἐλ ηῶ καλῶ, νὔηε δπλάκεη, εἰ κή ηηο βνύιεηαη πάλησο θαιεῖλ θελὸλ ηὸ αἴηηνλ ηνῦ
θέξεζζαη) (217b20-22), Aristotle concludes that the only sense in which void could be
said to exist is ―the matter of the heavy and the light, qua matter of them‖ (Οὕησ δ‘ ἡ ηνῦ
βαξένο θαὶ θνύθνπ ὕιε, ᾗ ηνηαύηε, εἴε ἂλ ηὸ θελόλ) (217b23), meaning that ―void‖ is the
name for the very tension existing naturally among the archai of nature. Void would be
then the possibility that some substantial being could change accidental form as a matter
of nature, i.e. a being that, like the infinite, is a being only in potentiality. 44 If we do not
want to name this aspect of nature, ―void,‖ then void exists neither actually, nor
potentially in Aristotle‘s physics.
That concludes our examination of Aristotle‘s scope, access, goals, and method in
the Physics, his arguments for the number and kind of principles in nature, and his
definitions of nature, motion, the infinite, place, and void in Physics i-iv 9. I have
stressed that Aristotle‘s emphasis on the interplay between potentiality and actuality in
nature, and especially that he allows the modality of potentiality a unique ontological
status to which he ends up assigning the infinite, and, in a sense, void, significantly sets
him apart from the endoxa. In the next chapter, we will complete the transition from
44

Coope (Coope 2008, 57 n22) does not seem to recognize the sense in which void can
exist potentially. She asserts without argument that void does not exist for Aristotle and
refers her reader to the treatise on void.
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kinêsis to chronos with an examination of Aristotle‘s (1) puzzles of time, and (2) his
analytic of time, to include his definition of time. Based on the questions Aristotle asks
about time and the method he employs to answer these questions, we will determine that
Aristotle‘s Treatise on Time is a parallel investigation to the ones explored here. Thus,
based on the claim that Aristotle‘s time section is highly contextualized with respect to
(1) Aristotle‘s scope, access, goals, and method, and (2) the manner in which he has
conducted the entire investigation thus far, I will claim that time, not unlike the infinite,
place, and void, for Aristotle is not, as the endoxa suppose, a ―real‖ or actual selfsubsistent natural being itself. Instead, I hope to show that it is a being always in
potentiality unless certain conditions are met in order that it be actualized.
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Chapter 2: Physics iv 10-11 in Context

Given the context of the Physics just explored, i.e. the method Aristotle has
employed in his treatises on the principles of nature, kinêsis, the infinite, place, and void
and the emphasis he has placed on the modal category of potentiality in these terms, I
will now provide a reading of Physics iv 10-11 with the aim of showing that chronos here
has to do with time as an attribute of motion, 45 as an interval, i.e. the type of time that, as
Aristotle describes at 218a1, ―is taken‖ (ιακβαλόκελνο ρξόλνο). 46 The alternative type
of time, which Aristotle also discusses at 218a1, ―infinite time‖ (ἄπεηξνο ρξόλνο) seems
outside the scope of Aristotle‘s arguments here in the Physics. As we shall see, references
to infinite time seem relegated to Physics iv 10. My thesis is then that chapter ten of the
Treatise on Time is analogous in purpose to the initial chapters of each foregoing treatise,
e.g. on the archai of nature, kinêsis, the infinite, place, and void. 47 Namely, it serves to
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Interpreting Physics iv 11 is difficult, and the literature is divided on interpretation. I
agree with Shoemaker 1969, Sorabji 1983, Hussey 1981 that time for Aristotle requires
perception of kinêsis. Roark (Roark 2011, 56) claims that readers of Aristotle in this
camp have not defended why Aristotle would hold this view here in the Treatise on Time
but nowhere else. My defense is that I read the Treatise on Time as highly contextualized
and parallel in structure to Aristotle‟s foregoing arguments about the terms of kinêsis.
Time, like the infinite, place, and void is not considered a being qua itself in Aristotle‟s
philosophy of nature here in the Physics. Recall, the Treatise on Time may have been the
end of Aristotle‟s initial work on nature.
46
Many thanks to Prof. Dr. Gottfried Heinemann for pointing out the importance of the
time interval vs. other ideas of time. Already, in the very idea of “the time taken,” there
is a nod to the fact that time requires a “taker.” Otherwise, time cannot be “taken.” This
seems a foreshadowing of the subsequent arguments about time and the soul in Physics iv
14.
47
Coope (Coope 2005, 17) also mentions the similarity in structure between the
beginning of Aristotle‟s Treatise on Time and the way he began his account of place
(209a2) and his account of the infinite (iii 4-5), but adds in n. 1 that while puzzles about
the infinite are answered by Aristotle (iii 8), he wrongly claims that he has solved all of
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discuss the endoxa as preparatory to Aristotle‘s actual analytic of time, which begins at
219a1-3: ―It is evident, then, that time is neither movement nor independent of
movement. We must take this as our starting-point and try to discover—since we wish to
know what time is—what exactly it has to do with movement‖ (Ὅηη κὲλ νὖλ νὔηε θίλεζηο
νὔη‘ ἄλεπ θηλήζεσο ὁ ρξόλνο ἐζηί, θαλεξόλ).48 In this chapter, I trace the development of
Aristotle‘s analytic from this starting point until he both defines chronos at 219b1
(ἀξηζκὸο θηλήζεσο θαηὰ ηὸ πξόηεξνλ θαὶ ὕζηεξνλ) and then, after some argument,
reaffirms his definition at 220a25 (Ὅηη κὲλ ηνίλπλ ὁ ρξόλνο ἀξηζκόο ἐζηηλ θηλήζεσο θαηὰ
ηὸ πξόηεξνλ θαὶ ὕζηεξνλ). I attempt to show, by way of a proposal that the ―now‖ for
Aristotle is not only (1) non-temporal, as Coope (Coope 2005, 29) has suggested, but also
(2) a name for existing self-subsistent natural beings undergoing kinêsis, that the best
reading of this analytic is to understand Aristotle‘s position on time to be that time is only
ever potentially real, and by consequence only ever potentially a continuum, unless it is
apprehended as such. This claim rests on the assumption that nothing is actually named
or referred to unless it is perceived. I support this reading by contrasting the way
Aristotle dismisses that time could be a self-subsistent being composed of real parts in
chapter 10 and then argues that time is in some sense continuous, i.e. presumably a whole
composed of parts, in chapter 11.49 For Aristotle, time that is taken as a whole, or
continuum, has to be dependent on (1) kinêsis and (2) something to apprehend the kinêsis
insofar as time‘s ―parts‖ are only ever potentially existent, requisite on the (1)
the puzzles about place at 212b22-23. Coope refers her reader to Ross (Ross 1936, 564).
48
Roark (Roark 2011, 53) supports the theory that Physics iv 11 begins Aristotle‟s
analytic of time, in Roark‟s words, “Aristotle‟s positive account of time.”
49
I offer a reading of Physics 11 despite that the order of arguments is challenging to
understand in a coherent way (see for example Hussey (Hussey 1983, 145) on the strange
arrangement of the section).
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apprehending and (2) naming of beings undergoing kinêsis. Details regarding the
actualization of time and the kind of beings who can count, apprehend, or ―take‖ time
will be discussed in chapter three.
Aristotle begins his Treatise on Time as he did with the other terms of motion see
(chapter 1 n. 37); he will examine the endoxa and attempt to understand the difficulties of
his subject—here, time (ρόκελνλ δὲ ηλ εἰξεκέλσλ ἐζηὶλ ἐπειζεῖλ πεξὶ ρξόλνπ· πξηνλ
δὲ θαιο ἔρεη δηαπνξῆζαη πεξὶ αὐηνῦ θαὶ δηὰ ηλ ἐμσηεξηθλ ιόγσλ, πόηεξνλ ηλ ὄλησλ
ἐζηὶλ ἢ ηλ κὴ ὄλησλ, εἶηα ηίο ἡ θύζηο αὐηνῦ) (217b29-30). Commentators commonly
refer to such difficulties as the ―paradoxes‖ or ―puzzles‖ of time: 50

(1) Does time exist or not?
(2) What is the nature of time?

Aristotle will begin by considering the arguments for the non-existence of time. Or, if
not the non-existence of time, the relative obscurity of whatever time is (Ὅηη κὲλ νὖλ ἢ
ὅισο νὐθ ἔζηηλ ἢ κόιηο θαὶ ἀκπδξο, ἐθ ηλδέ ηηο ἂλ ὑπνπηεύζεηελ) (218a1-2). He
implies that time is a whole composed of parts when he brings up the commonly known
―parts‖ (κέξε) of time: past and future. Past does not exist because it ―has been and is
not,‖ and the other part ―is going to be and is not‖ (Τὸ κὲλ γὰξ αὐηνῦ γέγνλε θαὶ νὐθ
ἔζηηλ, ηὸ δὲ κέιιεη θαὶ νὔπσ ἔζηηλ) (218a2-3). But, then, Aristotle backtracks to state
that any time ―is made up of these‖ (218a4). Aristotle continues to argue that since in
order for something divisible to exist it is necessary that all or some of its parts exist, but
50

Coope (Coope 2005, 17) adds Aristotle‟s subsequent question, “What is time‟s relation
to the present, or „now‟?” to the puzzles.
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then seemingly exempts time from this conditional saying: ―but of time some parts have
been, while others are going to be, and no part of it is, though it is divisible‖ (ηνῦ δὲ
ρξόλνπ ηὰ κὲλ γέγνλε ηὰ δὲ κέιιεη, ἔζηη δ‘ νὐδέλ, ὄληνο κεξηζηνῦ) (218a5-6). It is
unclear, however, whether Aristotle actually believes that time necessarily is composed
of these two parts, or if he is merely appealing to the endoxa. For Plato, in the Timaeus,
days, nights, months, and years are all parts (κέξε) of time; the past (what ―was‖) and
future (what ―will be‖) are not parts, but forms (εἴδε) of time (37e). It is thus unclear, if
he is appealing to endoxa here, the source of the idea that ―past‖ and ―future‖ are parts of
time. But, if Aristotle is not appealing to endoxa, the argument seems circular. This is
to say that if Aristotle is positing non-existent parts of time as a premise from which to
conclude that time does not exist, he has already assumed that time is a whole, thus is
composed of parts. The whole idea that time is a whole is problematic when we consider
the arguments Aristotle has just made with regard to the kind of being he attributes to the
infinite, place, and void. These are terms of kinêsis and not actual self-subsistent beings.
Why then might Aristotle begin his Treatise on Time with the assumption that time is a
whole?51

51

Aristotle will argue in Physics 11 that time is continuous. Since the essence of
continuity for Aristotle is that something is a whole with parts, that these parts are
touching, and that there is the potential for infinite divisibility of the whole, it seems to
make sense that he begins with this assumption. But, if his Treatise on Time is an
investigation in the same vein as his previous queries into the terms of kinêsis, i.e. in the
form of APo ii 1, 89b24-5, and beginning with endoxa in the order of explanation and
proceeding to demonstrate that the term of motion is not a self-subsistent being itself, this
assumption seems impetuous. If Aristotle‟s puzzles are not just rhetorical, how can we
assume something is continuous when we have not yet established whether or not it
exists? Indeed, in her reply to Miller (Miller 1974, 139-41), Coope (Coope 2005, 20)
raises a similar point when she says that Miller‟s suggestion that the puzzles of time
could have been solved if Aristotle had said, “to be is to be surrounded by time,” would
not work because assuming that being is surrounded by time is to already assume that
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Aristotle clarifies that there are two kinds of time: (1) infinite time (ἄπεηξνο
ρξόλνο), and (2) time taken (ιακβαλόκελνο ρξόλνο) (218a1). Now, Aristotle has already
shown that the infinite exists only to the extent that the potentiality for it exists, e.g. in the
possibility for infinite divisibility. What are we then to make of the idea of ―infinite
time,‖ mentioned here without explanation or definition?52 On my reading, Aristotle‘s
reference to infinite time could mean two things: (1) it could be a reference to the ‗time‖
of his predecessors, that is, to Platonic time, whose emphasis on number may be traced
back to the Pythagoreans, 53 or (2) an idea, whether from Plato or elsewhere, presupposed
about the possibility for endless time (aion),54 given that certain heavenly motions seem

time exists, and whether or not time exists is the question Aristotle poses. Yet, Coope
does not raise this same issue with regard to Aristotle‟s assumption that time is a whole
composed of parts, i.e. is continuous.
52
Coope (Coope 2005, 81) cites Generation and Corruption (338b9-11) to argue that
Aristotle elsewhere posits “a pretemporal order that is both infinite and (in the relevant
sense) linear,” and she believes that Aristotle could have used this notion in the Physics
to provide a temporal basis for the before and after, thus defending “his assumption about
time‟s linearity.” I will discuss shortly that Aristotle did not need a temporal basis for the
before and after in his account of time in the Physics and that in fact before and after are
not inherently temporal concepts.
53
In the Timaeus 37d-38c, Plato defines time (chronos) as a type of number: as the
number according to which the universe, or Living Creature, moves (πνηεῖ κέλνληνο
αἰλνο ἐλ ἑλὶ θαη᾽ ἀξηζκὸλ ἰνῦζαλ αἰώληνλ εἰθόλα, ηνῦηνλ ὃλ δὴ ρξόλνλ ὠλνκάθακελ)
(37d) and as that which “imitates eternity and circles according to number” (κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν
κυκλουμένου γέγονεν εἴδη) (38a). Later, he affirms that there are numbers of time (38c).
So, he appears to be inconsistent regarding the relationship between time and number.
The universe, or “Living Creature” has a mostly eternal nature, but cannot be fully eternal
due to the fact that it was created. That which comes into being must also perish from
being. So, it is said to have been modeled after eternity; yet, it is truly sempiternal. As
such, despite having been generated, it will be for all time. As Helena Keizer (Keizer
1999, 88) points out, Aristotle seems to be referring to the Timaeus 38c1-3 in De Caelo i
10, 280a28-32. Here, Aristotle questions the idea that something can be both generated
and existing for all time. In short, Aristotle calls into question the whole notion of
sempiternity. Cf. also Physics viii 1 251b15-20 where Aristotle challenges Plato‟s claim
that time was created.
54
Keizer (Keizer 1999, 90) highlights the sense in which aion cannot be endless, i.e. it is
“a completeness which is an end (telos) in all its fullness.”
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to be ceaseless and that the possibility exists (at least in the intellective faculty of the
soul) for motion qua motion to continue forever.
In Plato‘s Timaeus, there is a differentiation made between (1) unchanging motion
that continues forever and (2) becoming in the world of sense (ηὸ δὲ ἀεὶ θαηὰ ηαὐηὰ ἔρνλ
ἀθηλήησο νὔηε πξεζβύηεξνλ νὔηε λεώηεξνλ πξνζήθεη γίγλεζζαη δηὰ ρξόλνπ νὐδὲ
γελέζζαη πνηὲ νὐδὲ γεγνλέλαη λῦλ νὐδ᾽ εἰο αὖζηο ἔζεζζαη, ηὸ παξάπαλ ηε νὐδὲλ ὅζα
γέλεζηο ηνῖο ἐλ αἰζζήζεη θεξνκέλνηο πξνζῆςελ) (Timaeus 38a). These two types of
motion correspond with Aristotle‘s distinction between time as infinite and time as taken
insofar as for both thinkers, time seems to be related to motion. Plato makes the
connection between motion and time already here in the Timaeus when he concludes that
these things becoming in the world of sense do so in time. Time (chronos) is the circling
number, which imitates eternity (aion) (ἀιιὰ ρξόλνπ ηαῦηα αἰλα κηκνπκέλνπ θαὶ θαη᾽
ἀξηζκὸλ θπθινπκέλνπ γέγνλελ εἴδε) (38a). If time as infinite refers to that which is
unchanging and not becoming, it is not the kind of time we would expect Aristotle to
discuss in the Physics.55 We have seen his emphasis on becoming from the beginning of
the work. Contrast that with the fact that there has been no mention whatsoever about the
unchanging movement of the heavens.56 Indeed, it would be beyond the access permitted
to the natural scientist. This ever-continuous time is not the time, which is a term of
55

Though some have argued that aion is timeless (cf. Sorabji 1988, 126 n. 122 where he
mentions Leyden 1964 and Keizer 1999, 89), Sorabji (Sorabji 1988, 126-127) appeals to
de Caelo i 9, 279a12-b3 to argue that Aristotle does not mean ―timelessness‖ when he
writes aion; but, rather, ―everlasting duration.‖ This is not to say, as Sorabji concludes,
that Aristotle considers ―possessers of this sort of aion‖ to be in time. Instead, Sorabji
notes the ―special sense‖ of time that Aristotle presents in the Physics.
56
Aristotle will of course famously broach this topic in Physics viii, but one could argue
that, in the spirit of many of Aristotle‟s treatises, the topics of the last book are
preparatory to a subsequent topic of study. On this reading, Aristotle prepares us for the
de Caelo at the end of the Physics.
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kinêsis insofar as it refers to the nature of natural beings. Instead, it might be a subject
for a more speculative thinker, perhaps a cosmologist. In both cases, then, the idea for
infinite time (ἄπεηξνο ρξόλνο), seems outside the scope of Aristotle‘s arguments here in
the Physics; they would be beyond the scope, access, method, and goals of this inquiry. 57
Instead, Aristotle will focus on time that comes to concern us because it is a term of
kinêsis —the time of this sort is a time interval—time taken (ιακβαλόκελνο ρξόλνο).
First, Aristotle investigates what appears to be a third part of time, the ―now.‖
But, ―now,‖ what we commonly think of as the present tense of time, is not going to be a
part of time for Aristotle. Parts, he instructs, are measures of wholes, and parts
themselves have parts (218a6-7). But, time for Aristotle is not made of nows, at least in
the temporal sense. Aristotle is rejecting the idea that time could be represented as a
string of points. We could imagine a string of beads to illustrate this commonly held
view of time. Placing a finger on one bead isolates it as the ―present‖—whatever beads
exist to the left of the finger are ―the past,‖ and the beads to the right are ―the future.‖ In
one‘s actual experience of life, the now seems elusive. When can it be said actually to
occur? Is it now? Now? Now? How about, now? No, it is always already gone. The
future slides into the past before we can really acknowledge it. It takes great intention to
experience each moment as it arrives.
But, this is not at all how Aristotle is thinking of ―now,‖ precisely because for him
time is not going to end up being a linear continuum existing as a subsistent being itself,
independent of natural objects. The treatment of what are commonly held to be ―parts of

57

Sorabji (Sorabji, 1983, 126) has noted that it does not seem that infinity can be a
number. Since time is going to end up being a number (arithmos) for Aristotle, the idea
that time could be both a number and infinite is self-contradictory.
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time,‖ i.e. past, present, and future, then is meant to show the absurdity of understanding
time in this way. Or, if not the absolute absurdity, at least that such an understanding of
time does not derive from the preceding theory of nature. Aristotle easily demonstrates
that the past and future do not actually exist as real, i.e. we can clearly think about them,
but they cannot be perceived, and now Aristotle sets out to understand ―now.‖
He writes that the now seems to be bound by past and future and then wonders
whether it is always the same or each time different (218a9-10). It seems to me that the
arguments he then puts forth to show that neither is possible are not arguments made in
earnest. On the contrary, he is disclosing the logical inconsistencies required to
understand the present, ―the now,‖ as a real part of time. After giving arguments against
each possibility, he concludes that there are ―difficulties about the attributes of time‖
(πεξὶ κὲλ νὖλ ηλ ὑπαξρόλησλ αὐηῶ ηνζαῦη‘ ἔζησ δηεπνξεκέλα) (218a30).58 At this
point in the text, this conclusion is easy to infer. There are clearly internal
inconsistencies with the position that holds time to be a whole, composed of two parts
that do exist, and the now, which is not a part but acts as a marker between the two parts
that do not exist, and is neither always the same, nor always different. Aristotle is
peeling us away from holding the traditional view of time as a being itself, presupposed
in our common understanding of nature and nudging us toward an internally consistent,
sound, view of time as the ―time taken.‖ Let us have a look at the arguments for the
impossibility of the now as ever same or as ever different:
If it is always different and different, and if none of the parts in time which are
other and other are simultaneous (unless the one contains and the other is
contained, as the shorter time is by the longer), and if the ‗now‘ which is not, but
formerly was, must have ceased-to-be at some time, the ‗nows‘ too cannot be
58

“Attributes” is not a perfect translation of ηλ ὑπαξρόλησλ, literally ―posessions.‖
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simultaneous with one another, but the prior ‗now‘ must always have ceased-tobe. But the prior ‗now‘ cannot have ceased-to-be in itself (since it then existed);
yet it cannot have ceased-to-be in another ‗now‘. For we may lay it down that one
‗now‘ cannot be next to another, any more than point to point. If then it did not
cease-to-be in the next ‗now‘ but in another, it would exist simultaneously with
the innumerable ‗nows‘ between the two-which is impossible. Yes, but neither is
it possible for the ‗now‘ to remain always the same. No determinate divisible
thing has a single termination, whether it is continuously extended in one or in
more than one dimension: but the ‗now‘ is a termination, and it is possible to cut
off a determinate time. Further, if coincidence in time (i.e. being neither prior nor
posterior) means to be ‗in one and the same ―now‖‗, then, if both what is before
and what is after are in this same ‗now‘, things which happened ten thousand
years ago would be simultaneous with what has happened to-day, and nothing
would be before or after anything else.
(ὁ δὲ ρξόλνο νὐ δνθεῖ ζπγθεῖζζαη ἐθ ηλ λῦλ. ἔηη δὲ ηὸ λῦλ, ὃ θαίλεηαη δηνξίδεηλ
ηὸ παξειζὸλ θαὶ ηὸ κέιινλ, πόηεξνλ ἓλ θαὶ ηαὐηὸλ ἀεὶ δηακέλεη ἢ ἄιιν θαὶ ἄιιν,
νὐ ῥᾴδηνλ ἰδεῖλ. εἰ κὲλ γὰξ αἰεὶ ἕηεξνλ θαὶ ἕηεξνλ, κεδὲλ δ‘ ἐζηὶ ηλ ἐλ ηῶ ρξόλῳ
ἄιιν θαὶ ἄιιν κέξνο ἅκα (ὃ κὴ πεξηέρεη, ηὸ δὲ πεξηέρεηαη, ὥζπεξ ὁ ἐιάηησλ
ρξόλνο ὑπὸ ηνῦ πιείνλνο), ηὸ δὲ λῦλ κὴ ὂλ πξόηεξνλ δὲ ὂλ ἀλάγθε ἐθζάξζαη πνηέ,
θαὶ ηὰ λῦλ ἅκα κὲλ ἀιιήινηο νὐθ ἔζηαη, ἐθζάξζαη δὲ ἀλάγθε ἀεὶ ηὸ πξόηεξνλ. ἐλ
αὑηῶ κὲλ νὖλ ἐθζάξζαη νὐρ νἷόλ ηε δηὰ ηὸ εἶλαη ηόηε, ἐλ ἄιιῳ δὲ λῦλ ἐθζάξζαη ηὸ
πξόηεξνλ λῦλ νὐθ ἐλδέρεηαη. ἔζησ γὰξ ἀδύλαηνλ ἐρόκελα εἶλαη ἀιιήισλ ηὰ λῦλ,
ὥζπεξ ζηηγκὴλ ζηηγκῆο. εἴπεξ νὖλ ἐλ ηῶ ἐθεμῆο νὐθ ἔθζαξηαη ἀιι‘ ἐλ ἄιιῳ, ἐλ
ηνῖο κεηαμὺ [ηνῖο] λῦλ ἀπείξνηο νὖζηλ ἅκα ἂλ εἴε· ηνῦην δὲ ἀδύλαηνλ. ἀιιὰ κὴλ
νὐδ‘ αἰεὶ ηὸ αὐηὸ δηακέλεηλ δπλαηόλ· νὐδελὸο γὰξ δηαηξεηνῦ πεπεξαζκέλνπ ἓλ
πέξαο ἔζηηλ, νὔηε ἂλ ἐθ‘ ἓλ ᾖ ζπλερὲο νὔηε ἂλ ἐπὶ πιείσ· ηὸ δὲ λῦλ πέξαο ἐζηίλ,
θαὶ ρξόλνλ ἔζηη ιαβεῖλ πεπεξαζκέλνλ. ἔηη εἰ ηὸ ἅκα εἶλαη θαηὰ ρξόλνλ θαὶ κήηε
πξόηεξνλ κήηε ὕζηεξνλ ηὸ ἐλ ηῶ αὐηῶ εἶλαη θαὶ ἑλὶ [ηῶ] λῦλ ἐζηηλ, εἰ ηά ηε
πξόηεξνλ θαὶ ηὰ ὕζηεξνλ ἐλ ηῶ λῦλ ηῳδί ἐζηηλ, ἅκα ἂλ εἴε ηὰ ἔηνο γελόκελα
κπξηνζηὸλ ηνῖο γελνκέλνηο ηήκεξνλ, θαὶ νὔηε πξόηεξνλ νὔηε ὕζηεξνλ νὐδὲλ ἄιιν
ἄιινπ) (218a12-29):
P1: If the now is ever different, and if none of the parts in time are simultaneous,
and if the ―now‖ ceased to be at some point, then the ―nows‖ too cannot be
simultaneous.
P2: (assumed) The now is ever different.
P3: None of the parts of time are simultaneous (from above) because the past has
been and the future will be.
P4: The now does not exist; it is ―not‖; but, it formerly was.
Therefore, the ―nows‖ too cannot be simultaneous
If ―nows‖ cannot be simultaneous, it follows that when the present now ―is,‖ the prior
now must have ceased to be.
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P1: If the now did not cease to be in the next now, but it did cease to be in another
now, then it would exist simultaneously with the innumerable nows between the
two.
P2: The prior now must always have ceased to be.
P3: Since the now never actually existed, the prior now cannot have ceased to be
in itself.
P4: By analogy, since one now cannot be next to another now, as it is with points,
the prior now cannot have ceased to be in another now.
Therefore, since the nows cannot exist simultaneously (from above), it is
impossible that they exist simultaneously with the innumerable nows between the
two.
The arguments against the possibility for ever-different nows suggest, on the one
hand, that the ―now‖ does not actually exist. Look at P3 in the final argument above.
The now cannot cease to be in itself because this entails that it must have existed. But,
Aristotle never denies that the now exists. As we noted, it seems demonstrable by way of
perception, even if the perception requires intention, to show that it does. But, he
understands it as akin to a point, i.e. without parts itself. If it cannot have parts itself,
then it cannot be part of a whole. Thus, as we saw, it is not a part of time.
P1: No determinate divisible thing has a single termination despite the ways it is
extended.
P2: (from above) The now is like a point, indivisible.
P3: The now is a termination.
P4: It is possible to cut off a determinate time.
Therefore, the now cannot be always the same.
Aristotle thus shows that the ―now‖ is neither always the same, nor always
different. Following which, he openly dismisses the ―difficulties‖ dealt with in this
preliminary chapter and remarks that, ―the traditional accounts give us as little light as the
preliminary problems which we have just worked through‖ (ὁκνίσο ἔθ ηε ηλ
παξαδεδνκέλσλ ἄδειόλ ἐζηηλ, θαὶ πεξὶ ὧλ ηπγράλνκελ δηειειπζόηεο πξόηεξνλ) (218a3132). After announcing this conclusion, he proceeds to challenge the endoxa explicitly—
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(1) time is a movement of the whole; (2) time is a sphere; (3) time is motion and a kind of
change. He readily dismisses the first two. Regarding the first view, Aristotle turns
entirely away from the idea of time as infinite time and instead takes up the idea of time
as that which is taken (from 218a1) in order to show that time cannot be the kinêsis of the
whole itself. On the one hand, he states that part of the kinêsis, or revolution, is a time
(218b2). Thus, the revolution cannot be that which is taken (218b3). On the other hand,
if time were the kinêsis of the whole and if there were more than one whole, each one
revolving would be time. Aristotle waves this off as nonsensical, since this would allow
for the existence of multiple times at the same time (218b4-5). In this rebuttal, there
seems to be an equivocal use of the term ―chronos.‖ It seems plausible that Aristotle has
been talking about the time taken, i.e. the time of natural objects, but now he refutes the
idea that time is the kinêsis of the whole based on an idea of infinite time. The time
taken, after all, can be simultaneous with other times taken. Whereas, infinite time is
time of the actual whole.
Regarding the second view that time is the sphere of the whole itself, Aristotle
supposes that this idea is based on the logic that (1) all things are in the sphere of the
whole and (2) all things are in time (218b7). He dismisses this out of hand as naïve, and
he moves on to the only theory of his predecessors that seems worthwhile to discuss.
That time is ―supposed to be motion or a kind of change‖ (ἐπεὶ δὲ δνθεῖ κάιηζηα
θίλεζηο εἶλαη θαὶ κεηαβνιή ηηο ὁ ρξόλνο) is taken up next (218b10-11). He reasons that
time is not kinêsis because kinêsis is in the thing that changes and where the thing, which
moves, is (218b12-13). Time, on the contrary, is ―present equally everywhere and with
all things‖ (ὁ δὲ ρξόλνο ὁκνίσο θαὶ παληαρνῦ θαὶ παξὰ πζηλ) (218b13-14). Again, it
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seems strange that Aristotle differentiates time from kinêsis with this logic because
―chronos‖ is again used ambiguously. It seems that he wants to understand the time
appropriate to physics, but as we have noticed, he refutes the endoxa on the grounds that
they are inconsistent ways to understand time. It seems to me that Aristotle is being
ambiguous here because he is contending with views of time that are outside the scope of
his purposes. This is to note that all views of time in Aristotle‘s time were views of
infinite time. Because he would be the first to define time as that which comes out of
nature instead of something presupposed by nature, ―the time taken,‖ he has no actual
endoxa with which to grapple. But, curiously, he finds it necessary to engage the
irrelevant endoxa without distinguishing between the multiple meanings of the word,
time.
Despite that commentators have taken Aristotle‘s arguments in chapter ten so
seriously as part of his analytic on time, it seems clear—when reading it as parallel to
Aristotle‘s previous treatments of the other terms of motion—that he is here simply
exposing the problems with the endoxa and setting himself up to re-understand time as an
appropriate topic for physics. If time is to be a subject for physics, and if, as Aristotle has
just shown, it is not a natural self-subsistent being itself (it defies the principles of nature
previously set out), it will have to be something derived from nature. Indeed, as we have
seen, Aristotle considers it a term of kinêsis, and he will go on to note here that it will be
an attribute of kinêsis. In this preliminary investigation, then, he shows us only that time
is not a whole composed of real parts, which seems to call into question whether or not
time is a continuum, but also that time is not a self-subsistent being itself.
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In chapter eleven, Aristotle moves on to his analytic of time. This is where he
will take up the question regarding the nature of time despite that he has given his reader
no good reason to think that time actually exists. This is an important point to carry over
from chapter ten. If time does not really exist, then (1) what can we really say about it,
and (2) in what sense could it exist?
Aristotle introduces his analytic with what I consider to be a sort of preamble;
first, he establishes time, like infinity, place, and void, to be an attribute of motion. He
begins with an argument for the coexistence of time and kinêsis. Time does not exist
without kinêsis, he concludes, because it does not seem to us that time has elapsed when
we have not noticed kinêsis. He likens this to those fabled to sleep among the heroes of
Sardinia who when awakened did not realize that any time had passed. They conflate the
―now‖ they experience when awakened with the ―now‖ experienced before falling asleep.
Since they do not perceive the change that has in fact taken place, they fail to notice the
time interval (218b21-27). Aristotle continues with an analogy—just as if the ―now‖
were one and the same, time would not exist, when different nows are not perceived as
such, it does not seem that the interval separating them is in time (ὥζπεξ νὖλ εἰ κὴ ἦλ
ἕηεξνλ ηὸ λῦλ ἀιιὰ ηαὐηὸ θαὶ ἕλ, νὐθ ἂλ ἦλ ρξόλνο, νὕησο θαὶ ἐπεὶ ιαλζάλεη ἕηεξνλ ὄλ,
νὐ δνθεῖ εἶλαη ηὸ κεηαμὺ ρξόλνο) (218b27-29). Aristotle then reasons that time is not
independent of kinêsis (218b31); if it is true that there is no realization that time exists
when there is no perception of kinêsis. Now, this is a peculiar claim because, on the one
hand, Aristotle seems to be saying that time does exist independently of perception.
When the difference between nows is not perceived, time is not perceived, but Aristotle
seems clear here that just because time is not perceived does not mean that it does not

81

exist. Yet, he supports his conclusion that time does not exist independently of kinêsis
because time is not perceived without the perception of kinêsis; put another way, time
perception entails perception of kinêsis. So, on the one hand, he explains time as
something that exists independently of perception; and, on the other hand, he justifies this
on the basis of what is perceived, i.e. on account of the inextricability of time perception
with perception of kinêsis. These first arguments in Aristotle‘s analytic establish the
preamble to the rest of his analytic and point to what I argue to be his theory of time as a
time interval—a result of an interaction between a being undergoing kinêsis and one that
is ―taking‖ or apprehending the time of the kinêsis.59
The analytic begins in earnest at 219a1 when Aristotle claims that, ―it is evident,
then, that time is neither kinêsis nor independent of kinêsis‖ and then announces that this
will be his starting point (ἐπεὶ νὖλ νὐ θίλεζηο, ἀλάγθε ηῆο θηλήζεώο ηη εἶλαη αὐηόλ). His
task now, he offers, is to understand what time has to do with kinêsis (219a3-4). He
begins again to show that we perceive time and kinêsis together. The argument (219a4-9)
is as follows:
Now we perceive movement and time together: for even when it is dark and we
are not being affected through the body, if any movement takes place in the mind
we at once suppose that some time also has elapsed; and not only that but also,
when some time is thought to have passed, some movement also along with it
seems to have taken place. Hence time is either movement or something that
belongs to movement. Since then it is not movement, it must be the other.
(ἅκα γὰξ θηλήζεσο αἰζζαλόκεζα θαὶ ρξόλνπ· θαὶ γὰξ ἐὰλ ᾖ ζθόηνο θαὶ κεδὲλ δηὰ
ηνῦ ζώκαηνο πάζρσκελ, θίλεζηο δέ ηηο ἐλ ηῇ ςπρῇ ἐλῇ, εὐζὺο ἅκα δνθεῖ ηηο
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Hussey (Hussey 1983, 142) claims that, “Aristotle is arguing here from the
phenomenology of time and change,” which he notes to be good dialectical method and
apparently “carefully non-committal” about whether time is a “content-noun” or a “massterm.” If Hussey intends the difference between “content-noun” and “mass-term” to be
analogous to Aristotle‟s differentiation between “time taken” and “infinite time,”
respectively, which I suspect he does, I disagree that this ambiguity continues in chapter
11. It seems to me relegated to chapter 10.
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γεγνλέλαη θαὶ ρξόλνο. ἀιιὰ κὴλ θαὶ ὅηαλ γε ρξόλνο δνθῇ γεγνλέλαη ηηο, ἅκα θαὶ
θίλεζίο ηηο δνθεῖ γεγνλέλαη. ὥζηε ἤηνη θίλεζηο ἢ ηῆο θηλήζεώο ηί ἐζηηλ ὁ ρξόλνο.
ἐπεὶ νὖλ νὐ θίλεζηο, ἀλάγθε ηῆο θηλήζεώο ηη εἶλαη αὐηόλ)
P1: (assumed) We perceive kinêsis with bodily senses (δηὰ ηνῦ ζώκαηνο
πάζρσκελ).
P2: (assumed) We assume that time has passed when we perceive kinêsis.
P3: (implied) kinêsis happens in the mind (ἐλ ηῇ ςπρῇ).
P4: Even when kinêsis happens in the mind, we assume time has elapsed.
P5: When time is thought to have passed, it is believed that kinêsis has occurred.
Therefore, time is either kinêsis or something that has to do with kinêsis.
Based on his previous separation of kinêsis from time, Aristotle immediately denies that
time is actually kinêsis, thereby concluding that time is an attribute of kinêsis (ἀλάγθε ηῆο
θηλήζεώο ηη εἶλαη αὐηόλ).
Aristotle then starts in another vein. The subsequent arguments have to do with
the relationship of kinêsis, thus time, with magnitude. This series of arguments appears
ill-placed, but they proceed as follows (219a10-14):
But what is moved is moved from something to something, and all magnitude is
continuous. Therefore the movement goes with the magnitude. Because the
magnitude is continuous, the movement too must be continuous, and if the
movement, then the time; for the time that has passed is always thought to be as
great as the movement. (ἐπεὶ δὲ ηὸ θηλνύκελνλ θηλεῖηαη ἔθ ηηλνο εἴο ηη θαὶ πλ
κέγεζνο ζπλερέο, ἀθνινπζεῖ ηῶ κεγέζεη ἡ θίλεζηο· δηὰ γὰξ ηὸ ηὸ κέγεζνο εἶλαη
ζπλερὲο θαὶ ἡ θίλεζίο ἐζηηλ ζπλερήο, δηὰ δὲ ηὴλ θίλεζηλ ὁ ρξόλνο· ὅζε γὰξ ἡ
θίλεζηο, ηνζνῦηνο θαὶ ὁ ρξόλνο αἰεὶ δνθεῖ γεγνλέλαη)
P1: What is moved is moved from something to something.
P2: All magnitude is continuous.
Therefore, kinêsis entails the magnitude.
P1: The kinêsis entails the magnitude.
P2: The magnitude is continuous.
Therefore, the kinêsis is continuous.
P1: kinêsis is continuous.
P2: (from 219a9) Time belongs to kinêsis
P3: The time that has passed is always thought to be as great as the
kinêsis.
Therefore, it seems that time is, at least in some way, continuous.

83

Having now established the relationship of time to magnitude, Aristotle continues then to
transpose the distinction of ―before‖ and ―after,‖ one he admits to hold primarily of place
and in virtue of relative position (219a15-16), to time. He moves from what he thinks
must be the correspondence of ―before‖ and ―after‖ in place to that of kinêsis (219a17),
and from ―before‖ and ―after‖ in kinêsis to that of time (219a18). That Aristotle argues
from magnitude to time both in the case of continuity and in the case of ―before‖ and
―after‖ demonstrates the primacy of magnitude to time in his account (on primacy of
change in place to all other kinêsis see also Meta. xii 7, 1073a10-13).
The diversion to establish the primacy of magnitude to time benefits Aristotle‘s
account because it establishes that there is a before and after in time, but not in the
circular sense where temporality has to be assumed in order to conclude the existence of
time as an attribute of kinêsis. 60 Instead, before and after are transposed from attributes
of magnitude to attributes of time by way of the attributes of kinêsis to show that they
constitute nothing temporal at all. Instead, they are spatial. Time for Aristotle comes
later. The kinêsis from before to after is noticed because before, ―x,‖ alters. It no longer
exists; it becomes, ―x1‖—after. It is thus when the kinêsis is noticed that time is said to
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My reading here has benefitted greatly from Tony Roark‟s account of the “before” and
“after” as non-temporal (Roark 2011, 95-119). Roark argues against the majority view
that Aristotle‟s definition of time is circular because it uses seemingly temporal terms, i.e
“before” and “after” in the definition (Cf. Annas 1975, Owen 1975, Ross 1936 for the
alternative view). But, as helpful as Roark‟s account is, it does not seem necessary to
buy into Roark‟s hylomorphic reading of Aristotle‟s Treatise on Time to understand
Aristotle to intend an underlying material continuum to provide non-temporal “relata”
expressed in the relation “before” and “after.” Roark argues that priority and posteriority
are already present in Aristotle‟s account of kinêsis (Cf. Roark 2011, 95). I agree, but
they are present only insofar as there is a natural being undergoing kinêsis. It is the
natural being that undergoes change and is a material continuum itself insofar as it is
always becoming.
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have elapsed. So, while the potential for the continuity of time exists even at the same
level as the continua of magnitude and kinêsis, it does not exist in actuality unless the
kinêsis from before to after is noticed. Thus, time is not the kinêsis from before to after.
Once Aristotle accounts for a non-temporal before and after in time, he turns back
to his argument for the relationship between time and kinêsis:
But we apprehend time only when we have marked motion, marking it by before
and after; and it is only when we have perceived before and after in motion that
we say time has elapsed. Now we mark them by judging that one thing is
different from another, and that some third thing is intermediate to them. When
we think of the extremes as different from the middle and the soul pronounces
that the ‗nows‘ are two, one before and one after, it is then that we say that there
is time, and this that we say is time. For what is bounded by the ‗now‘ is thought
to be time—we may assume this (ἀιιὰ κὴλ θαὶ ηὸλ ρξόλνλ γε γλσξίδνκελ ὅηαλ
ὁξίζσκελ ηὴλ θίλεζηλ, ηῶ πξόηεξνλ θαὶ ὕζηεξνλ ὁξίδνληεο· θαὶ ηόηε θακὲλ
γεγνλέλαη ρξόλνλ, ὅηαλ ηνῦ πξνηέξνπ θαὶ ὑζηέξνπ ἐλ ηῇ θηλήζεη αἴζζεζηλ
ιάβσκελ. ὁξίδνκελ δὲ ηῶ ἄιιν θαὶ ἄιιν ὑπνιαβεῖλ αὐηά, θαὶ κεηαμύ ηη αὐηλ
ἕηεξνλ· ὅηαλ γὰξ ἕηεξα ηὰ ἄθξα ηνῦ κέζνπ λνήζσκελ, θαὶ δύν εἴπῃ ἡ ςπρὴ ηὰ
λῦλ, ηὸ κὲλ πξόηεξνλ ηὸ δ‘ ὕζηεξνλ, ηόηε θαὶ ηνῦηό θακελ εἶλαη ρξόλνλ· ηὸ γὰξ
ὁξηδόκελνλ ηῶ λῦλ ρξόλνο εἶλαη δνθεῖ· θαὶ ὑπνθείζζσ) (219a22-29). 61
So, it is the perception and the marking of ―before‖ and ―after,‖ i.e. the perception and
marking (orizei) of a being undergoing kinêsis, by which we seemingly apprehend time.
Kinêsis—the alteration, growth or diminution, or locomotion—that which makes ―one
thing different from another‖ (ὁξίδνκελ δὲ ηῶ ἄιιν θαὶ ἄιιν ὑπνιαβεῖλ αὐηά, θαὶ κεηαμύ
ηη αὐηλ ἕηεξνλ) of a substantial being ―some third thing intermediate to the two
differences‖ (ὅηαλ γὰξ ἕηεξα ηὰ ἄθξα ηνῦ κέζνπ λνήζσκελ, θαὶ δύν εἴπῃ ἡ ςπρὴ ηὰ λῦλ)
of substantial beings happens regardless of its perception by a third party. Yet, it is this
perception and marking, i.e. this apprehension, which seems to create time. This is to say
that time, meaning the time taken, appears to exist because it is apprehended by us as a
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Hardie and Gaye translate ἡ ςπρὴ, ―mind‖ in the ROT. To be more precise, I have
amended the translation so that ἡ ςπρὴ is rendered ―soul.‖
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result of (1) the principle of nature, and (2) the apprehension of that principle. ―Now,‖
which is terminology precipitate of the endoxa, takes on a spatial reference here. ―Now,‖
recall, is not a real part of time (see also ahead at 220a18-21); it is merely believed to be a
part of time. It is a limit. It delimits the kinêsis occurring of existing self-subsistent
beings (Recall 211b30-212a2 from Aristotle‘s discussion of place. He related place first
to the hypokeimenon, or the intermediate that undergoes change, and then as a limit).
When accidental change is noticed and marked, time is said to have elapsed, at least in
some sense.
Aristotle continues, again drawing conclusions about what time is with support
from the way it is perceived (recall 218b27-29). Time is not thought to have elapsed, he
reasons, when the ―now‖ is not perceived to be more than one (219a30-31).

But,

whereas in the previous argument Aristotle leaves open the possibility that his reader
understand him to be saying that time exists regardless of the perception, and that it is
only on account of the perception—or lack thereof—when we misapprehend time, here
Aristotle makes the stronger claim that the actual perception and subsequent
apprehension of the before and after actualizes time. ―When we do perceive a ‗before‘
and an ‗after,‘‖ he writes, ―then we say that there is time. For time is just this—number
of motion in respect of ‗before‘ and ‗after‘‖ (ὅηαλ δὲ ηὸ πξόηεξνλ θαὶ ὕζηεξνλ, ηόηε
ιέγνκελ ρξόλνλ· ηνῦην γάξ ἐζηηλ ὁ ρξόλνο, ἀξηζκὸο θηλήζεσο θαηὰ ηὸ πξόηεξνλ θαὶ
ὕζηεξνλ) (219a34-219b1). Not only do we say ―there is time,‖ when we perceive the
change from ―before‖ to ―after,‖ but this time that we proclaim when we have
apprehended it is indeed all that time is if we are talking about the time taken. Aristotle‘s
words that precede his well-known definition of time cannot be brushed aside: ―for time
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is this‖ (ηνῦην γάξ ἐζηηλ ὁ ρξόλνο). His original puzzle to understand the being of time
has properly debunked the endoxa, and in their wake leaves an entirely new way to think
about temporality. Not unlike his treatments of place, infinity, and void, we see his clear
intention here to associate time with kinêsis and, more primordially, with the beings
undergoing kinêsis, to render time a potential derivation of kinêsis when certain
conditions are met. I will discuss the conditions in the next chapter.
Predictably, then, Aristotle again concludes that ―time is not kinêsis,‖ and here he
adds the clarification that it is, ―only kinêsis in so far as it admits of enumeration‖
(219b3-5). At this point, then, Aristotle has moved through his justification for the
conclusion that time does exist despite that it seems impossible that it could. It exists
because Aristotle has redefined it. Now, time is to be understood as a number and not as
an imagined vessel containing parts that do not exist. And, on my reading, it is to be
understood as a number, which demarcates each interval of kinêsis for natural beings
when this kinêsis is apprehended. To say that time exists, then, is to significantly qualify
what ―exists‖ means. This is where we have to rely once again on the modal category of
beings that exists only in potentiality, which Aristotle established in Physics iii.
Aristotle posits a person‘s body (219b13-33), which is meant to be a metaphor for
the ―now.‖ At this point, we will get Aristotle‘s arguments for how we are to understand
the ―now.‖ The idea that the now is a being itself, and a perfect being at that, is
dismissed. The body is carried from place to place. As the body travels, time progresses.
So is the body the same body in each place, at each moment? Or does the body change?
Aristotle‘s solution is two-fold. It reiterates our earlier point about the way that natural
self-subsistent beings undergo kinêsis. On the one hand, the body stays the same because
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there is something about the body that is not fundamentally altered as it moves along. In
order for kinêsis to even exist, there must be something that is undergoing the kinêsis.
Aristotle calls this aspect of something its substratum. In the case of the body, there is an
underlying unity about the body as it is carried along. Its identity remains intact not only
in its starting location, but also in each location where it arrives thereafter. On the other
hand, the body changes. With its travels, we can imagine it ages in accordance with the
succession of its locomotion; it is altered in small—even superficial—ways, e.g. it may
become pale, thinner, weaker. The body both remains the same and yet is ever different.
What I think Aristotle‘s means here is that the now, like the body, is nontemporal; it is something that exists and changes along the continuum of spatial
magnitude. 62 The body is ―here‖ and now it is ―there.‖ The change in the body is noticed
as a spatial difference. The body can be moved in any direction—it is not necessarily
moved in the typical forward processing temporal direction ―left‖ to ―right.‖ Despite its
direction, its change from ―here‖ to ―there‖ is perceived and marked. Just as we become
aware of ―before‖ and ―after‖ in the act of the body being carried, yet despite the
direction it is moving, we likewise notice the now when we observe spatial change. 63
The wall was painted blue, and now it is half yellow. There has been a change. ―Before‖
62

Coope (Coope 2005, 29) supports that the now is not temporal when she observes, “On
the one hand, none of time is except the now. This suggests that time only exists in virtue
of the existence of the now. But on the other hand, for the now to exist, it must be a
division or boundary of some independently existing continuum. This continuum cannot
be time, since time itself is dependent on the now. It follows that there must be some
other continuum, prior to time, on which the now depends for its existence” (emphases in
original). For Coope, however, the “other continuum” is going to be change. I will
ultimately disagree with this conclusion. The more primordial “other continuum” is a
“this,” the self-subsistent existing natural beings, “the matter” undergoing the change.
63
See Hussey (Hussey 1983, 143) on “changes „along‟ magnitudes”; there, he concludes
that every change is necessarily a change along a path and thus that there is ontological
and logical priority on the path.
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the alteration is differentiated from ―after‖ the alteration because a change is perceived.
The man was unmusical, and now he is musical; the house was not built, and now it is
built; I was on my way to Thessaloniki, and now I have arrived. We typically think of
these examples of kinêsis as temporally determined. We understand time to be a vessel in
which all change occurs according to a predetermined progression, and we think of the
―now‖ as points on the line of this progress. But, this view is precisely what Aristotle is
countering. Time is a number apprehended after kinêsis is perceived; it is not a vessel or
prefabricated line. The ―now‖ is not a point in a series of points on a line; it is a spatial
difference, a limit. The ―now,‖ as it is with the body, is both that which remains, i.e. the
identity or substratum that is maintained through kinêsis, as well as the difference before
and after the kinêsis (219b26-29).

The ―now‖ is every subsistent being, both its

substratum and its difference between what it is before and then after kinêsis. The man‘s
unmusicality, yet simultaneous potential for musicality is ―before,‖ and his musicality is
―after.‖ The man is ―now,‖ the unmusicality is ―now,‖ and the musicality is ―now.‖
Recall, that Aristotle is after comprehensive understanding of nature, and here he
writes, ―this is what is most knowable; for motion is known because of that which is
moved, locomotion because of that which is carried. For what is carried is a ‗this‘ (ηόδε
ηη), the movement is not‖ (θαὶ γλώξηκνλ δὲ κάιηζηα ηνῦη‘ ἔζηηλ· θαὶ γὰξ ἡ θίλεζηο δηὰ ηὸ
θηλνύκελνλ θαὶ ἡ θνξὰ δηὰ ηὸ θεξόκελνλ· ηόδε γάξ ηη ηὸ θεξόκελνλ, ἡ δὲ θίλεζηο νὔ)
(219b29-31). Physics i-ii provided us the archai of nature and the nature of natural
beings.

And Physics iii-iv have investigated motion and its terms.

Here, we see

confirmation from Aristotle that we have indeed been proceeding from what is most
knowable to us to what is most knowable to nature. We perceive motion, which alerts us
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to investigate nature. When we investigate the nature of natural beings, we find that their
nature is the principle of kinêsis and stasis. The kinêsis is not the being to investigate;
but, as discussed in the previous chapter, that we observe kinêsis alerts us to the way
natural beings exist and, at the same time, because of the way natural beings exist, we
observe kinêsis. Kinêsis exposes the complexity of natural beings, humans included; no
natural being, by its nature, is simply static. We proceed from the kinêsis we perceive,
and we discover that the terms of motion are all—at least to begin with—potentialities
and not actualities of being. e.g contra Zeno, infinity exists only by potential division.
The kinêsis itself is not the topic of investigation; the ―this,‖ or substantial beings are.
The ―now‖ we notice as ―before‖ in this way and ―after‖ in that way is precisely
Aristotle‘s topic in the Physics, as I attempted to show in the last chapter. The kind of
being, which remains the same, and yet constantly changes, is peculiar to natural being.
This is to say that ―the now‖ is a common name for natural being, and thus an identifier
for the kinêsis it undergoes.
Aristotle has thus done the work to extricate the temporal character of ―now‖
(nun) from the term. To perceive a change from ―now‖ to ―now‖ connotes no change ―in
time.‖ Instead, it means simply the actual difference on the path (to use Hussey‘s term)
of kinêsis from ―before‖ (the wall is blue) to ―after‖ (the wall is half yellow). Aristotle‘s
moving body metaphor is perfect here—the body was ―here‖ and now it is ―there.‖ The
temporal component of such kinêsis comes as a derivative of the kinêsis, i.e. once the
kinêsis has been apprehended.
With this said, then, we are in a position to correctly interpret Aristotle‘s
subsequent claim that ―if there were no time, there would be no ‗now‘, and vice versa‖

90

(θαλεξὸλ δὲ θαὶ ὅηη εἴηε ρξόλνο κὴ εἴε, ηὸ λῦλ νὐθ ἂλ εἴε, εἴηε ηὸ λῦλ κὴ εἴε, ρξόλνο νὐθ
ἂλ εἴε) (220a1). It would be too easy to read this passage to suggest that Aristotle has
now contradicted himself, or that my argument is severely flawed, understanding him
here to be reverting to a traditional understanding of time as a whole composed of three
parts: past, present, and future. And, this would seem to make sense. How could we
have time without having ―now‖? But, what I think Aristotle is getting at here is that to
speak of ―now‖ as a common name for an existing self-subsistent natural being
undergoing kinêsis is already to be implying perception of the being. Just like the
number that Aristotle claims to be time, the ―now‖ refers or names the natural being
existing independently of all perception and conceptualization. The ―now‖ does not exist
without time and vice versa because both the ―now‖ and time require someone noticing
and naming, i.e. apprehending, kinêsis in natural objects.

Re-invoking the body

metaphor, Aristotle concludes that, ―the number of the locomotion is time, while the
‗now‘ corresponds to the moving body, and is like the unit of number‖ (ρξόλνο κὲλ γὰξ ὁ
ηῆο θνξο ἀξηζκόο, ηὸ λῦλ δὲ ὡο ηὸ θεξόκελνλ, νἷνλ κνλὰο ἀξηζκνῦ) (220a4). The
number is the name of the change, and the now is the name of the ―this‖—the existing
self-subsistent natural being—observed. That both the thing changing and the change
itself are named implies someone or something doing the naming.
The ―now‖ and time have a complex relationship because not only does time
seem to be made continuous by the now, i.e. time intervals continue so long as a natural
object is in motion, but also time is limited by the ―now,‖ i.e. when change has occurred,
the interval numbering the change likewise ends (220a5). To say here that the ―now‖ is
both that which makes time continuous as well as that which limits time is really to
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equivocate on the term. Or, to be charitable to Aristotle here, it is seemingly to conflate
the two senses of ―now‖ just established—(1) the substratum of the natural object and (2)
the object ―before‖ and then ―after‖ kinêsis. It is by the first sense of ―now‖ that time is
made continuous because the natural object continues to move with periods of rest so
long as it exists. It is by the second sense that time is limited.
Aristotle returns to the earlier comparison of the ―now‖ with a point (recall
218a12-29), officially dismissing it here (220a9-14). Whereas a point can be the end of
one thing and the beginning of another, essentially making one into two, so long as there
is a pause, the ―now‖ taken in the first sense above is the analogue or name of the body
constantly moving.

It continuously undergoes many individual instances of kinêsis.

Thus, it is in this sense always different. It is constantly undergoing kinêsis just as the
body is always being carried along.
Aristotle concludes iv 11 asserting that the ―now‖ in indeed not time. It is an
attribute of time (ᾗ κὲλ νὖλ πέξαο ηὸ λῦλ, νὐ ρξόλνο, ἀιιὰ ζπκβέβεθελ). To clarify,
though, Aristotle does not intend attribute (ζπκβέβεθελ, literally ―comes together‖) here
in the sense that time is ―an attribute‖ of kinêsis, i.e. derivative of it. The sense in which
the ―now‖ is an attribute of time is ―in so far as it numbers, it is number…but number
(e.g. ten) is the number of these horses, and belongs also elsewhere‖ (ᾗ δ‘ ἀξηζκεῖ,
ἀξηζκόο †· ηὰ κὲλ γὰξ πέξαηα ἐθείλνπ κόλνλ ἐζηὶλ νὗ ἐζηηλ πέξαηα, ὁ δ‘ ἀξηζκὸο ὁ ηλδε
ηλ ἵππσλ, ἡ δεθάο, θαὶ ἄιινζη) (220a18-21). This is the first time Aristotle will
introduce the Greek idea that number is nothing symbolic, but rather that which is named
by the number (see also 220b6-9), i.e. ―the number of these horses‖. Because ―now‖
names the natural object or ―this,‖ and the ―this‖ is constantly undergoing kinêsis, the
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number of its kinêsis from ―here‖ to ―there,‖ from ―before‖ to ―after,‖ ends up referring
to the same thing, though in a different sense, that the ―now‖ names. Number names the
things counted, i.e. the ―nows,‖ and the now names, at least in one sense, the natural
being at different points of kinêsis.
Following the discussion of the relationship between time and ―now,‖ Aristotle
concludes iv 11 confidently, saying: ―It is clear, then, that time is number of kinêsis in
respect of the before and after, and is continuous since it is an attribute of what is
continuous‖ (ὅηη κὲλ ηνίλπλ ὁ ρξόλνο ἀξηζκόο ἐζηηλ θηλήζεσο θαηὰ ηὸ πξόηεξνλ θαὶ
ὕζηεξνλ, θαὶ ζπλερήο (ζπλερνῦο γάξ), θαλεξόλ) (220a25-26).64 Aristotle thus ends the
chapter as if he were providing a conclusion immediately following his discussion of the
magnitude-kinêsis-time relationship at 219a14. Strangely, this abrupt back-step to what
he had discussed prior to his arguments for the relationship between the ―now‖ and time
make the latter seem as though they were slightly tangential. Perhaps Aristotle wanted to
reconcile his definition of time with previous conceptions of the now; if his entire
analytic of time would contend with the endoxa, he had to explain too a new way to think
about ―now,‖ i.e. as non-temporal. If ―now‖ is non-temporal, then so too are ―before‖
and ―after,‖ and thus there is no circularity in his definition of time, as the number of
before and after with regard to kinêsis. And, in this last assertion, he brings everything
together when he returns to the idea that temporality is an attribute of that which is
already continuous, i.e. kinêsis, and by way of his discussion of the now, it seems clear

64

Hardie and Gaye (ROT) render “ζπλερήο (ζπλερνῦο γάξ), θαλεξόλ” as “attribute of
what is continuous,” but the idea of “attribute” does not appear in the Greek. It would be
more accurate to translate the Greek: manifestly continuous; for of the continuous.
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that kinêsis is in turn consequent of that which is more primordial to change, i.e. the
natural being that undergoes the kinêsis.
If Aristotle has then addressed the first puzzle in his analytic of time and has
established that time does exist, but in a new sense, i.e. as a potential continuum derived
from the kinêsis beings are undergoing, it is still left to him to be more explicit about its
nature. If time needs to be apprehended in order that it exist as real, i.e. as a number
identifying the kinêsis of a being from before to after, who or what exactly is doing the
apprehending? Whence does the number come? In the next chapter, I will highlight the
difference between marking (orizei) kinêsis and counting/numbering (arithmeiton) or
measuring (metreiton) kinêsis to argue that as an attribute of motion, time on Aristotle‘s
account is fully actualized only if kinêsis is perceived and counted by an intellective soul.
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Chapter Three: Conditions of Actualized Time

As a consequence of Aristotle‘s account of the nature of natural beings—their
principles, that they undergo kinêsis, and that there are terms of this kinêsis—in the first
half of the Physics, and in particular Aristotle‘s emphasis on potentiality as a modality of
being, he defines the last term of kinêsis, time (chronos), in terms of kinêsis. What is
more, insofar as he defines time in terms of kinêsis, he defines it likewise in terms of
existing self-sufficient natural beings. This is implicitly so by the fact that kinêsis is a
function of these natural beings, by their very nature, but explicitly because Aristotle
defines time outright as the number (arithmos) of motion (kinesis) with respect to before
and after (219b1-2). ―Before‖ and ―After,‖ anteriority and posteriority, is a non-temporal
relation between relata, i.e. they describe a relation (pros ti) between actual beings. We
saw this in the previous chapter. We also saw that time for Aristotle, in the sense that it
is ―taken‖ (ιακβαλόκελνο), requires some sort of ―taker,‖ or more precisely, since time is
an arithmos of kinêsis for Aristotle, it requires someone or something to observe the
before and after and thus to ascertain the number of the kinêsis. This is not to say that
time cannot exist potentially insofar as kinêsis can exist independently of its
apprehension, but only that time requires additional conditions in order to be actualized.
In Physics iv 14, Aristotle argues that time is dependent on nous (223a25). It is
not such a big leap then to conclude that the number of motion with respect to before and
after is dependent on nous. What might this mean? Because Aristotle famously
discusses the relationship between time and the soul, and only once qualifies soul as
nous, it has been common for readers to underdetermine nous, as simply ―soul.‖ This is
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problematic because, for Aristotle, there are five main potencies of soul: intellective,
locomotive, desiring, sensitive, and nutritive. While he argues that human beings have
all five, he also tells us that non-human animals have at least desiring, sensitive and
nutritive potencies—usually they also have locomotive— and still plants have the
nutritive potency (See De anima ii 3). If nous can be collapsed into meaning simply,
soul, the implication is that time is dependent on ensouled being generally. The term
nous, often translated ―mind‖ and not ―soul,‖ is problematic without the added confusion
that comes from conflating it with ―soul.‖ Namely, it is both the term Aristotle uses to
single out the intellective faculty of soul, which as noted is reserved for human beings,
and the term often understood by Aristotle‘s readers as that which names God/the first
principle and the celestial bodies. In order to follow Aristotle‘s definition of (chronos),
it is necessary to understand how he is using nous in Physics iv 14. In this chapter,
therefore, I offer two arguments in defense of the view that (1) the kinêsis of natural
beings along with (2) human beings are the necessary and sufficient conditions for
actualized time in Aristotle‘s account. I discuss in particular the relationship between
number (arithmos) and nous in Physics iv 14 and Aristotle‘s account of sensation in De
sensu 436a-437a. Namely, I suggest that the existence of number requires not only (1) a
body by which to sense-perceive that which can be counted (recall 219a4-6, we perceive,
αἰζζαλόκεζα, time with kinêsis, and, by extrapolation, we perceive kinêsis through bodily
senses, ζώκαηνο πάζρσκελ, and in the soul, ἐλ ηῇ ςπρῇ), but also (2) a readiness for
thinking that can actually count/number (arithmeiton) or measure (metreiton), as opposed
to simply marking (orizei) kinêsis. These of course are in addition to the being
undergoing kinêsis. I will proceed with these tasks in sections II ―Number Requires
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Readiness for Thinking‖ and III ―Seeing and Counting Number.‖ But, first, in section I
―Impossibilities for Real Time,‖ I will provide a negative account and say more about
what I think Aristotle does not mean when he uses nous in Physics iv 14.
I.

Impossibilities for Real Time
In Greek, there is a way in which nous means not only ―mind,‖ but also

―perception.‖ While I would argue against the thesis that Aristotle intends a generally
unconventional use of ―nous‖ in Physics iv 14, i.e. meaning ―perception‖ and not ―mind,‖
as he seems to do elsewhere (see Nic. Ethics vi), on my reading ―nous‖ here means
broadly the working together of sense and intellection in that, as we see in De anima, the
faculties of intellect require sensation. This is important to Aristotle‘s definition of time
in particular because actualizing time requires not only perception of kinêsis, but also
counting kinêsis. The being undergoing kinêsis does so irrespective of the apprehension.
But, only a being that can both perceive and count can interact with the being undergoing
kinêsis in such a way so as to actualize time. Super human beings have neither a faculty
(dunamis) by which to apprehend kinêsis, nor the type of intellect with the potential for
counting. Sub-human beings do not have a rational soul with which to count. Aristotle
thus could not have meant either that actualized time depends on, on the one hand, a
super human being like God or the celestial bodies, or, on the other hand, a sub-human
being like non-human animals or plants. In an effort to justify this point, I will provide a
reading of relevant passages from Metaphysics xii 7 and 9 and De Memoria I, namely to
support not only the idea that nous is a readiness for thinking for Aristotle, thus cannot
refer to God, but also that non-human animals and plants do not have the intellective
faculty to number, thus cannot fully actualize time.

97

The unmoved mover/God is neither in time, nor does God have the potential for
change. Thus, some have refuted the traditional reading of Metaphysics xii 7 where nous
is thought to refer to God. Instead, a distinction has been made between nous, which is a
readiness for thinking (see De anima iii 4) and noesis, or, thinking itself. It has been
argued, thus, that God is not nous for Aristotle, as that contradicts the idea that God is
pure actuality outside of time, but noesis (see Polansky 2011). Further, it has been
claimed that God cannot be noesis either for Aristotle, since even the act of thinking
seems to suppose an element of potentiality in that it requires an object (noeta) (see
Gabriel 2009). Both have important implications for understanding Aristotle‘s account of
time, and I agree with the general thrust of both. On the first account, nous cannot mean
God in Physics iv 14 because that would require God, or pure activity, to have the
potentiality to number, or count, the ―before‖ and ―after‖ in a being undergoing kinêsis.
Ironically, this would render God impotent, since he would share the same lack of
knowledge that humans, non-human animals, and plants have. On the second account,
there is even more to find objectionable, i.e., not only is God‘s mind reduced to mere
readiness for counting, but also it has an object of its activity, i.e. the arithmos of the
kinêsis. Let us look at the pertinent arguments in Metaphysics xii 7 in order that we
ascertain further evidence that reference to nous here should not be understood as a
reference to God.
Aristotle begins Metaphysics xii 7 recounting his conclusions from Physics viii,
that there are eternal heavens set into motion by what must be an unmoved mover. He
likens the unmoved mover to objects of thought and desire; they too move without being
moved (1072a26-27). Aristotle will demonstrate here that whatever cannot be moved

98

also cannot be that which is moved by an object of thought. The arguments proceed as
follows (1072a26-1072b1):
And the object of desire and the object of thought move in this way; they move
without being moved. The primary objects of desire and of thought are the same.
For the apparent good is the object of appetite, and the real good is the primary
object of rational wish. But desire is consequent on opinion rather than opinion on
desire; for the thinking is the starting-point. And thought is moved by the object
of thought, and one of the two columns of contraries is in itself the object of
thought; and in this, substance is first, and in substance, that which is simple and
exists actually. (The one and the simple are not the same; for ‗one‘ means a
measure, but ‗simple‘ means that the thing itself has a certain nature.) But the
beautiful, also, and that which is in itself desirable are in the same column; and
the first in any class is always best, or analogous to the best.
(θηλεῖ δὲ ὧδε ηὸ ὀξεθηὸλ θαὶ ηὸ λνεηόλ: θηλεῖ νὐ θηλνύκελα. ηνύησλ ηὰ πξηα ηὰ
αὐηά. ἐπηζπκεηὸλ κὲλ γὰξ ηὸ θαηλόκελνλ θαιόλ, βνπιεηὸλ δὲ πξηνλ ηὸ ὂλ
θαιόλ: ὀξεγόκεζα δὲ δηόηη δνθεῖ κιινλ ἢ δνθεῖ δηόηη ὀξεγόκεζα: ἀξρὴ γὰξ ἡ
λόεζηο. λνῦο δὲ ὑπὸ ηνῦ λνεηνῦ θηλεῖηαη, λνεηὴ δὲ ἡ ἑηέξα ζπζηνηρία θαζ᾽ αὑηήλ:
θαὶ ηαύηεο ἡ νὐζία πξώηε, θαὶ ηαύηεο ἡ ἁπιῆ θαὶ θαη᾽ ἐλέξγεηαλ（ἔζηη δὲ ηὸ ἓλ
θαὶ ηὸ ἁπινῦλ νὐ ηὸ αὐηό: ηὸ κὲλ γὰξ ἓλ κέηξνλ ζεκαίλεη, ηὸ δὲ ἁπινῦλ πὼο ἔρνλ
αὐηό). ἀιιὰ κὴλ θαὶ ηὸ θαιὸλ θαὶ ηὸ δη᾽ αὑηὸ αἱξεηὸλ ἐλ ηῇ αὐηῇ ζπζηνηρίᾳ: θαὶ
ἔζηηλ ἄξηζηνλ ἀεὶ ἢ ἀλάινγνλ ηὸ πξηνλ).
P1: Thinking is the starting point.
Therefore, desire is consequent on opinion rather than opinion on desire.
AND
P1: The apparent good is the object of appetite.
P2: The real good is the primary object of rational wish.
Therefore: The primary objects of desire and of thought are the same.
P1: Desire is consequent on opinion rather than opinion on desire.
P2: The object of desire and the object of thought are the same.
Therefore, thought is moved by the object of thought.
P1: One side of the list of contraries is in itself the object of
thought.
P2: In the list of contraries, substance is first.
P3: Of substance, what is simple and exists actually is first.
P4: (assumed) What is simple and exists actually is unmoved.
P5: What is actually good, i.e. that which is in itself desirable, is on
the same side of the list.
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P6: The first in any class is always the best or analogous to the
best.
P7: (assumed) What is simple and exists actually is desirable in
itself.
Therefore, the best object of thought is itself unmoved and
desirable in itself.
This passage differentiates noesis (thinking), nous (readiness, i.e. a potentiality, for
thinking) and noeta (object of thought). The term in question is nous, which according to
this passage has the capacity to receive objects of thought—a capacity that the unmoved
mover could not have—not least of all because that which only ―exists actually‖ has no
capacity, i.e. potentiality at all. Consider, for example, that the unmoved mover, as the
first mover, is not only the first in its class, but by virtue of this, the best. If the unmoved
mover is the best object of thought, it is clearly an object of thought. Objects of thought
move thought. Yet, it is impossible that the unmoved mover move itself. The unmoved
mover does not have motion. If the unmoved mover is an object of thought, it is thus not
also moved by thought.
Further, Aristotle explains, since thought shares the nature of the object of
thought, readiness for thinking can think itself. Thought and object of thought can be the
same thing (αὑηὸλ δὲ λνεῖ ὁ λνῦο θαηὰ κεηάιεςηλ ηνῦ λνεηνῦ) (1072b20-21). But, again,
thought (λνῦο) here cannot be reference to the unmoved mover/God. God has no
capacity to think itself. Thinking for Aristotle, when human thinking, is not an isolated
activity of an intellective capacity; rather, it occurs as a relation between a rational soul
(nous) who has the capacity for receiving an object of thought, i.e. perception, and the
readiness to think about it, i.e. intellection. In order to be both that which is thinking and
that which is the object of thought, something must have the potential for actual thinking.
Nous here refers instead to the intellective faculty of the soul. That the rational soul can
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make an object of itself shows that the rational soul is a potentiality of an existing selfsubsistent being, who is itself a natural being. While the actuality of the divine is
something toward which nous always strives, it is the potentiality of nous and of all
natural objects, which characterizes them as existing self-sufficient natural beings.
For Aristotle, actual rational thought depends on the potentiality (dunamis) for
thought, and this is consequent on the capacity (dunamis) to receive the object of thought
(1072b21-22). The thinking is actual, which is to say it is in the process of thinking,
when it possesses the object (1072b22). It is this active element, which Aristotle calls,
God-like (δνθεῖ ὁ λνῦο ζεῖνλ ἔρεηλ). The subsequent argument is as follows (1072b2430):
If, then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this compels
our wonder; and if in a better this compels it yet more. And God is in a better
state. And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is
that actuality; and God‘s self-dependent actuality is life most good and eternal.
We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and
duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for this is God (εἰ νὖλ νὕησο εὖ
ἔρεη, ὡο ἡκεῖο πνηέ, ὁ ζεὸο ἀεί, ζαπκαζηόλ: εἰ δὲ κιινλ, ἔηη ζαπκαζηώηεξνλ. ἔρεη
δὲ ὧδε. θαὶ δσὴ δέ γε ὑπάξρεη: ἡ γὰξ λνῦ ἐλέξγεηα δσή, ἐθεῖλνο δὲ ἡ ἐλέξγεηα:
ἐλέξγεηα δὲ ἡ θαζ᾽ αὑηὴλ ἐθείλνπ δσὴ ἀξίζηε θαὶ ἀΐδηνο. θακὲλ δὴ ηὸλ ζεὸλ εἶλαη
δῶνλ ἀΐδηνλ ἄξηζηνλ, ὥζηε δσὴ θαὶ αἰὼλ ζπλερὴο θαὶ ἀΐδηνο ὑπάξρεη ηῶ ζεῶ:
ηνῦην γὰξ ὁ ζεόο).
P1: God is in a better state than we are, i.e. God is always pure actuality, thinking.
P2: The actuality of thought is life.
P3: God is that actuality.
P4: God‘s essential actuality is life most good and eternal.
P5: Life belongs to God.
Therefore, ―God is a living being, eternal, most good‖ and ―…life and duration
continuous and eternal belong to God.‖
God‘s nature then is essentially different from the nature of existing selfsubsistent natural beings. Some natural beings are ―God-like‖ in that they have a rational
soul; for Aristotle, these are human beings. God is eternal, whereas humans are mortal,
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God is superlative, whereas humans share in a piece of God‘s goodness, God is actuality
and life, whereas substantial beings are by nature ever potentially other than what they
are now; their nature is the potential for kinêsis. Aristotle turns to the nature of divine
thought in Metaphysics xii 9, concluding there that God or ―God‘s thinking‖ is ―thinking
on thinking‖ (ἔζηηλ ἡ λόεζηο λνήζεσο λόεζηο) (1074b34). In other words, God is pure
actuality (energeia). Recall that the inherent potentiality for kinêsis (and likewise, rest) is
the nature of natural beings. The first mover/God is pure actuality and cannot be
otherwise; hence, it is not capable of kinêsis. Since pure actuality has no readiness to
receive perceptibles, and in fact no potentiality whatsoever in its being, it cannot carry
out the functions requisite to apprehend or take time.
A reading of De memoria indicates that non-human animals experience time.
Aristotle begins the treatise announcing that he will now treat memory and remembering.
He will consider not only its nature and its cause, but also the part of the soul to which
these functions, along with recollecting, belong (449b4-6). The distinction made here
between memory and recollecting is important for Aristotle; for example, he goes on to
clarify that the former is generally sharper in slow people, while the latter is generally
sharper in clever people (449b7-8). The objects of memory, he argues, are relegated
completely to things that are past (449b14). The future is not remembered, but expected,
and the present is sense perceived (449b10-13). Aristotle demonstrates this to be the case
with an example. When one is sensing a white object before him, he would say he is
perceiving it, not remembering it. Likewise, when one is contemplating an object of
science in a given moment, he would say that he knows it, not that he is remembering it.
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When the objects are not being perceived or thought readily, then they are being
remembered. Remembering, for Aristotle, reconstitutes previously learned knowledge or
previously experienced sense perception in one‘s mind (449b15-24). It brings to mind an
activity that has since ceased. He concludes that, ―memory is, therefore, neither
perception nor conception (ππόιεςηο), but a habit or state of one of these, whenever time
has become (ἕμηο ἢ πάζνο, ὅηαλ γέλεηαη θξόλνο)‖ (449b25).65
The consequence of Aristotle‘s definition of memory is that, ―only those animals
which perceive time remember, and the organ whereby they perceive time is also that
whereby they remember‖ (ὥζζ΄ ὅζα ρξόλνπ αἰζζάλεηαη͵ ηαῦηα κόλα ηλ δῴσλ
κλεκνλεύεη͵ θαὶ ηνύηῳ ᾧ αἰζζάλεηαη) (449b29-30). Thus, on Aristotle‘s account, time
perception (θξόλνπ αὶζζάλεηαη), which implies the ability either for sense perception or
intellection, or for both, is the necessary and sufficient condition for memory. We must
determine the organ by or through which time perception happens, then, in order that we
understand the types of animals that perceive time. Deciding the organ by or through
which time perception happens may also be additional evidence that we can rule out God
as a sufficient condition for the actuality of time, since as we have seen, God does not
have parts, thus cannot have organs for time perception.
Aristotle appeals to his argument from De anima regarding the necessity of
images for thinking. The argument given here is as follows (449b31-450a8):
Without an image thinking is impossible. For there is in such activity an affection
identical with one in geometrical demonstrations. For in the latter case, though
we do not make any use of the fact that the quantity in the triangle is determinate,
we nevertheless draw it determinate in quantity. So likewise when one thinks,
65

Beare translates ἕμηο, ―affection,‖ seemingly missing the ambiguity of the term, i.e. that
it might mean habit or potentiality/disposition. He renders ὅταν γένηται κρόνος,
―conditioned by a lapse of time‖ in the ROT.
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although the object may not be quantitative, one envisages it as quantitative,
though he thinks of it in abstraction from quantity; while, on the other hand, if it is
something by nature quantitative but indeterminate, one envisages it as if it had
determinate quantity, though thinks of it only as a quantity. (λνεῖλ νὐθ ἔζηηλ
ἄλεπ θαληάζκαηνο ζπκβαίλεη γὰξ ηὸ αὐηὸ πάζνο ἐλ ηῶ λνεῖλ ὅπεξ θαὶ ἐλ ηῶ
δηαγξάθεηλ· ἐθεῖ ηε γὰξ νὐζὲλ πξνζρξώκελνη ηῶ ηὸ πνζὸλ ὡξηζκέλνλ
εἶλαη ηνῦ
ηξηγώλνπ͵ ὅκσο γξάθνκελ ὡξηζκέλνλ θαηὰ ηὸ πνζόλ͵ θαὶ ὁ λνλ ὡζαύησο͵ θἂλ κὴ
πνζὸλ λνῇ͵ ηίζεηαη πξὸ ὀκκάησλ πνζόλ͵ λνεῖ δ΄ νὐρ ᾗ
πνζόλ· ἂλ δ΄ ἡ θύζηο ᾖ ηλ
πνζλ͵ ἀνξίζησλ δέ͵ ηίζεηαη κὲλ πνζὸλ
ὡξηζκέλνλ, λνεῖ δ΄ ᾗ πνζὸλ κόλνλ).
P1: In the activity of thinking, there is a habit identical with one in geometrical
demonstrations.
P2: In geometrical demonstrations, we do not make any use of the fact that the
quantity in the triangle is determinate even though we draw it determinate in
quantity.
P3: (by analogy) When we think, we envisage it as a quantity even though it may
not be a quantity and we truly think it as an abstraction of quantity.
P4: Even if we are thinking of an indeterminate quantity, we envisage it as if it
had a determinate quantity.
Therefore, without an image, thinking is impossible.
Aristotle posits subsequently that, ―we cannot think of anything without a continuum or
think of non-temporal things without time‖ (450a9-10), a fascinating admission to which
he does not return. It is possible that Aristotle is referencing his claim from Physics iv 12
that things not measured are not necessarily ―in time,‖ but only accidentally in time
(221b25). Even if non-temporal, which I imagine entails not undergoing kinêsis,
Aristotle imagines that something can be accidentally ―in time‖ insofar as it exists in
concert with things that are undergoing kinêsis and being measured. Next, Aristotle
builds on his previous argument, now showing that thought and thinking are only
incidental to memory. The arguments here are as follows (450a9-14):
Thus it is clear that the cognition of these objects is effected by the primary
faculty of perception, and memory even of intellectual objects involves an image
and the image is an affection of the common sense. Thus memory belongs
incidentally to the faculty of thought, and essentially to the primary faculty of
sense-perception. (κέγεζνο δ΄ ἀλαγθαῖνλ γλσξίδεηλ θαὶ θίλεζηλ ᾧ θαὶ ρξόλνλ·
[θαὶ ηὸ θάληαζκα ηῆο θνηλῆο αἰζζήζεσο πάζνο ἐζηίλ] ὥζηε θαλεξὸλ ὅηη ηῶ
πξώηῳ αἰζζεηηθῶ ηνύησλ ἡ γλζίο ἐζηηλ· ἡ δὲ κλήκε͵ θαὶ ἡ ηλ λνεηλ͵ νὐθ
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ἄλεπ θαληάζκαηόο ἐζηηλ͵ <θαὶ ηὸ θάληαζκα ηῆο θνηλῆο αἰζζήζεσο πάζνο ἐζηίλ>·
ὥζηε ηνῦ λνῦ κὲλ θαηὰ ζπκβεβεθὸο ἂλ εἴε͵ θαζ΄ αὑηὸ δὲ ηνῦ πξώηνπ
αἰζζεηηθνῦ).
P1: One must cognize magnitude and motion by means of the same faculty by
which one cognizes time.
Therefore, it is clear that the cognition of these objects is effected by the primary
faculty of perception.
P1: The cognition of magnitude and motion is effected by the primary faculty of
perception.
P2: Memory even of intellectual objects involves an image.
P3: An image is a habit of common sense.
Therefore, memory belongs incidentally to the faculty of thought, and essentially
to the primary faculty of sense perception.
The sense in which, then, intellection is only incidental to sense perception in the case of
memory is that intellection depends on sense perception, even remotely in the case of
intellectual objects since it is impossible to think without having had any experience at all
with sense perception. Thus, Aristotle is saying here that there is the possibility for
memory, which requires only the faculty of sense perception. Whereas, memory can be
aided by intellection derived from sense experience, this is not a necessary condition for
memory. This reasoning allows Aristotle then to conclude that, ―Hence not only human
beings and the beings which possess opinion or intelligence, but also certain other
animals, possess memory‖ (δηὸ θαὶ ἑηέξνηο ηηζὶλ ὑπάξρεη ηλ δῴσλ͵ θαὶ νὐ κόλνλ
ἀλζξώπνηο θαὶ ηνῖο ἔρνπζη δόμαλ ἢ θξόλεζηλ) (450a14-15). When we connect this
conclusion with the prior claim that animals that sense time also have memory, we are
tempted to conclude that animals who have the faculty of sense perception perceive time.
Aristotle next clarifies that memory entails apprehension of before and after
(450a19-20), which one assumes if memory entails time sense and if time sense entails
apprehension of before and after. He then gets specific when he writes, ―if asked, of
which among the parts of the soul memory is a function, we reply: manifestly of that part
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to which imagination also pertains‖ (ηίλνο κὲλ νὖλ ηλ ηῆο ςπρῆο ἐζηη κλήκε͵ θαλεξόλ͵
ὅηη νὗπεξ θαὶ ἡ θαληαζία) (450a21-22). Aquinas, in his commentary on De Memoria,
explains that apprehension of before and after entails (determinate) imagination
(phantasia): ―For some animals perceive nothing save at the presence of sense objects,
such as certain immobile animals, which on this account have an indeterminate
imagination, as De anima III says. And on this account they cannot have cognition of
prior and posterior, and consequently nor time. Hence they do not have memory.‖ It is
not simply animals with sense perception that have memory, but animals with the ability
to determine that ―this‖ perceptible is being perceived ―before‖ or ―after‖ ―this‖
perceptible. It seems that this determination requires an ability to mark (orizei) kinêsis in
some sense.
Aristotle ends the first chapter writing, ―it has been shown that it [memory] is a
function of the primary faculty of sense perception, i.e. of that faculty whereby we
perceive time (ὅηη ηνῦ πξώηνπ αἰζζεηηθνῦ θαὶ ᾧ ρξόλνπ αἰζζαλόκεζα)‖ (451a16-17).
While I am open to thinking that non-human animals may indeed have a weak sense of
temporal succession enabled by their ability to sense perceive kinêsis, which could mean
the additional capability to mark ―before‖ and ―after‖ in change, I insist that Aristotle
intended to say here that sense perception is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
time sense. My concern hinges on the difference I see between perceiving and counting
number. Time is a number for Aristotle, so insofar as some non-human animals can mark
(orizei) before and after in kinesis, in some case perhaps sense-perceiving number, they
must have a weak sense of time. But, insofar as the number must be counted or
measured, time actualization is left to humans (see Ross 1936, 599 on orizei, that it is not
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the same thing as measuring time). I will discuss this further at the end of section two
and in the third section.

II.

Number Requires Readiness for Thinking
Aristotle‘s discussion of the dependence of time on the soul is one of the more

famous and debated passages in the time section of the Physics. Despite its relative
brevity—spanning a mere paragraph of the overall argument—interpreters have
disagreed about how to understand the crucial relationship Aristotle posits among time,
arithmos, soul, and nous. The passage reads as follows (223a16-28):
It is also worth considering how time can be related to the soul; and why time is
thought to be in everything, both in earth and in sea and in heaven. Is because it is
an attribute, or state, or movement (since it is the number of movement) and all
these things are movable (for they are all in place), and time and movement are
together, both in respect of potentiality and in respect of actuality? Whether if
soul did not exist time would exist or not, is a question that may fairly be asked;
for if there cannot be some one to count there cannot be anything that can be
counted, so that evidently there cannot be number; for number is either what has
been, or what can be, counted. But if nothing but soul, or in soul reason, is
qualified to count, there would not be time unless there were soul, but only
that of which time is an attribute, i.e. if movement can exist without soul, and the
before and after are attributes of movement, and time is these qua numerable.
(Ἄμηνλ δ‘ ἐπηζθέςεσο θαὶ πο πνηε ἔρεη ὁ ρξόλνο πξὸο ηὴλ ςπρήλ, θαὶ δηὰ ηί ἐλ
παληὶ δνθεῖ εἶλαη ὁ ρξόλνο, θαὶ ἐλ γῇ θαὶ ἐλ ζαιάηηῃ θαὶ ἐλ νὐξαλῶ. Ἢ ὅηη
θηλήζεώο ηη πάζνο ἢ ἕμηο, ἀξηζκόο γε ὤλ, ηαῦηα δὲ θηλεηὰ πάληα (ἐλ ηόπῳ γὰξ
πάληα), ὁ δὲ ρξόλνο θαὶ ἡ θίλεζηο ἅκα θαηά ηε δύλακηλ θαὶ θαη‘ ἐλέξγεηαλ;
πόηεξνλ δὲ κὴ νὔζεο ςπρῆο εἴε ἂλ ὁ ρξόλνο ἢ νὔ, ἀπνξήζεηελ ἄλ ηηο. Ἀδπλάηνπ
γὰξ ὄληνο εἶλαη ηνῦ ἀξηζκήζνληνο ἀδύλαηνλ θαὶ ἀξηζκεηόλ ηη εἶλαη, ὥζηε δῆινλ
ὅηη νὐδ‘ ἀξηζκόο. Ἀξηζκὸο γὰξ ἢ ηὸ ἠξηζκεκέλνλ ἢ ηὸ ἀξηζκεηόλ. Εἰ δὲ κεδὲλ
ἄιιν πέθπθελ ἀξηζκεῖλ ἢ ςπρὴ θαὶ ςπρῆο λνῦο, ἀδύλαηνλ εἶλαη ρξόλνλ ςπρῆο κὴ
νὔζεο, ἀιι‘ ἢ ηνῦην ὅ πνηε ὂλ ἔζηηλ ὁ ρξόλνο, νἷνλ εἰ ἐλδέρεηαη θίλεζηλ εἶλαη
ἄλεπ ςπρῆο. Τὸ δὲ πξόηεξνλ θαὶ ὕζηεξνλ ἐλ θηλήζεη ἐζηίλ· ρξόλνο δὲ ηαῦη‘ ἐζηὶλ
ᾗ ἀξηζκεηά ἐζηηλ).
I will begin with a general observation. Notice here that Aristotle is recalling his
actual definition of time from Physics iv 11, talking about time as a number, arithmos.
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And here, he takes a step further to define number. Number is something that has been or
can be counted: Ἀξηζκὸο γὰξ ἢ ηὸ ἠξηζκεκέλνλ ἢ ηὸ ἀξηζκεηόλ. Contrast this with his
previous allusions to ―marking‖ (orizei) kinêsis. Before moving on to discuss the relation
of soul to time, then, I want first to say something about Aristotle‘s use both of arithmos,
or number, and metron, or measure, in his various definitions and explanations of time
leading up to this discussion. In the Treatise on Time, Aristotle uses three different
verbs to describe the apprehension of time and their corresponding nominal forms to refer
to that which time is. He says that kinêsis is counted, arithmeiton, measured, metreiton,
and marked, orizei (see 219a22 ―we have marked motion,‖ 219a25 ―we mark them,‖ and
220b15, ―time marks the movement‖). But, as just mentioned, orizei is not synonymous
with either arithmeiton or metreiton. Because Aristotle uses both arithmos and metron in
the time section, it has been argued that he uses them interchangeably (See Annas 1975
99). Since metron, literally ―that by which anything is measured,‖ seems to be a genus of
various kinds of ―thats,‖ it has also been argued that Aristotle understands number in this
case to be a kind of measure (see Coope 2005, 100). In Metaphysics x 6, Aristotle
explains that, ―Plurality is as it were the class to which number belongs; for number is
plurality (pleithos) measurable (metreiton) by one‖ (1057a3). This passage has been used
not only to defend each of the opposing views above, but also to say that for Aristotle, it
is one, as opposed to number, which is under the genus of ―measure‖ (see Klein 1969,
108). The potential for equivocation on ―measure‖ runs parallel to the potential for the
equivocation on ―number‖; for, as Aristotle himself points out about ―arithmos,‖ measure
can mean both the unit of measure, i.e. the ―that,‖ or the measurement itself (see 219b
where Aristotle says that number can mean both the number counted and the number with

108

which we count). In the first case, we are talking about ―one,‖ and in the second place
we are talking about a plurality measured by one. For Aristotle, time is number in so far
as it is that which is counted—the plurality and not the one. The impulse to think that the
analogous sense of arithmos and metron are not synonymous here has to do with the idea
that Aristotle understands time to be an ordering and not a quantity (see Coope 2005,
104). While I would not have a problem acceding to the claim that there is a nontemporal ordering going on between anteriority and posteriority, it seems important to
understand these positions as designating a relation. Yes, relations can connote an
ordering, but the fact that such a relation exists does not automatically prohibit that the
terms in relation, the relata, exist as a discrete plurality or quantity of things. I thus
maintain the standard view that number and measure are synonymous in Aristotle‘s
treatment, on the basis that I do not think order and quantity are mutually exclusive
designations, and I understand them both to refer to the plurality counted and not the unit,
one, by which we count.
With that said, I want now to return to the passage on time and the soul.
Recalling the first few lines from the passage above, Aristotle introduces the topic with a
statement and a quasi-question, he thinks it ―is worth considering how time can be related
to the soul (ςπρή); and why time is thought to be in everything (ἐλ παληὶ), both in earth
and in sea and in heaven.‖ Aristotle wants to consider how time is related to the soul,
here not yet qualified as the rational soul. Time is thought to be in everything, meaning
things in on earth, in the seas, and in the heavens. Though, since Aristotle has offered an
unconventional definition of time here in the Treatise on Time, the idea commonly held
that time is ―in everything‖ is right, but now in a new sense. For Aristotle, time is in
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everything because, (1) ―it is an attribute, or state (πάζνο ἢ ἕμηο), of movement
(θηλήζεώο) (since it is the number of movement),‖ and (2) ―all these things [on earth, in
the sea, and in the heavens] are movable (for they are all in place), and time and
movement are together, both in respect of potentiality and in respect of actuality.‖ If time
is the number of kinêsis, it is not an intrinsic part of natural objects. Indeed, as I argued
in the previous chapter, it has no existence for Aristotle qua itself and unless actualized
remains a potentiality of kinêsis.66 Yet, to the extent that natural beings on earth, in the
sea, and in the heavens, undergo kinêsis, and kinêsis is an actualized potentiality because
they are first of all actually in place, there is the potentiality for these natural beings to be
in time.
Since at this point Aristotle has said only that it is worth considering that time is
related to the soul and clarified that time is an attribute of kinêsis because it is a number
of kinêsis, the specific relationship of time to soul is not clear, but it does seem clear that
it is going to have to have something to do with the sense in which time is a number, and
number, as we saw previously, is something counted. At this point in the text, a question
could be raised as to whether this counting is done not by anyone in particular, but in
accordance with some celestial standard, as it has been argued, or if it results from direct
observations and then counting of kinêsis. This difference is parallel to the question
raised in the previous chapter regarding whether Aristotle‘s analytic of time was an
analytic of infinite time or time taken. It is necessary, if seemingly redundant, to address
the analog to the previous question we find here. Understanding time as the number in
66

See Polansky (Polansky 2007, 463 n. 5) on interpretation of hexis. For Polansky, the
examples of light and art in De Anima iii as hexis provide support that hexis can mean
potentiality or disposition. It seems that chronos as hexis provides further evidence that
hexis is a potentiality for possible actualization under certain conditions.
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accord with a celestial standard annihilates the possibility that time is actualized by the
interaction between the observed and the observer and so too my previous claim that
Aristotle is focused here in the Physics on the time taken. Instead, time becomes
something a priori, namely, what we might take to be infinite time, unaffected by
particular instances of existing self-subsistent natural beings undergoing kinêsis.
In addition, it seems suspicious that Aristotle would argue for the definition of
time that he does, if he just meant to explain time as a pre-established standard—
essentially predetermined before any kinêsis takes place and unalterable by particular
kinêsis and observation. Certainly, given the context of his scope, access, method and
goals in the Physics, it is unclear as to why, if time were really just a set number naming
the perfect motion of the heavens, it appears in this context at all.
Returning again to the text, Aristotle asks another question, which at this point
seems redundant, namely: ―whether if soul did not exist time would exist or not.‖ But,
now we get an explicit answer, ―if there cannot be some one to count there cannot be
anything that can be counted either.‖ Whereas someone counting is not requisite so that
―anything‖ exist, it is requisite in order that ―anything‖ be counted. Aristotle here makes
a general claim about the relationship between things existing, things being counted, and
someone counting. Whereas, the claim that something counted, i.e. number, depends on
someone counting may seem like a strange claim (one generally accepts that there can be
eight planets in the solar system whether or not they are ever counted), the ideas of
counting (by way of the counter) and the counted are intimately related in ancient Greek.
It has been argued that our modern concept of number, which comes from
Descartes and Leibniz, is vastly different from the concept of number employed here by
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Aristotle (see Sachs 2008, 129). In Greek mathematics, numbers are names given to a
discrete plurality of things (see De interpretatione ii on names as convention). They are
―natural‖ and not symbolic expressions (see Sachs 2008 130 and Klein 1969 regarding
fractions and negative expressions). Ross (Ross 1936, 541) explains in reference to Meta
987b27 that ―the Pythagoreans identified real things with numbers, it is not to be
supposed that they reduced reality to an abstraction, but rather that they did not recognize
the abstract nature of numbers.‖ While the plurality of things to be counted exists outside
of the fact of someone‘s counting them, the name given to the plurality is only potentially
so. In order for number, as name, to arise, the plurality—the something to be counted—
must be counted, thus named. In the case of time, as we know, the something to be
counted is kinêsis insofar as there are natural beings undergoing kinêsis. The sense in
which kinêsis becomes numbered, and thus the sense in which time exists at all on this
account, has to do with whether or not there is someone counting it. Indeed, since on
Aristotle‘s definitions, time is a number, and ―number is either what has been, or what
can be, counted,‖ number is arrived at by way of counting. It is thus implied that
someone or something is doing the counting. Aristotle‘s claim here is that the number,
i.e. time, necessarily depends on the counter.
It is the ―some‖ of this someone counting—namely, who or what is it—that has
caused so much debate over this passage in Aristotle‘s Treatise on Time. From the
conclusions I draw in section I above, I suggest that this someone could not be any
ensouled being, i.e. plants, non-human animals, and humans alike. Unlike the act of
simply marking (orizei), counting—really a type of naming—seems to be uniquely
human. Looking back to the passage, Aristotle seems to say as much: ―But if nothing
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else is of such a nature as to count but the soul and the intelligence (nous) in the soul.
Then it is impossible that time be if soul is not, but only that of which time is an
attribute.‖ The actual existence of time, then, requires not simply soul, as it is often
suggested and consequently misunderstood, but the intellective capacity of soul, or nous.
It is the intellective faculty of the human soul that allows for a readiness for counting or
naming, a potentiality, that is not present either in Aristotle‘s definition of God or in the
souls of non-human beings (compare with De anima iii 4 ―And indeed, they speak well
who say that the soul is a place of forms, except that it is not the whole soul but the
intellective soul, and this is not the forms as being-fully-itself, but in potential‖ 429a).
Time is actualized when a human being brings this potentiality to bear on a being actually
undergoing kinêsis.
Aristotle concludes the passage with a reminder about what is actually being
counted: ―The before and after are attributes of movement, and time is these qua
countable.‖ Whereas, I have emphasized before the notion of ―marking‖ the difference
from ―before‖ to ―after,‖ thus not quite counting, here Aristotle uses the term arithmeiton
instead of orizei. One wonders how and/or why the ―before‖ and ―after‖ are sometimes
marked, and marked by some non-human animals, and yet sometimes counted, seemingly
only by human beings, i.e. those with nous. Since number is the name of an existing
plurality of things, the difference must come down to the number existing in the plurality.
When there is only the difference between ―before‖ and ―after‖ in a particular segment of
kinêsis, the number of the plurality is the lowest possible, i.e. two. But, when there are
many nows, or instances of ―before‖ and ―after‖ in one particular segment of kinêsis, the
number of the plurality can be quite large. My proposal is that if the number is low,
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kinêsis can simply be marked. But, if the number is large, kinêsis must be counted. In
the case of marking, i.e. in the case of apprehending short-term or otherwise simple
kinêsis, e.g. I walk across the room, an intellective soul may not be required. Indeed,
from our reading of De Memoria, and life experience confirms this, it seems that nonhuman animals can apprehend this kinêsis without a problem. Insofar as they are able to
do this, they might have a weak sense of temporal succession. But, in the case of
counting, e.g. apprehending my relocation to New Haven from Pittsburgh, an intellective
soul is required. The change is too great to mark, and indeed I can affirm that my dogs
did not relate to the experience temporally. This explains why Aristotle reintroduces the
term arithmeiton when he discusses the relationship between time and the soul and then
clarifies nous. I will discuss this difference further in the next section.
Still, there is a question as to how the discrete existing plurality and the potency
of the intellective soul come into contact with one another so as to allow for the
actualization of time. In order to count or name, which points to the bringing into
actuality a potentiality of soul, there must first be sense perception of the before and after.
The act of sense perception is not dealt with in Aristotle‘s general work on physics. Yet,
as we have seen, Aristotle tells us in Physics i 1 that we learn first about nature by way of
confused perceptions. We assume, then, that sense perception plays an integral role in
our understanding of the being of natural objects, and an adequate account of the
relationship of the Greek sense of number and the degree to which it can be senseperceived—putting the readiness for thinking into actuality—is missing from this work.
Thus, we have to look elsewhere to understand the importance of such an argument for a
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proper understanding of the time/soul relationship for which Aristotle argues. In the next
section we will look at relevant arguments in the De sensu.
III.

Seeing and Counting Number
In De sensu, Aristotle takes up discussions that would have been too specific for

his general work on the soul, De anima. He refers to these as the ―remaining part of our
subject‖ where he means specifics about soul. Here, we are going to get into the details
of soul functioning. Despite that we learn in De anima about certain faculties of soul,
which do not require the body as medium, the soul never functions disembodied. In De
sensu, Aristotle‘s topic turns to a more focused discussion of what he names the most
common and important faculties of soul, those that require both soul and body. He
explains that these faculties—sensation, memory, passion, appetite, desire, pleasure, and
pain—belong to all animals (436a8-10). Indeed, they can be quickly tested to reveal that
both soul and body are necessary for their proper operation. One does not see without an
eye, but neither does a corpse or a brain-dead animal even with eyes. A disembodied
stomach does not desire food, but a person with a very small stomach desires less food.
The brain in the vat does not feel pain, but neither do the disemboweled organs. This
type of reasoning leads Aristotle to argue (436b1-9):
That all the attributes above enumerated belong to soul and body in conjunction,
is obvious; for they all either imply sensation as a concomitant, or have it as their
medium. Some are either affections or states of sensation, others, means of
defending and safe-guarding it, while others, again, involve its destruction or
privation. Now it is clear, alike by reasoning and without reasoning, that
sensation is generated in the soul through the medium of body. (ὅηη δὲ πάληα ηὰ
ιερζέληα θνηλὰ ηῆο ηε ςπρῆο ἐζηὶ θαὶ ηνῦ ζώκαηνο͵ νὐθ ἄδεινλ. πάληα γὰξ ηὰ
κὲλ κεη΄ αἰζζήζεσο ζπκβαίλεη͵ ηὰ δὲ δη΄ αἰζζήζεσο͵ ἔληα δὲ ηὰ κὲλ
πάζε ηαύηεο
ὄληα ηπγράλεη͵ ηὰ δ΄ ἕμεηο͵ ηὰ δὲ θπιαθαὶ θαὶ ζσηεξίαη͵ ηὰ δὲ
θζνξαὶ θαὶ ζηεξήζεηο·
ἡ δ΄ αἴζζεζηο ὅηη δηὰ ζώκαηνο γίγλεηαη ηῇ ςπρῇ͵
δῆινλ θαὶ δηὰ ηνῦ ιόγνπ θαὶ ηνῦ
ιόγνπ ρσξίο).
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Sensation, then, is a faculty of soul inextricable from the body through which external
stimuli are taken in. Aristotle writes, ―Sensation must, indeed, be attributed to all animals
as such, for by its presence or absence we distinguish between what is and what is not
animal‖ (ηνῖο δὲ δῴνηο͵ ᾗ κὲλ δῶνλ ἕθαζηνλ͵ ἀλάγθε ὑπάξρεηλ αἴζζεζηλ· ηνύηῳ γὰξ ηὸ
δῶνλ εἶλαη θαὶ κὴ δῶνλ δηνξίδνκελ) (436b11-13). But, even if the senses are a natural
attribute of the beings, which we call ―animal‖ (zoon), they operate for different functions
in different animals. For Aristotle, despite that sense perception is activity (energeia),
which is an end in itself, the senses are also a means to an end, and the ends (teloi) differ
in accordance with the varied potencies of souls for which he argued in De anima. This
difference is seen first with regard to the senses requiring an external medium to operate:
smelling, hearing, and seeing (436b18-19). We are told that animals that move locally
possess these senses, and for all of them these senses are means for basic survival.
Animals can use smell, sound, and sight to find food and/or to be alerted to possible
dangers. But, these senses can, ―…serve for the attainment of a higher perfection. They
bring in tidings of many distinctive qualities of things, from which knowledge of things
both speculative and practical is generated in the soul‖ (ηνῖο δὲ θαὶ θξνλήζεσο
ηπγράλνπζη ηνῦ εὖ ἕλεθα· πνιιὰο γὰξ εἰζαγγέιινπζη δηαθνξάο͵ ἐμ ὧλ ἥ ηε ηλ λνεηλ
ἐγγίλεηαη θξόλεζηο θαὶ ἡ ηλ πξαθηλ) (437a1-4). These higher ends are restricted to
animals that have intellect, i.e. to humans.
Yet, whereas the distance senses of seeing, hearing, and smelling allow animals to
sense proper sensibles, i.e., that which can be sensed only by being seen, that which can
be sensed only by being heard, and that which can be sensed only by being smelled, we
learn also of common sensibles (see De anima ii 6 for a parallel account). When things
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can be perceived with more than one faculty of sense, they are sensed in common.
Aristotle provides the following list: figure, magnitude, motion, rest, and number. Sight
allows us the most variability in sensing, and it plays an especially big role in perceiving
common sensibles.
Now, these passages leave us with a lot to think about regarding the way sense
perception functions to allow animals—both human and non-human—to attain various
ends. Both humans and non-humans, in so far as they are capable of locomotion, can see.
But, what can they see? By virtue of the fact that Aristotle has them using sight to
acquire food, and hardly any animals eat dead animals in the wild, we understand him to
mean that non-human animals can sense at least some common sensibles. They would
have to sense motion in order to catch prey. In fact, modern animal research tells us that
it is quite difficult, or maybe impossible, for some non-human animals to differentiate
many still objects from each other. This is why camouflage is a defense tool for many
different animals. They protect themselves from each other. Surely, even for humans it
is difficult to differentiate a cuttlefish from the backdrop of a piece of coral; they blend in
so well. Thus, it is the motion of animals that usually alerts other animals to their
presence. This is likewise the case with detecting the approach of one‘s own natural
predators. The old adage may go, ―if you can see, you can be seen,‖ but the likelihood of
our seeing an intruder dressed in all black as he hides in a dark alley is quite slim.
It seems reasonable then that non-human animals can detect motion. But,
Aristotle also lists number as a common sensible. It is crucial then to argue that seeing
number and counting number are two different things, which require two different
potencies of soul. As we have seen, sight is a faculty of the soul and body in conjunction.
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It is a means by which animals both human and non-human serve basic ends. And, so too
we have seen that non-human animals can see motion. In what sense might they see
number? Since number here is nothing abstract that requires high order intelligence, but
rather just a name given to a multiple of discrete objects, it seems rather likely that nonhuman animals see it. Returning to the example of predator and prey, one would not say
that the wolf is somehow unaware that he is forging into a herd of deer. In order to catch
one, he not only sees the many, but also devises a strategic plan for isolating his
anticipated catch. It can hardly be disputed that animals see multiple, but it is not
necessarily the case that they see number (see Klein 1969 on the possible intuitive nature
of arithmos). Even humans seem only to see small numbers. 67 When I see two apples on
the table, for example, I can say without thinking that there are two there. When there is
a bushel on the table, however, I can only immediately say that there are many. I would
have to count them to know exactly how many are there. I suspect that the same is true
for non-human animals, except they probably do not count, or name, number at all. 68 A
wolf sees the number two, in the Greek sense, when he is faced with two possible
antelopes to attack. But, when he is faced with the herd, he sees ―many,‖ not a precise
number.
As we have seen, in De memoria chapter 1, Aristotle concludes that sense
perception is the faculty by which time is perceived (451a18). It seems appropriate then
67

Thanks to Prof. Anna Cremaldi for alerting me to the fact there are studies showing
this to be true. According to Cremaldi‟s recollection, humans are said to perceive as
many as six, but we must count any larger quantities to ascertain the number of the
quantity (conversation during Q&A at the 2012 meeting of the Society of Ancient Greek
Philosophy (SAGP)).
68
See West and Young (2002) on why non-human animals can understand simple
calculations, e.g. two treats are shown and one treat is taken away, so the dog notices the
difference between two and one.
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to distinguish between time perception based solely on sensation, which seems to be the
course of ―marking‖ (orizei) and time perception made more precise by the capacity for
enumeration (arithmeiton). As I have already concluded in the previous section, I accept
the idea that a non-human animal with the sensitive faculty of soul can perceive a weak
version of time, which is to say that there is a degree to which they can perceive and
mark small numbers, but I deny that they are the sufficient condition for the existence of
actualized time. The potential for time exists in all kinêsis, and it is in some sense
recognized by the sensitive soul, but the rational faculty of the soul is required in order to
bring time, at least in the case where the number that time names is a large quantity of
discreet beings, from a hazy multiplicity to a known quantity. In order to achieve
actualized time, there must be an existing self-sufficient natural being with the readiness
for thinking, i.e. time as a numeral or name, requires the ability to count and the ability to
name.
In conclusion, counting sets humans apart from non-human animals. We can
differentiate a multitude by counting. This allows us to move past seeing number, hence
employing our souls‘ intellective potency to determine the discrete number of items that
we sense to be a multitude. Thus, counting looks to require both a body as medium for
obtaining sense data and a higher order intellect to discern number. Counting motion,
which amounts to the coming into actuality of time, then, requires humans capable of
sensing the before and after in motion and, when we are not just dealing with short-term
kinêsis or a small quantity of discrete existing beings, a readiness for intellection in order
to number, or name, the plurality.
***
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I started out talking about the place of the time section in the wide aims of the
Physics. Aristotle‘s goal to understand the nature of natural beings brought him from
discussing the natural beings themselves to topics derived from the way natural beings
naturally are, i.e. their nature is an inner potentiality for kinêsis. Since Aristotle‘s study
of time comes from his interest in nature and time for him is not an existing selfsubsistent natural being to investigate qua itself, but something ―taken,‖ it has been
difficult for readers of Aristotle to know exactly how to understand what time is for
Aristotle. This is particularly the case when we look at other works in Aristotle‘s natural
philosophy, which add additional details about what he understood time to be. There is
something ephemeral about time in that, as Aristotle puzzles about in Physics iv 10, it
does not really seem to exist. This quality, as we saw, is characteristic of all terms of
kinêsis for Aristotle. The sense in which time seems clearly to exist, and yet can be said
really not to exist has to do with Aristotle‘s interest in the modality of potentiality in
nature—an interest, I have argued, which defines his natural philosophy and sets it apart
from his predecessors. We saw just as is the case with the infinite and place, time is only
ever potentially existence—only ever potentially a continuum and a whole with parts—
insofar as it derives from that which does actually exist in this way. While place can
become actual when there is a natural being occupying magnitude, the infinite and time
both require something beyond the materiality of natural beings in order that they be
actualized. Infinity is the potentiality for endless divisions of beings that never actually
occurs. The sense in which the infinite exists is as an actualized thought about the
possibility for continuous beings. It is a consequence of continuity recognized by the
rational soul. Similarly, time only ever becomes continuous itself as an actualized
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attribute of kinêsis, i.e. when the rational soul apprehends kinêsis and counts it. When
time is taken the ―parts of time‖ acquire some sort of ontological status in that we use the
terms ―past‖ and ―present‖ to organize our experience of and subsequent counting of,
kinêsis. This is not to suggest, however, that humans are divorced or excised from
nature. Humans are certainly natural objects themselves on Aristotle‘s account, but they
are unique natural objects in that they have a divine-like faculty, i.e. the rational soul.
Time, then, is not something to discover, or learn about, which explains why it receives
relatively little attention in Aristotle‘s corpus. Instead, Aristotle seems to recognize it as
something we use to make sense of things; by way of actualizing it, we better understand
our relationship to other natural beings. The lasting legacy of Aristotle‘s Physics is thus I
think the relationship he posits among natural beings and that he recognized and
emphasized the modality of potentiality at the heart of the nature of natural beings.
Nearly two hundred years after Newton supplanted Aristotle‘s theory of nature,
and thus his theory of time, and more than two thousand years after Aristotle penned the
Physics, Kant seemed to grant a similar role to consciousness—the moderns were no
longer talking about rational souls—in his theory of time. Namely, it has been suggested
that Kant, like Aristotle, takes a ―consciousness-centered‖ approach to explaining the
being of time. In the next chapter, however, I will show that Kant‘s consciousnesscentered approach to time theory was an adulteration of Aristotle‘s Treatise on Time.
Both Aristotle and Kant may agree that time results from the way human beings interact
with nature, but Kant‘s theory of time is not derived from his theory of nature. On the
contrary, his theory of time is posited in order to help support his theory of nature.
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Chapter 4: Kant‘s Adulteration of Aristotle‘s Treatise on Time

It has been popular for some modern readers of Aristotle‘s Treatise on Time to
label him with a certain epistemological orientation. Namely, Aristotle has been called
an ―idealist‖ as a response to interpreters misunderstanding the role of nous, or the
requisite ―counter,‖ in his Treatise on Time—this is to say that instead of understanding
the intellective soul as a being that actualizes the potentiality for time insofar as time is an
attribute of kinêsis, one believes nous on Aristotle‘s account to be that which allows for
the human experience of kinêsis. This latter reading effectually separates humans from
the rest of natural beings and suggests an account of time that designs, instead of derives
from, a philosophy of nature. In the Transcendental Aesthetic of his First Critique
(Kritik der reinen Vernunft), Immanuel Kant famously argues that time (die Zeit) is an a
priori intuition. This is to say, that he posits time as a structure of the rational mind
absolutely independent of experience (B3), which allows for experience of the external
world at all. For Kant, time could not be derived from a philosophy of nature, i.e.
ultimately, from experience, as the consequence of this approach renders time contingent.
For Kant, this is unacceptable because it is on the basis of his time concept that he then
explains his philosophical program. If the foundation is contingent, whatever is
established in terms of the foundation will be contingent as well. Kant was looking for
certainty. Thus, despite apparent similarities in both Aristotle and Kant‘s emphases on
the rational soul, or cognition, respectively, in their accounts of time, I examine relevant
passages from Kant‘s First Critique to argue here for a fundamental dissimilarity
between their two treatments.
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In the first lines of the Introduction to Ausgabe B of the First Critique, Kant‘s
approach already reads like an adaptation of Aristotelian natural philosophy. Regarding
the conditions for experience, Kant writes:
There is no doubt whatever that all our cognition (Erkenntnis) begins with
experience; for how else should the cognitive faculty (Erkenntnisvermögen) be
awakened into exercise if not through objects (Gegenstände) that stimulate our
senses and in part themselves produce representations (Vorstellungen), in part
bring the activity of our understanding (Verstandestätigkeit) into motion
(Bewegung) to compare these, to connect or separate them, and thus to work up
the raw material of sensible impressions into a cognition of objects that is called
experience? As far as time is concerned, then, no cognition in us precedes
experience, and with experience every cognition begins (BI).69
Our cognitive faculty, which exists prior to experience, is only awakened after
experience. This is reminiscent of Aristotle‘s claim in De anima that thinking requires
images. In German, the connection between the words for cognition, Erkenntnis, and for
the cognitive faculty, Erkenntnisvermögen, represent perfectly Kant‘s meaning here.
Cognition happens because of an a priori ability or capacity (Vermögen) for cognition.
There is a potentiality for cognition that exists prior to experience and is awakened by
experience. He explains that the objects of experience play three crucial roles: (1) they
stimulate senses; (2) they produce representations/they appear a certain way to us; (3)
they bring the activity (Tätigkeit) of our understanding (Verstandes) into motion
(Bewegung). Once the understanding, which heretofore has lain dormant with
potentiality, is set into motion, it orders, categorizes, and organizes sense data in order
that it become experience. Yet, as Kant goes on to explain, ―although all our cognition
commences with experience…it does not on that account all arise from experience‖ (BI).
Every cognition begins with experience, but cognition requires certain necessary
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Emphasis is Kant‟s, see footnote c (Guyer and Wood 2009).
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structures of the mind, which exist before all possible experience. Time is one of these.
Time, thus allows for experience.
Kant tells us that Hume awakened him from a ―dogmatic slumber,‖ and Kant‘s
response was to create a system of transcendental idealism, a program that effectually
blended the merits of realism and idealism. In the Ausgabe A Introduction to the First
Critique, which explicitly discussed the idea of transcendental philosophy, a section later
excised for Ausgabe B, Kant explains that while, ―experience is without doubt the first
product that our understanding brings forth as it works on the raw material of sensible
sensations…it is far from the only field to which our understanding can be restricted‖
(A2). He then goes on to explain that anything ―borrowed‖ from experience is uncertain,
and only those cognitions, which are internal and independent of all experience, are
necessary and certain. Kant observes that the experiences we have are mixtures of sense
data with a priori features, which allow for the reception of external sense data at all.
Reality, then, is not located either in the external world or in one‘s mind; it is never
accessible by either, and its appearances are given to us only through a coming together
of both. It limits the scope and possibilities for what pure reason can know, but in so
doing, as Kant reports, it expands the fields about which we can know more. In a note
made in his personal copy of the First Critique, Kant famously likens his approach to
Copernicus‘s discovery of the motion of the heavenly bodies. Kant writes that these,
―would have remained forever undiscovered if Copernicus had not ventured, in a manner
contradictory to the senses yet true, to seek for the observed movements not in the objects
of the heavens but in their observer‖ (Bxxii). For Kant, the possibilities for experience of
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external objects are located within the observer, but contact with these by way of the
bodily sense is required to actualize what he assumes to be potential capacities.
Some readers of Aristotle argue that time for Aristotle is ―unreal,‖ or located in
the rational faculty of the soul. This argument sets them up then to make a case that
Kant‘s treatment of time in the First Critique is Aristotelian. Indeed, there are passages
in Kant‘s treatment of time that sound strangely reminiscent of Aristotle‘s treatise. My
response to these readings of Aristotle and of the similarities between his Treatise on
Time and Kant‘s treatment is that they depend both on a fundamental misreading of
Aristotle and a subsequent misunderstanding of the Kantian project. Chief among the
problems of such a misreading is that the scope and themes of Aristotle‘s Physics and
Kant‘s First Critique are entirely different. Whereas Aristotle seeks the archai of nature,
Kant wants to limit the possibilities of human reason. Since I have argued that Aristotle‘s
Treatise on Time comes out of his general work on nature, it should be clear that Kant‘s
treatment of time could not and in fact does not emerge from such a context.
As I have tried to show, actualized time for Aristotle is the result of an interaction
between more than one being in nature, thus it is based on a lack of distinction between
the human being and the rest of nature. It arises from the meeting of an external object in
motion and the perceptive and calculative faculties of a human being. Potential time
exists despite perception and calculation, as it is an attribute of movement. For Kant,
time is not an attribute of motion at all, and the noumenal world, or reality, exists without
time. Time is a way for an observer to sequence events in order to make sense of them,
i.e. in order to experience them. There is no possibility on Kant‘s account that experience
of the external world happens outside of time. It is a condition of all experience, which
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happens regardless of whether or not the person making the observations is aware of it or
intends it. In short, there is no on/off switch. In the rest of this chapter, I will examine
Kant‘s treatment of time from the Transcendental Aesthetic (from the Greek aistheisis,
perception by the senses) in the First Critique in an effort to show that it is an
unnecessary adulteration of Aristotle‘s treatise on time. It obfuscates and generally
distorts the advantages of Aristotle‘s project. 70
I.

Context of Kant‘s Treatment of Time
Kant‘s treatment of time is found in paragraphs four through seven of both the A

and B Ausgabe, Section II, Part I, the Transcendental Aesthetic, of the first section of the
First Critique, entitled the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements. Before we look at his
treatment of time itself, however, I discuss its context.
Kant introduces the Transcendental Aesthetic with some important definitions.
The term intuition, or Anschauung, means, ―whatever way and through whatever means a
cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates immediately to them, and at
which all thought as a means is directed as an end‖ (A19/B33). Cognitions only relate to
objects, however, when two sufficient and necessary conditions have been fulfilled: (1)
70

Not so long ago, I was a proponent of this view. Thanks to the organizers of the 2011
ATINER conference in Athens for the opportunity to deliver an early draft from my
project. There was a lively question and answer period, which allowed me to confront
just how Kantian my reading of Aristotle had been. My project then became to read Kant
through Aristotle instead of the other way around. Thanks also to the organizers and
invited participants of the 2012 International Aristotle Symposium in Thessaloniki,
Greece. Over the course of our stay, the issue of the unreality of time in Aristotle was a
popular topic for discussion. It was brought to my attention during one of these
conversations that opponents to the view that time is “unreal” in Aristotle believe that this
is a Kantian reading of Aristotle. This spurred me to try and show that this idea seems to
equivocate on “unreal” and prompted me to write a chapter exploring the differences
between the two approaches as preparatory to my intended discussion of what I have
observed to be certain Aristotelian elements in Schelling‟s Naturphilosophie.
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the object is given to human sensibility, and (2) the object affects the mind by way of
sensibility. The relationship among objects (Gegenstände), thought (Der Verstand), and
sensibility (Sinnlichkeit) is argued as follows (A19/B33):
P1: Sensibility is receptivity to the representations of external objects and
capacity to acquire them.
Therefore, objects are given to us via sensibility.
P1: Sensibility gives us the object.
P2: Objects are related to cognition by intuitions.
Therefore, sensibility alone affords us intuitions.
P1: Intuitions are thought through the understanding.
P2: Concepts arise via the understanding.
Therefore, all thought, whether directly or indirectly is related to
intuitions. And by P2 above, it is related to sensibility, too.
Thus, objects and sensibility allow for intuitions, which come to be experienced by way
of the understanding. Kant defines sensation as ―the effect of an object on the capacity
for representation, insofar as we are affected by it‖; empirical as ―that intuition which is
related to the object through sensation‖; and appearance as ―the undetermined object of
an empirical intuition‖ (A20/B34). He then goes on to explain that the appearances of
objects we sense perceive are the ―matter‖ of experience; whereas, the a priori intuitions
that allow sensibility to bring external objects to cognition are the ―form.‖ There is an
important distinction in Kant between epistemology and metaphysics, or a theory of
knowledge and a theory of realty. As I have worked to show, this is a distinction we do
not find in Aristotle, although it is often imposed on his work. For Kant, the nature of
reality is permanently and irretrievably unknown to us. What we can know of the world
is precisely whatever we are able to make of the appearances of external objects in
conjunction with what he argues here to be a priori forms of intuition. Form and matter
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no longer mean, as they do in Aristotle, a necessary composition of substantial being.
Rather, they amount to what the human being can determine about the world given a
priori capacities for knowledge, sense faculties, and the opportunity to encounter objects
in the world. This view is a consequence of transcendental philosophy because there is a
―real‖ component to experience, i.e. the appearance, or matter as well as an ―ideal‖
component, i.e. the a priori intuitions, or form.
In what remains of the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant argues that both space and
time are the two a priori forms of sensible intuition, and he works through each in turn.
The argument for space (der Raum) is as follows (paragraph 3, B41):
P1: Geometry is a science that determines the properties of space
synthetically and a priori.
P2: (assumed) There must be a representation of space, which allows for
such a cognition to be possible.
P3: From mere concepts no propositions can be drawn that go beyond the
concept.
P4: (from Introduction V) In geometry, propositions can be drawn that go
beyond the concept.
Therefore, space must be an intuition (Anschauung).
P1: Space must be an intuition.
P2: All geometric propositions are apodictic, e.g. space has only
three dimensions.
P3: (by definition) Only a priori intuitions are pure (rein
Anschauung), necessary and not empirical.
Therefore, the intuition of space must be encountered in us a priori.
The consequences of such a view include: (1) ―space represents no property at all of any
things in themselves nor any relation of them to each other‖; (2) ―space is nothing other
than merely the form of all appearances of outer sense, i.e. the subjective condition of
sensibility, under which alone outer intuition is possible for us‖ (A26/B42). And these
amount practically to the fact that, ―we can accordingly speak of space, extended beings,
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and so on, only from the human standpoint‖; outside of which, ―the representation of
space signifies nothing at all‖ (A26/B42). But, this is not to say that space for Kant is a
figment of the imagination. For him, it exists but only under specific conditions. For this
reason, he concludes, ―we therefore assert the empirical reality of space (with respect to
all possible outer experience), though to be sure its transcendental ideality, i.e. that it is
nothing as soon as we leave aside the condition of the possibility of all experience, and
take it as something that grounds the things in themselves‖ (A28/B44). In sum, space
does not exist qua itself and has no bearing whatsoever on things in themselves.
However, in so far as human beings experience the external world, space as an a priori
intuition is requisite for that experience to exist. In so far as space is requisite for the
experiences, it exists. When we are no longer talking about external objects in terms of
experience, we likewise have no grounds to posit space.
It is important to note here that Kant‘s treatment of space is divergent from
Aristotle‘s account of place in crucial ways. And, we cannot let ourselves be fooled by
Kant‘s initial entry into the First Critique where it looked as though he shared an
important foundation of his inquiry with Aristotle—one with regard to the distinction
between potentiality and actuality. First of all, as I have mentioned, it does not come
from out of a general examination of nature‘s archai, nor more specifically, from the
assumption that it is an attribute of motion, which is believed to be the defining
characteristic of natural objects. Second, Aristotle does not much mention space and
generally seems to believe that space is real and widely existent. Aristotle is interested in
place in his natural philosophy to the extent that place, as the outside limit of a body, is
anterior to, and in fact allows for, kinêsis. For Aristotle, place is in no sense ideal; it has
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for Aristotle what Kant would consider empirical reality both as a potentiality and as an
actuality.
II.

Kant‘s Treatment of Time
Kant begins the section on time with a Metaphysical exposition and then makes a

few additions regarding motion in a subsequent paragraph premising the Transcendental
exposition. Kant‘s arguments for his concept of time are as follows (A31/B46-B49):
P1: Simultaneity or succession would not themselves come into perception
if the representation of time (Die Vorstellung der Zeit) did not ground
them a priori.
P2: One represents that things happen at the same time (simultaneously) or
in different times (successively) only after presupposing time.
Therefore, time is not an empirical concept (kein empirischer Begriff) that
is somehow drawn from (abgezogen von) an experience.
P1: One cannot remove time from appearances (Anschauung).
P2: One can take the appearance away from time.
Therefore, time is given a priori.
P1: Time is given a priori.
P2: In time alone is all actuality of appearances possible.
Therefore, time is a necessary representation that grounds all
intuitions.
P1: It is possible that there are apodictic principles of relations of
time, e.g. time has only one dimension.
P2: These principles could not be drawn from experience.
Therefore, the a priori necessity of time grounds these principles.
P1: Different times are only parts of one and the same time.
P2: The representation of time can only be given through a single
object.
P3: The representation of time is an intuition.
P4: (assumed) There are propositions about time.
P4: Propositions about time, e.g. different times cannot be
simultaneous, cannot be derived from a general concept.
P5: Propositions about time are synthetic.
P6: Propositions about time must be contained in the intuition and
representation of time.
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Therefore, time is a pure form of sensible intuition and not a
general concept.
P1: (assumed) There is an infinitude (Die Unendlichkeit) of time.
P2: The infinitude of time signifies nothing but that every
determinate magnitude of time is only possible through limitations
of a single time grounding it.
P3: The parts of time known through limitation must be grounded
by immediate intuition.
Therefore, the original representation of time must be given as
unlimited.
P1: Motion is alteration of place.
P2: Motion is only possible through and in the representation of
time.
P3: Locomotion is a combination of contradictorily opposed
predicates in one and the same object, e.g. a thing‘s being in a
place and the not-being of the very same thing in the same place.
P4: If the representation of time were not an a priori intuition, then
no concept could make comprehensible the possibility of
locomotion.
P5: Only in time, through succession, can both contradictorily
opposed determinations in one thing be encountered.
Therefore, time as an a priori form of sensible intuition explains
the possibility of as much synthetic a priori cognition as is
presented by the general theory of motion.
The conclusions of Kant‘s view, then, are that (1) time cannot exist qua itself as an
object; (2) time is a form of our inner sense, which allows us to relate the representations
we receive by way of our senses: and, (3) time is the a priori condition for all appearances
and together with space, allows for experience of external objects at all. And, the
implications of this view are that time is on the one hand empirically real in that it
permits experience of appearances and without it there would be no human perception of
external objects. On the other hand, it is itself objectively nothing outside of the
apparatus of human perception. It is something inside of the human subject, but it is
nothing outside of the human subject (A35/B51).
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While some have attributed a similar position to Aristotle, we have seen that for
Aristotle time is not a condition of human experience. Since actual time for him requires
an interaction between the perceptive and rational faculties of the human being, together
with external kinêsis, there is the possibility for human error and potential miscalculation
of time and/or misapprehension of time. This possibility is explored by Aristotle in
Physics iv 11 when he discuses the fabled heroes of Sardinia. Because time awareness
for him requires both perception and intellection of motion, when there is no perception
of change, the change cannot be and is not counted. When the fabled heroes awoke, they
counted the ―now‖ they experienced as no different than the ―now‖ they experienced
upon going to sleep. Because there was no perception of change in the interim, there was
no possibility for the bringing into actuality of time. This meant that the fabled heroes
did not experience actual time because they did not properly relate to the goings on
around them. On the Kantian view, there is no possibility for the fabled heroes to
misperceive motion and consequently to misapprehend the passing of time. For Kant, as
we saw above, motion is only possible because time is an apriori intuition of the subject.
Without time as an intuition, he argues, motions are not possible (B54).
Kant‘s view is in part intended as a challenge to Newtonian physics, especially
Newton‘s theory of absolute space-time. Newtonian physics was the most formidable
challenge to Aristotelian physics. It is perhaps in part Kant‘s contention with Newton
that had him seemingly siding with Aristotle and promoting what some misread to be
Aristotelian idealism. For Kant, Newtonian space-time makes synthetic a priori
propositions impossible because space and time exists objectively qua themselves in the
world. Because they exist in the world, they are known to us a posteriori instead of a
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priori. The consequence of this is that Newtonian time is neither necessary nor certain,
which renders any conclusions based on temporal succession—or, on any other principle
or property of time—not absolutely true. In the case of geometric truths, Kant notes, this
is wholly damning, as geometric axioms—and really mathematical doctrines in general—
become contingent.
Although Kant‘s treatment of time is fundamentally different from the account
Aristotle proposed, Kant did provoke a school of thought that seems to have returned to
what I consider to be an Aristotelian approach, i.e. an approach that developed a theory of
time from a theory of nature and emphasized the role of potentiality in both. Early
Schellingian Naturphilosophie sought to understand nature as an interrelated and integral
system. The approach was a simultaneous rejection of Cartesianism and of Kantian
category distinction from Kant‘s critical works; mind (Geist) and matter are not two
differentiated entities, nor are time and space and attributes of matter given to experience
by way of consciousness. Thus, a theory of time derived from such a theory would have
to be the result of an interaction among the distinct yet undifferentiated parts of nature;
time could not have been considered an independent being that was a natural being itself.
Instead, it had to be the name for a type of actualization that comes out of the system of
nature. In an effort to provide some evidence of this conjecture, in the next chapter I
provide a reading of a portion of F.W.J. Schelling‘s 1797 work, Abhandlungen zur
Erlaeuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre, a work from Schelling‘s purported
―Kantian/Fichtean‖ period where Schelling introduces what seems to be an early version
of the analytic of nature he would articulate in later works.
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Chapter 5: Time‘s Place in Schelling‘s Early Naturphilosophie

Schelling wanted us to understand nature as something to which we are
inextricably related—and not just to understand, but to act as such.71 The divide between
subject and object, knower and known, could not simply be maintained. In fact, the two
are not separate entities at all. I, as the observer, am of the same substance as that which
I observe. There is a problem of first beginnings. Namely, we have to start somewhere,
so where is that starting point? How do we first say anything about nature when we are
supposedly the same as nature; what position can we take up? When we question the
position of knower, we call into question the Kantian view on time. This is to say that if
we posit the knower as the one contributing temporal succession to nature, it is hard to
understand how we derive time from nature when nature and subject are one and the
same. Schelling‘s work ultimately posits an absolute whence consciousness and nature
eventually emerge as two sides of one entity; they stand together in eternal and ceaseless,
yet productive, tension. What this tells us about time, then, is that it is not conceived of
as a linear progression. The idea of end or progress in Schelling is overcome by a view
that contraries give identity to one another and would thus destroy this identity were one
to sublate the other. Instead, Schelling stresses productivity, as opposed to the Hegelian
Aufhebung, or preserving negation. Schelling‘s view of nature benefits not only from
Fichte‘s subject-object dualism, though Schelling ultimately rejects Fichte‘s dualism on
account of the position Fichte grants the subject, but also recaptures the Platonic play
71

See Iain Hamilton Grant‟s (Grant 2005, 1) proposal that Schelling‟s Naturphilosophie
is meant to be literally generative, i.e. that through which nature produces itself v. coming
to know itself.
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between contraries in the Timaeus, between same and other. Thus, Schelling‘s view of
time emerges from his general, yet highly nuanced, understanding of nature as dynamic
organism.
In this chapter, my aim is to suggest that Schelling‘s early Naturphilosophie
presupposes his later articulations of time insofar as it sets itself up for a theory of time
that comes from a foregoing theory of nature. In this sense, I link Schelling to Aristotle
and propose that, though ultimately their philosophies of nature are very different, both
thinkers emphasize the modality of potentiality at the heart of the way natural beings are.
This potentiality does not simply allow for but demands an ongoing relationship between
various parts of nature and subsumes all natural beings under one umbrella, rather than
dissociating ―mind‖ from ―matter.‖ Whereas for Aristotle this umbrella was the principle
of nature for natural beings, for Schelling it is an original underlying unity. It is then in
and through the fundamental relationality of natural beings in nature that allows for a
concept of time on both accounts. Though their ideas about time also differ, Schelling
demonstrates a return to the fundamental Aristotelian thought that time is nothing real
itself and comes from the way natural beings interact with each other, i.e. with the way
natural beings exist qua themselves. In what follows, I will (1) situate Schelling‘s early
Naturphilosophie in the context of Kantian critical philosophy and in Schelling‘s oeuvre,
(2) offer a reading of chapter two of Schelling‘s Abhandlungen zur Erlaeuterung des
Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre (1796/1797),72 wherein Schelling introduces a way to
understand nature as founded on interactions between potentiality and actuality, form and
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matter, and subject and object, and (3) conclude with some reflections on the association
I make between Schelling‘s early Naturphilosophie, which I will argue already points to
the view of time as a relation that, as it has been argued, emerges from Schelling‘s
slightly later Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature, and the understanding of Aristotelian time
for which I have previously argued.
I.

Situating Schelling‘s Early Naturphilosophie
Schelling was a prolific writer but is generally considered to have been an

inconsistent thinker (Cf. Grant 2006, 5-6: that naturephilosophy is core to, rather than a
phase of, Schellingianism and Snow 1996, 3-4: that the tension between contraries in
Schelling‘s system is both the key hermeneutical principle to understanding his thought
and that by which we see Schelling‘s work as evolutionary instead of chameleon-like).
Scholars have traditionally organized his writings on the basis of methodology—
Schelling‘s early period as the ―negative philosophy,‖ and his more mature period as the
―positive philosophy‖ (Cf. Grant 2006, 5: ―the periodizing tendency…is at best
misleading‖). The sense in which negative is intended here refers to the influence of
Kant‘s critical philosophy, and so too of post-Kantian critical thinkers like Fichte, on
Schelling‘s work. To this end, it has been observed that his earliest philosophy of nature
is a synthesis of Kantian critical philosophy and Fichtean subject-object dialectic73—a
dialectic said to have been based on the subject (human beings), which resulted in an
internal problem of the other or object (nature), and as it has been claimed, a ―hatred‖ of
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2006, 3), and Breazeale (in Fichte 1994, xxviii, xxv-xxx) on the early influence of Fichte
on Schelling.
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the other.74 After publishing the first edition of Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature in
1797, which was at the time Schelling‘s most complete articulation of his analytic of
nature, Schelling wrote a second edition that seemed largely to move past the Fichtean
influence and instead draw from neo-Platonic themes (Stern in Schelling 1988, xx-xxi).
For Schelling‘s work, this meant a departure from an explanation of nature as
dialectically created by the subject and an alignment with a theory of differentiation that
comes first from an original unity, the absolute (das Unbedingte). This theoretical turn
has been described as a turn toward monism, beginning from ―one,‖ eternally productive
of ―many‖ (Stern in Schelling 1988, xxi). Not unlike the struggle we see with the
Milesian Pre-Socratic philosophers Anaximander and Anaximenes, who sought to
explain the coming into being of nature, which is to say the differentiation of beings,
from a single boundless first element, Schelling posited an absolute whence
differentiation in being emerged. Schelling‘s interest was not in deciding whether the
philosopher should start from a critical or ―idealist‖ standpoint or a dogmatic or ―realist‖
one, as had been Kant and Fichte before him. 75 Schelling argued that either starting point
was plausible and instead focused on what he thought to be the true single task of
philosophy, i.e. to understand how nature moves from an undifferentiated first beginning
to differentiation in being. For Schelling, this would eventually become a matter of
identifying three potencies (Potenzen) in the unfolding of unity to difference, ultimately
an inversion of the triads in Kantian categories. For Schelling, the most important
category was relation insofar as Schelling‘s rethinking of the organism of nature placed
human beings back into nature and made the human mind one element of the greater
74
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See Merleau-Ponty‟s report of Jasper‟s characterization (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 48).
See Breazeale (in Fichte 1994, xxv-xxvi, x) on Schelling‟s terminology.
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community of natural beings. 76 The turn from Kantian-Fichtean influenced critical
philosophy to what has been called an archē philosophy is considered to be Schelling‘s
turn from Naturphilosophie to Identity Philosophy, which occupied him up until he made
a final turn to an interest in the philosophy of mythology and to the position of
empiricism in philosophy, a period now referred to as his ―positive philosophy.‖
Schelling‘s Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre
(1796/97), Treatise Explaining the Idealism of the Science of Knowledge, is a lesserknown text from his early Naturphilosophie where Schelling ostensibly responds to
Fichte‘s Wissenschaftslehre (1796). When first published in the Philosophisches Journal
under the title, ―Survey of the Most Recent Philosophical Literature‖ (1797), it amounted
to a series of essays discussing in fact the critical program more generally and its
implications for practical philosophy, moreso Kant‘s contribution than Fichte‘s (Pfau
1994, 61). 77
In this text, one notices that Schelling is interested neither in how we know
something in nature, nor even in what we can know about nature; instead, he argues that
these questions entail a bifurcation of materiality from the conditions under which the
material comes to be—a speculative enterprise that is an impossible move in reality.
Schelling demonstrates a middle way (I/1, 365) whereby he will not focus on a false
notion of cause and effect in nature, which results from our need to separate the
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inseparable and to understand becoming as a linear enterprise, but will inquire into the
necessary presence of the idea of an external world in our minds. His brief inquiry leads
him ultimately to conclude that all contraries exist cohesively as one. Infinite and finite,
subject and object, matter and form, not only define each other but are absolutely
inextricable from one another. Schelling‘s move from thinking with Fichte, that the
subject creates nature, to understanding subject and object as two parts of nature having
emerged from, i.e. within, the same eternal unity, called into question the Kantian
assumption that space and time were conditions for all human experience of the external
world. On Schelling‘s proposal, there was no longer linearity in experience, no ―before‖
meaning cause and no ―after‖ meaning effect. Thus, time had to be, while not precisely
derived by one natural being from the experience of change, a relation among the various
instantiations of the absolute, or unity, of nature.
In Schelling‘s earliest Naturphilosophie, we do not yet find the ideas about time
that he would later articulate alongside his own analytic of nature, for example in Ideas
for a Philosophy of Nature and in The System of Transcendental Idealism. In the
Abhandlung, by contrast, we find Schelling explaining the critical tradition, seemingly
justifying it, but ultimately moving away from it. Schelling‘s departure from Kant and
Fichte is apparent especially in chapter two of this work, where Schelling seemingly
proposes to defend the critical position insofar as he claims it to be a reasonable system
based on human reason, but instead seems to issue a backhanded critique of the
assumption on behalf of the critical philosophers to try and limit the bounds of pure
reason by way of their own use of reason. Schelling then offers an alternative way to
think about the relationship of mind (Geist) and matter in nature. In his rethinking of the
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way mind and matter exist for each other, Schelling challenges Cartesian dualism,
Newtonian physics, and Kantian and Fichtean critical philosophy. Schelling emphasizes
the dynamic relationality of matter and mind, leaving open the question as to how one
understands temporality in the context of this burgeoning new system.

II.

A Reading of Chapter Two from Schelling‘s Abhandlungen zur Erlaeuterung des
Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre
Schelling begins the chapter with an observation: he has heard it asked how the

system of the critical philosophers could be conceived, let alone seem convincing to
others. He promises to respond to this question in the present chapter. Schelling
summarizes the main position as, ―the form of our knowledge comes from ourselves, the
material of the same thing, i.e. our knowledge, is given to us from outside‖ (I/1, 363).
And, he casts doubt on the idea that, on the one hand, knowledge is a hylomorphic
construct, composed by the marriage of real outside material with the likewise real
internal structure of consciousness, while on the other hand—as the critical philosophy
holds, limiting our knowledge—the possibility for this marriage—by calling into
question the capability of our consciousness to know the outside world. Schelling
criticizes these two tenets as inconsistent. How can we have a theory of knowledge not
grounded in our capability for human knowledge?
According to Schelling, no reasonable person would advance a critical position
not grounded in human nature:
I am of the firm conviction that no people not entirely bereft of reason have stated
something in speculative things for which there would be found no ground in
human nature itself. Were it impossible to elicit the source of speculative deceit,
we would need to consider its entire abandonment, keeping others away from
doubt. In hindsight, we would be leaving—each of us—our research to blind
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chance. A general distrust of human reason would bring us neither to a clear
opinion for ourselves, nor to a consensus with others. The reason to act at the
present is thus to disprove an inconsistent idea, to show the reason in the
seemingly irrational opinions (I/1, 363).
This is to say, that Schelling is about to propose a response to those critical of the critical
position, at least on these grounds. He thus begins again, introducing what is perhaps his
most provocative claim in this chapter. He writes that ―although in our knowledge itself
both form and material are intimately united, it is but clear, that philosophy sublates this
hypothetical unity in order to explain it‖ (I/1, 364). For Schelling, knowledge is going to
be the product of a relationship between the knower—Kant‘s transcendental ego and
Fichte‘s ―I‖—and what it knows. Knowledge is not going to depend on the a priori
intuition of the human mind to sequence and organize external phenomena for subsequent
digestion, as it was for Kant, nor the subsuming of the object, or other, by the subject, as
it was for Fichte. Instead, the knower and the known are one and the same thing, and
their internal opposition, e.g. ―I‖ and ―not-I,‖ allows us to differentiate by way of
reflection ourselves from the outside world.
The idea that the form of knowledge comes from a framework internal to human
consciousness, while the material make-up of knowledge—the referent of knowledge—
comes from the world external to human consciousness, is according to Schelling based
in an understanding of human nature. But, the basis of the distinction between form and
material itself is supposed only as a philosophical exercise; it is not meant to be an
ontology—an investigation into the being of—knowledge. For Schelling, it is clear that
this formulation is a generalization, which helps us to analyze the composition of
knowledge. However, as he goes on to explain, the idea that form is internal and material
is external truly is meant only for the purposes of philosophical analysis. This seems to
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be Schelling‘s way of saying that the critical project, while purported to be an effort to
limit the reach of human reason, is undertaken on the basis of certain assumptions about
the human mind, namely that it is fundamentally separate from nature and that its own
potentiality for speculation can be used to justify conclusions about (1) how it knows
things and (2) what it can know. Schelling is here calling into question that mind and
matter are fundamentally different from each other. By analogy, we can make
Schelling‘s distinction here more clear. When we are baking bread, we must properly
assemble, mix, and heat yeast, flour, and water. The finished product, the bread, could
never be literally disassembled to show flour, yeast, and water. These ingredients when
simply mixed do not make bread. There are added conditions that are required in order to
produce bread as an outcome. One needs to have mixed, kneaded, and heated the
ingredients properly. Yet, for the purposes of analysis, we could discuss the creation of
bread as the coming together of certain materials (e.g. yeast, flour, water) and
form/conditions (e.g. heat, mixing, kneading). Bread is something different from the
mere sum of its parts, and its parts are something more than their contributions to the
product of bread. There is a change undergone of the materials in the coming together of
the bread. Bread is an inextricable and quite particular combination of the ―form‖ and the
―materials.‖
It is an ancient tradition, he notes to have ―considered form and material as the
two extremes of our knowledge‖ (I/1, 364). When we are wondering about the
knowledge we have, or, as in the case of the Pre-Socratic philosophers, we are trying to
establish knowledge based on concrete empirical evidence, it makes sense that we try to
break it off into parts and kinds. After all, knowledge about what or why things are has
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to do in particular with a scrutinizing analysis into what causes and/or composes the
things. In the case of bread, we are putting components together in a particular way in
order to elicit a certain product; whereas, in the case of getting to know something, we
are acquainted with the product by way of sense data, and then we come to understand it
by way of analysis. Certainly, this is the method we see in Aristotle‘s Physics. In the
opening paragraphs, we learn that Aristotle‘s most general work on nature will begin with
what is most generally known and will proceed to learn of the causes, primary elements,
and principles of natural objects. But, this method of dissection ends up undermining the
very being of knowledge itself, which is made not unlike the bread—as an inextricable
synthesis between certain material components and the conditions under which these
components maintain a relationship with each other to form something altogether
different. Knowledge is a product; it is not a substantial being itself.
Schelling goes on to note that an effect of dissecting knowledge into material, on
the one hand, and form, on the other, is that the material becomes the ―substrate of all our
explanations‖ (I/1, 364). Bread is ―yeast, water, and flour‖; everything is ―water,‖ or
―aer‖ and it is what happens to these materials, which allows for them to become
something else. And, the consequence of this is that the question regarding the source of
material is not asked. Schelling continues, however, to show that there are some
phenomena that cannot be explained by accounting for a material substrate. Namely,
immaterial causal relationships: ―regular occurring phenomena that follow one another,
in particular things that could be purposive‖ (I/1, 364). Schelling explains that causal
relationships come to be known to us as inextricable from the objects involved in the
relationship. It seems impossible to disassociate the material, which causes or results
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from a causal interaction from the conditions by which the cause/effect relationship was
undergone. As a point of illustration, we can recall Anaximander‘s challenge to Thales‘s
purported thesis that all things come from water (11A12). If all nature comes from a
principle form, and that principle form is material, then—as Anaximander realized—it
seems impossible that all things have become what they are as a result of this initial
material substance. How can one material become all other materials in the world?
Instead, he supposedly argued that the first principle was indefinite and boundless,
immaterial infinite (12B1 + A9). We are told that opposition, according to Anaximander,
came from this initial boundless infinite (12A10). In the case of Thales‘s proposal, we
have a material substrate for all of nature. But, Anaximander refutes this idea as
impossible. Was his opposition to the fact that from one specific material substance, all
things are produced, or to the idea that all material diversity comes from a material
beginning?78 He may have realized that the only way we get diversity in materiality is
from an immaterial beginning, i.e. from conditions that effect materiality.
If we have a material beginning, then the form of the material will follow—we get
an infinity of diverse forms. And, if we have an immaterial beginning, then we have
form preceding material. But, the phenomena of cause and effect seems inappropriate as
a means to understanding, as Schelling puts it, ―this inseparable alliance‖ of conditions
and material (I/1, 364). Thus, Schelling promises to begin this chapter yet again, leaving
behind the question about the ―source of a world outside ourselves‖ (I/1, 364). He turns
instead to the question of how, ―the idea of the world came to be in us‖ (I/1, 364).
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He further clarifies the modality of his question: he is not after the possibility of
ideas of external things inside of us, but the necessity of the idea (I/1, 365). Further, he
is after the reasons why we seek a correlation between the ideas of outside things we have
inside us and outside things themselves; why do we not stop with the idea inside of us?
Schelling responds to this unasked question: ―real‖ knowledge, we assume, is the
correspondence of an idea of outside things with outside things themselves.

Thus, in

our possession of knowledge and desire for more knowledge, we have come to ask about
the being of knowledge. We verify truth based on this correlation between thoughts and
phenomena.
Schelling puts the problem this way: in our knowledge, there is an absolute
meeting between object and idea, but in speculation we can separate the two in an effort
to ask the kind of questions he is after. Once the separation has been proposed, however,
it is impossible to think again the unmediated relationship between the two. And, the
questions regarding cause and effect begin (I/1, 365). The point here is that as soon as
we ask about the relationship between matter and form, or object and idea, we try to
respond to the question in a linear way—one has to follow the other; one has to come
first. It is impossible for us to think of the two together, simultaneous, and independent
at the same time. Because the task is impossible, we never satisfactorily answer the
question.
Schelling‘s solution has to do with some self-reflection and investigation. He
argues that the only example of a being that looks at itself, i.e. a being that is in some
situations both the knower and the known, the one intuiting and that which is being
intuited, is a human being (I/1, 366). We are examples of this type of being—a being that
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has the unmediated ―I,‖ ―through which one knows and understands before anything
else‖ (I/1, 366). On the converse, in knowing any other external object, the object is
mediated by the ―I‖. In a slight twist on Kant‘s famous claim that existence has no
predicate, Schelling then concludes that, ―the essence or being (Wesen) of mind (Geistes)
[is] that it is for itself and no other predicate has an itself‖ (I/1, 366). Schelling thus
returns to his quest to identify our impulse to understand the possibility of the
correspondence between idea and object. He argues for the need to prove that mind only
intuits itself in order to show the absolute correspondence of idea and object. This move
is based on three accepted premises: (1) Mind intuits objects overall; (2) The reality of all
our knowledge is based in the absolute correspondence of idea and object, and (3) Only
in the self-intuition of a mind is there identity from idea and object (I/1, 366). Schelling‘s
plan for the demonstration begins with two steps: (1) supposing that the subject and
object are in us, i.e. the intuiting and intuited are identical, and (2) the mind‘s name is ―I‖
only when it is an object for itself (I/1, 366).
Schelling defends (2) above. Mind cannot be an object originally, as object is,
―something dead, calm, without ability for self-action, object is only the object
(Gegenstand) of action,‖ (I/1, 367). Thus, object cannot mean that which acts. Instead, it
is a subject, which acts itself. This becomes, then, the primary distinction Schelling
defends as that which separates the identity of subject from that of object. As Schelling
goes on to explain, a subject is an eternal (ewiges) becoming. 79 Part of this becoming is
becoming object to itself by way of acting. So, mind is first subject and becomes object
through the ongoing unfolding of itself by way of acting (I/1, 367). Indeed, Schelling
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underlines the importance of the self-action by which the mind, as subject, becomes
object through itself. Assuming that philosophy takes place with the mind, he concludes
that, ―philosophy begins with deed and action, and precisely therefore mind would not be
(per se) originally object‖ (I/1, 367).
Schelling continues, explaining that object is originally, thus necessarily finite.
Since mind is not originally finite, it is not necessarily finite. Schelling questions, thus,
whether it is infinite in nature. But, he notes that the peculiar characteristic of mind,
which makes it mind in the first place, is that it is not only originally subject, but also an
object in virtue of the fact that it makes itself an object to itself. Thus, since it is mind,
i.e. both subject and object, it can only be such because it is partly object. Since object is
finite, mind must be in some sense finite too. Schelling plays with the theme of
inextricable contraries, concluding that since mind is both subject and, subject‘s contrary,
object, it must also be both finite and infinite. He explains this seeming impossibility as
possible: ―it is neither infinite without becoming finite, nor can it become finite (for
itself) without being infinite. It is not of either, neither infinite nor finite, alone, but in
mind is the primordial union of the infinite and finite (a new condition of the character of
mind‖ (I/1, 367). Mind is finite because it is object, and object is not infinite. It is
something that is and will eventually no longer be. But, it is also infinite because it
endlessly re-produces itself as object. Once produced, an object is a finite product of the
subject, which by definition, is capable of infinite production.
Schelling notes that the idea of an immediate transition from finite to infinite is an
ancient concept, which was later covered over by theories of emanation, and later,
Spinozism. The reference seems to be an implicit allusion to Aristotle‘s infinite, which
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Aristotle argued for in the third book of the Physics. Not unlike Aristotle, Schelling‘s
emphasis here is on infinity of potentiality instead of on infinity of actuality, i.e. of a real
substance. As we saw in chapter one, the idea that infinity exists only in relation to the
potentiality (e.g. potentiality of division, addition, production, etc.) of a finite object.
Schelling continues, explaining that, ―it was not until later ages that inane systems
attempted to find intermediate links between the infinite and the finite‖ (I/1, 368). These
attempts, however, result in solutions comprised wholly of finite things. And, he
concludes, this is problematic because finite things and ideas cannot explain cause and
effect. The result of this, then, is that we find a need for philosophy. Without this
problem, notes Schelling, there is no need for philosophy because all knowledge can be
obtained by way of empirical investigations. It is the inextricable and original nature of
the finite and the infinite, he claims, that founds the ―being (Wesen) of an individual
nature (the ego)‖ (I/1, 368). This follows from the identity of the mind as that which is
both subject and object for itself, i.e. from the ―possibility of self-consciousness,‖ he
explains; only in self-consciousness do we see the marrying of a finite object with the
infinity of possible production by the subject.
For Schelling, this amounts to the fact that we are originally either infinite or
finite. If the former is the case, we do not comprehend the finite ideas and conditions
within us, and if the latter is the case, the idea of infinity seems to be inexplicable. Since,
as Schelling goes on to claim, the mind exists, thus sees everything only through its own
lens—which, as Schelling notes, means that it exists, and sees, through its own action—is
a false dichotomy. While Schelling may think it the case that the fundamental opposition
between the contraries is infinite, each action performed by the mind is a finite action.
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There is no way to explain the original nature of the ego as either infinite or finite, as the
two are inseparable. And, Schelling here returns to his previous theme regarding the
method by which we come to think of contraries as separate in identity from each other,
i.e. the finite and the infinite here ―should be distinguished only in their mutual
relationship with each other‖ (I/1, 368).
The infinite nature of the opposition marries the contraries. But, as Schelling
explains, it is only through the action of the mind that one comes to know the contrary
activities. Because this is the case, however, the activities are not seen as contraries.
Instead, they are thought to be one and the same action of the mind, and Schelling
identifies this action to be intuition (I/1, 368). Intuition does not imply consciousness,
and yet it is a necessary precondition for consciousness. Consciousness, after all, is that
through which one distinguishes the opposed activities. Schelling describes the
contrariness in terms of ―positive‖ and ―negative,‖ following up with the depictions,
―filled in circle,‖ and ―outline of a circle‖ (I/1, 368). Finally, he provides an analogue for
the positive, filled in circle, which are the actions from outside of the mind, and for the
negative, outline of a circle, we have the actions internal to the mind (I/1, 369). Schelling
argues that existence is not predicated on being alive, but rather in being affected by
conditions. He uses the example of a dead body, which is no longer alive or being
there—―it is not,‖ but which ―is there‖ in the world. The mind ―is,‖ then by the
conditions it imposes on itself for itself. This is to say that mind ―limits itself in its
activity…mind is itself not other than this activity and this limit, both as simultaneously
thought‖ (I/1, 369). This is to express that mind‘s infinite potential for infinite action, is
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self-limited by its finite actions.80 The potential for action is unlimited, but the actual
action is not.
In this vein, then, Schelling writes that, ―by limiting itself mind is at the same
time active and passive (leidend), and because without this action also there would be no
consciousness of our nature, so would be this absolute unity of activity and passivity of
character of the individual nature‖ (I/1, 369). Because the mind is not just a subject and
not just an object, but both, it is likewise not just infinite and not just finite, but both.
And, finally, it is not just form and not just matter, but both. As such, it is similarly both
activity and passivity. Without being infinite and finite, active and passive, it could not
be both subject and object—subject and object for itself. So, the possibility of the unity
of contraries are both the necessary and sufficient conditions for mind itself. Without this
unity, there could be no consciousness for a subject of itself as object. Likewise, we
could imagine a general lack of ability for any type of reflective intuition. The only
possibility for perception would have to be naïve realism, where the subject does not
even realize him or herself as the filter through which all external material are given.
Schelling goes on to discuss the interrelatedness between activity and passivity
when he describes passivity as ―not other than negative activity‖ (IW, 369). Passivity
does not and cannot exist without its contrary because, as Schelling goes on to explain,
―an absolutely passive being (Wesen) is an absolute nothingness (a nihil privativum)‖
(I/1, 369). The confluence and absolute simultaneity of activity and passivity are the
ground for the existence of mind, or intellect (―intellectual nature‖). Schelling notes that
―all philosophers have realized this,‖ and it seems fair to take this as at least a partial
80

This notion of mind as self-limiting seems to be an inchoate version of Schelling‟s later
articulations of time as relation in the System of Transcendental Idealism.
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reference to Aristotle, though perhaps also as a dismissal of the Eleatic school. We will
come back to this idea.
Without the unity of these contraries, ideas (vorstellungen)—though, not external
objects—become impossible. As Schelling has previously discussed, it is the mind as
subject, which acts and in that process becomes object to itself. The infinity of possible
action characteristic of the mind is made finite by its own singular actions. But, here,
Schelling declares that the grounding for mind is in fact that simultaneity of activity and
passivity; it is the possibility for mind to act and simultaneously to be acted on, which
allows that it exists at all. Regarding activity and passivity in terms of mind, it is both
intuiting from the outside world, i.e. being affected by outside stimuli and external
phenomena, and it is actively developing ideas about that which exists outside itself.
Schelling thus writes that, ―in us no idea is possible without passivity, but even
less so without activity‖ (I/1, 369). This is to say that ideas are a synthesis of the two.
On the one hand, the mind requires intuition of external phenomena so as not to be an
―absolute nothingness,‖ but it is then the activity of the mind, which allows for the
production of new internal phenomena, i.e. of ideas. What we now find, and Schelling is
keen to this in his explicit observation that ―unnoticed, we have been led through our
investigations to the most difficult problem in philosophy.‖ Without actually asking what
is considered the first and most crucial epistemological question— namely, what or who
is the starting point of knowledge—we have come upon a reply. There is no starting
point; there is no before (knower) to the after (known). Instead, there is an inextricable,
necessary, and simultaneous relationship between different aspects of nature, which allow
for the production of ever novel phenomena. To be clearer, knowledge is not based on
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the simple intellectual intuition that something outside of the mind is predicated a certain
way, e.g. ―the ball is red.‖ (1) There is a red ball; (2) I see the red ball; (3) I have an idea
of the red ball; (4) Thus, I realize the existence of a red ball. Instead, nature is less linear
and not based necessarily on cause and effect, i.e. on pre-set conditions. Instead, the
active nature of the intellect allows for a productive self-limiting. Because the
interminable opposition between infinite and finite, form and matter, subject and object,
etc. exists, ideas come from a simultaneous working together of more than one aspect of
nature—mind or ―intellectual nature,‖ on the one hand, and matter or ―physical nature‖
on the other hand. Through this inter-working, we find the production of even further
nature by way of mental action. This results in ideas, which in themselves do exist; but,
they are not actually existing external to intellectual nature.
The interrelation between activity and passivity is, for Schelling, that which
founds in a sense our ―being‖ (Wesen), and what he must mean by this is that the very
subject-object dualism he previously defended as characteristic of mind only is in turn the
very essence of human existence. 81 It is the implication of this idea that, when taken out
of context, implicates Schelling as a philosophical idealist: ―And because everything
finite is only graspable through opposed activities, but these are originally united only in
mind, so it follows from the self, that all outside existence comes forth and is apparent
first from intellectual nature‖ (I/1, 369). Schelling is not implying either that all of nature
comes to be only from the mind or that there is a fundamental difference between what
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Of course, this raises the question as to whether or not Schelling thought only humans
are essentially mind. This type of belief seems to be in line with the Aristotelian tradition
of relegating intellectual nature to intellectual beings, i.e. human beings. Whether or not
non-human animals share in an active mind, in the Schellingian sense, this means a mind
that produces ideas, is not discussed.
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we can know and what actually exists external to us, as Kant supposed. This is to say
that Schelling is not arguing for a separation between metaphysical and epistemological
conclusions. Since the existence of opposition allows for intellectual nature, this nature
is a plain facet of nature broadly construed, which is entirely different from saying that
mind is somehow outside of nature, trying to ―know‖ it. While the outcome might be the
same, i.e. that we never know objects unfiltered by our minds, it is one thing to say that
(1) this is because there is a bifurcation between what really is and what we have access
to, in Kantian language, ―noumena‖ and ―phenomena,‖ and another to say that (2) the
mind as a part of nature produces, in conjunction with intuition from the external world,
additional components of nature.
In what follows, Schelling begins seemingly to interchange two German words,
Objekt and Gegenstand, both commonly rendered ―object‖ into English. But, while it has
sparked discussion among readers as to whether or not Schelling meant to convey the
same or different ideas with his use of the two different terms, it seems clear to me in
conjunction with our foregoing reading, that he indeed meant the terms to reference
different things. By ―Gegenstand,‖ literally ―standing against/in opposition to,‖ he means
external phenomena opposing the subject intuiting the object. Likewise, the way the
mind as subject makes itself object by its own action. By ―Objekt,‖ he means the object
as intuited by the mind, as that which has been filtered through the lens of the subject
and, likewise, that which will simultaneously lend itself to the production of ideas.
Schelling thus explains, ―the object (Gegenstand) of the intuition is thus not other than
the mind itself in its activity and passivity‖ (I/1, 369). The mind is acted on by the
Gegenstand, which by way of the mind both is and becomes the Objekt of the intuition,
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which also simultaneously is and becomes the mind‘s activity as producer of ideas. The
Gegenstand, according to Schelling, is ―the mind itself in its activity and passivity‖ (I/1,
369). Since the mind is self-intuiting, however, it does not immediately recognize the
difference between itself and its intuition. Because of the indistinguishable simultaneity
of Objekt, Gegenstand, mind, and the act of intuition, we derive ―the belief that reality is
in the intuition alone‖ (I/1, 370). ―But,‖ as Schelling continues, ―we know that we can
distinguish the object (Objekt) and the idea‖ (I/1, 370). In fact, he notes that it is only
because we distinguish the two that philosophy even began.
In order to make the distinction, we need to be able to reflect on, i.e. to step away
from, the immediate intuition, which is the passivity of the mind, establishing effectually
that there is a difference between the object (Gegenstand) and the object intuited by the
mind (Objekt). Schelling explains the importance of abstraction to this process. By way
of abstraction we create a new object (Objekt) by way of our own mental action, which is
to say that we create ideas that have their own independent existence in real nature.
Further, the fact that we can abstract ourselves from the process of intuition and
differentiate between object (Gegenstand) and intuited object (Objekt) has a far-reaching
implication for Schelling. For him, the necessary condition of such abstraction is that we
as humans are free, both from the objects whence we understand ourselves not to be and
in the sense that by way of a freedom to act with which we can freely repeat the process
of intuition and subsequent abstraction (I/1, 370). Hence, Schelling concludes that, ―only
by my free action, insofar as it opposes an object, arises consciousness in me‖ (I/1, 370).
And, it is the independent existence of such an object that allows it to be intuited by way
of the innate passivity of an intellectual nature. Unless there exists an object for mind to
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intuit, there would be no possibility for abstraction of the Gegenstand. Schelling
describes thus the converse relationship between, on the one hand, the ability of the mind
for free abstraction and the accompanying compulsion for abstraction by way of intuition,
and on the other hand, the compulsion for abstraction and the ability for free abstraction
(I/1, 371). It is the repetition of this free action, which happens both because of and as a
result of the ability for abstraction, which allows us to become who we are. And, it is
over the course of such repetition that the actions of intellectual nature, i.e. the production
of ideas, becomes a producer of concepts (I/1, 371).
It is then the difference between the concept and the intuition of the Gegenstand,
as Objekt, which allows us to see the two as separate entities. But, as Schelling shows, it
is the perspective one takes on this difference that allows for certain philosophical
conclusions. On the one hand, if one thinks about the concept as having been abstracted
directly from the Gegenstand, one takes up the standpoint of empiricism. On the other
hand, if one thinks about the fact that we repeat the production of ideas freely, even
without continually intuiting external phenomena, it may seem that we do not require the
Gegenstand at all for the process of concept creation. If this is believed to be the case,
one takes up a position of formal philosophy—maintaining that everything is created in
the mind and then ―transferre[d] to things outside of us‖ (I/1, 371). Schelling is neither
an empiricist, nor a formalist (a realist or an idealist); instead, he argues for a middle
road. This is not to say, however, that Schelling goes the way of Kant. Despite his
appreciation of the critical project, Schelling has not invoked the ―Copernicanism‖ of his
predecessor. There are no presumed pure forms of intuition—no space, no time, and no
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categories given by the mind to shape a manifold of sense data into a meaningful
perception.
Instead, Schelling discusses what both empiricists and formalists have in
common: ―both will be conscious of the objects only in contrast to the free practice of
their minds; both also agree, the object is something independent of this practice,
notwithstanding the object itself is not this particular practice‖ (I/1, 372). Schelling
attempts to present this idea more clearly by shortening his argument. I present it here in
standard form (I/1, 372):
P1: We are conscious of concepts only in opposition to the intuition.
P2: We are conscious of the intuition only in opposition to the concept.
P3: (assumed) We do not have to be conscious of the intuition in order that it
exist.
P4: (assumed) We do have to be conscious of the concept in order that it exist,
since concepts are created as the result of a repetition of the production of ideas.
Therefore, the concept is dependent on the intuition, but the intuition is
independent of the concept.
However, he adds that when one removes consciousness, or the intellective nature, one
sees that the concept and the intuition are indeed the same thing. The concept arises as
something additional to the Objekt only because mind contributes to its production as a
separate entity, previously unknown and now known. Schelling continues with the
introduction of yet another dichotomy, united by his system: the ideal and real.
According to him, ―an action, in respect of which we feel free ourselves, we call ideal,
one in respect to which we ourselves feel compelled, real‖ (I/1, 372). Thus, he aligns the
produced concept as ideal and the intuition, the taking in of which we have no choice, as
real. Both the concept and the intuition, i.e. the ideal and the real, exist to us only insofar
as the other exists because, according to Schelling, ―for we are ourselves conscious
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neither of the concept without the intuition, nor the intuition without the concept‖ (I/1,
372).
There are then two vantage points whence to take in this information. From the
first, it appears that our knowledge is always part ideal and part real and, as such, it will
never be by way of this two-faced knowledge that which one caused the other could be
explained. From another point of view, knowledge is not one part ideal and the other part
real; but, rather, it is simultaneously both ideal and real and there is no actual difference
between the two.
From this analysis of the final pair of contraries he will introduce in this chapter,
Schelling returns to the opposition between form and material. Suggesting an analogue
between the second vantage point given above and the way one might look to the
perennial opposition between form and material, Schelling concludes that there is no
actual difference between the two. Instead, we think that there must be because it is only
by way of our own intellective nature that we have come to find a difference between the
two in the first place. We can identify form and material as contraries only because we
know each of them separately through their opposition to each other. And, yet, in
identifying the pair with the opposition in this way, we incorrectly identify them as
fundamentally separate and opposed. Schelling, if we recall, refers to the ―practice of
mind‖ as the intuition and to the ―product of this practice‖ as the concept. When the
intuition is abstracted from the concept, what is left is purely formal, and when the
concept is abstracted from the intuition, what is left is pure material (I/1, 372).
Therefore, Schelling is able to conclude that starting a philosophical inquiry where
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consciousness is presented as a given, i.e. as a fact, will result in false conclusions
precisely because the premise will be false; he calls it an ―inconsistent system‖ (I/1, 372).
Schelling‘s final conclusion here, then, shows the beloved statement of the critical
philosophers, ―The form of our knowledge comes from us ourselves, the material is given
to us from outside‖ to be unfounded (I/1, 373). The last question he briefly takes up,
then, given that form and material are for him one and the same thing, is whether form
and material are both given to us from the outside or from the inside, i.e. from our
intellective nature (I/1, 373). At first blush, Schelling admits, it looks as though material
must come from outside of us. This is because we accept that material is actually real,
i.e. a Gegenstand, outside of us. But, material without mind is only ever a Gegenstand, as
it cannot be anything for itself. And, so, does this then mean that the material has
preceded us? In order for us to know whether material is in itself, we must be material,
Schelling surmises. But, as it turns out, he is unable to answer the question he has just
posed regarding the origins of form and material. Instead, he asserts that we can only
really know ourselves. We should not pretend or purport to have access to knowledge
claims about the origins of our knowledge. And, we have come full-circle. The solutions
of the critical philosophers fail primarily because they offer answers that cannot, on
Schelling‘s view, be justified. They rest on the false premise that we can know the
original conditions and origination of form and material. Whether or not material comes
from outside of us, or whether the challenge that it must come from inside of us, is
correct, Schelling does not think we can say. So, he proposes a transition to the next
chapter where he will take up the topic of practical philosophy.
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III.

A Place for Time? Some Conclusions.
In Schelling‘s early Naturphilosophie, there is no clear analytic of temporality.

Nevertheless, it has been speculated that Schelling‘s proposals in the Abhandlungen
remove temporality from the system (Distaso 2004, 116). While it may in fact be true to
say that time in the Newtonian or Kantian sense is no longer present in Schelling‘s ideas
about nature, Schelling has lain the ground whence I contend we can interpolate time as
the result of inherent relationality in nature. The reason we might want to do this may not
be self-evident. Since I have aimed in previous chapters to show that Aristotle‘s
philosophy of time comes out of, and is a consequence of, his philosophy of nature, I am
interested in understanding the relationship between ideas about time in general as
concepts arising from or emerging co-equal to, instead of providing the conditions of or
foundations for, philosophies of nature. Hence, since with Aristotle‘s Physics we got a
unique and well-argued philosophy of nature, which was the dominant view of nature for
most of the history of Western Philosophy, and since Schelling‘s philosophy of nature
rejects both of Aristotle‘s key opponents, i.e. Newton and Kant, in these matters, and,
lastly, since Schelling‘s early Naturphilosophie returns to the ancient tendency to
privilege opposition—rather than promote dualism—I am keen to suggest that any theory
of time that we might attribute to Schelling‘s early studies of nature be the same type of
theory of time that I claim arose from Aristotle‘s.
Thus, if Schelling‘s early philosophy of nature does allow for a sense of time as
the result of a relation between more than one part of nature, I do not understand it to be a
new sense of time. Rather, I understand it to be a renewed sense of Aristotelian time.
Contrary to the claim that time has been dropped from Schelling‘s system, then, I argue
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that it has been re-introduced in his system. What is more, since my previous arguments
for understanding Aristotle‘s Treatise on Time rests on my reading of his foregoing
account of nature in the Physics, the task to support my current thesis is to suggest some
points of commonality between Aristotle‘s view of nature and the one we see Schelling
proposing here, even despite the vast differences between them. 82 The principal
characteristic shared by the two studies is an emphasis on the interrelation and
inextricability of actuality and potentiality, among other contraries.
With Schelling, as it is with Aristotle, we get a commonsense approach to
understanding nature, which begins with the idea that we are a part of, not divorced from,
nature. As such, the task to developing a philosophy of nature is neither an effort to
mythologize it, nor to catalogue it as if we humans were simply the narrators of
something unfolding around us, separate from us. Aristotle‘s first task in the Physics, to
know the principles, elements, and causes of natural beings is clearly a task that
implicitly includes human beings as natural beings. Aristotle is not looking to investigate
nature in the sense that ―nature‖ means whatever is other than human beings, i.e. the
Cartesian or Fichtean ―other.‖ In fact, he never questions that humans are an inextricable
part of nature, and thus that he is himself a part of nature.
Schelling exposes, as Aristotle did before him, the modal category of potentiality
in nature, which is to say an element of actual non-being in nature. The object exists in
such a way that it is always up for re-negotiation. This renegotiation happens by way of
82

Chief among the differences is perhaps the difference in what each thinker positions
himself to know about “nature.” Whereas Aristotle‟s general interest is understanding
the nature of existing self-subsistent natural beings, Schelling seems more taken with the
idea of nature itself. In Schelling‟s later work, this difference seems solidified because
Schelling takes a modern approach and discusses nature in terms of forces, not in terms
of particular beings.
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its own potentiality for alternate predication, as it is an unceasing interplay of contraries,
and—as Schelling‘s work points out—also as that which is intuited and understood by
humans to be its potentiality for renegotiation. While a natural being‘s capacity to be
something else is always a real potentiality, it is only by way of an intellectual nature that
this potentiality becomes something actual before it is ever ―real‖ in nature. So too,
something actual in one sense can become actually something other in the content of
one‘s thoughts. In fact, by way of the activity of intellectual nature, it can become actual
in ways that may never be ―real.‖
For Aristotle, the terms of motion, e.g. the infinite, void, place, and time, do not
exist qua themselves. The terms arise as a consequence of the nature of natural beings.
Particularly in the case of the infinite and time, as I have tried to show, the term results
from an interaction between more than one natural being in nature.
More broadly, this interaction, which is capable of continual reproduction, gives
birth to a remainder. And, this product is the always-different finite. In Schellingian
terms, this product of intellective activity is an idea. Ideas exist, but they are not selfsubsistent beings existing apart from the intellective nature that has produced them.
Instead, ideas in Schelling, as is the case with the infinite and time in Aristotle, exist as an
interaction between a human being and another being in the world.
The receptivity, or passivity, characteristic of the sensitive faculty of soul, in
Aristotle‘s terminology, or of the intuition, in Schelling‘s, allows for the question about
the being of nature to arise at all. After all, if we as humans were unaware of change
going on around us, to use Aristotelian language, or of the difference between the objects
external to us and the objects we intuit, to speak in Schellingian terms, we would have no
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use for questions about the principles and makeup of nature. Asking these kinds of
questions about nature is quite different from inquiries that begin with the assumption
that such faculties allow for the very existence of nature. No, these faculties are the
vehicles by which the questions about nature arise in us. Clearly, as we have said, these
faculties are just as much a part of nature as are the external objects themselves.
Schelling‘s claim that the ‗I‘ is perfectly both subject and object simultaneously,
and thus the perfect place to begin an investigation into the being of nature is a claim
about the state in which we always find nature. This is to say that nature is always going
to be something that is not a singular object to investigate as if we were simply passive
observers. Instead, it must always begin as an investigation into a relationship between
the part of nature asking about nature and the aspect of nature sensed or intuited by the
questioner. Thus, from its beginning, such an investigation does not make the Newtonian
or Kantian mistakes of attributing either too much to the external world, nor too much to
the intellective nature. Instead, as Schelling proposed, we begin talking about one natural
being, i.e. the human being, which is at the same time form and material, subject and
object, passive and active, real and ideal. Beginning with an investigation of one being
who is at the same time mind and matter, subject and object to itself, in turn demonstrates
that this marriage of contraries is the non-foundational foundation (abgrundt) of all
nature.
But, Aristotle had already argued, in the first book of the Physics, that the very
interplay between contraries is the starting point to any study of nature. In the
Aristotelian vein, then, Schelling demonstrates the foundation of nature as a robust
relationship between contraries by emphasizing the being of a human being as the one
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being who can have a relationship with itself. As we saw with Aristotle, all natural
objects can be predicated both as ―actually‖ one way while simultaneously being
predicated ―potentially‖ the contrary. But, Schelling demonstrates that the aspect of
potentiality really surfaces as the result of the relationship between that thing and a
human being. He does this when he uses the human being as an example of a natural
object, which is both actually ‗I‘ and ‗not-I‘ at the same time by virtue of the fact that it
can understand this about itself. By way of the understanding, the human being becomes
object to itself, thus can identify itself as both what it is and as what it is not-yet. When
actual material, or real, nature enters into a relationship with a human being, who is both
real and ideal in nature as a result of its intellective faculty, nature‘s principles become a
known quantity by way of the relationship. This is to say that the inseparability of all
contraries and that they are always and irrevocably co-definitive becomes clear through,
in Aristotle‘s words, that which is not immediately clear to us.
The activity of the intellective nature, which for Schelling occurs as the result of
intuition and for Aristotle requires a prior readiness for thinking in addition to sense
perception, is simultaneous with its passivity. Because the intellectual nature is active
only as the result of—or, put another way, in conjunction with—its partial passivity, its
activity is always the product of the unceasing intermingling and interconnectedness of
both passivity and activity. The product of the activity, the finite idea, is thus literally
nothing without the infinite potential of the mind continually to act, and this infinite
potential is as it is only because the mind is both subject and object, both active and
passive.
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From this view of nature emerges an idea of time. But, this time is neither that
which exists as a being qua itself to take in passively, nor as a necessary feature of the
capacity for human beings to intuit outside phenomena. Instead, time in this sense results
from the primary way in which nature exists, as an interrelated dynamism. Thus, time
must be either coequal to, as Schelling seemingly argues in later works, or a byproduct of
the process by which the human being intuits and processes change either in the external
world or in the context of a change in its own state of mind. Time is thus very real to the
human experience in the world, but it means nothing outside of the subjectobject/potential-actual relationship that occurs as primary in nature. Aristotle, spelled
this out fairly clearly in the fourth book of the Physics, or so I have tried to show by
emphasizing (1) Aristotle‘s arguments about the archai of nature, (2) his definition of
kinêsis, which highlights the relationship between actuality and potentiality, and (3) his
examinations of the terms of motion, which include time.
Schelling offers an understanding of nature that presupposes that nature is always
already interacting with more than one part of itself; nature is always nature in relation.
The human being freely creates concepts to better understand the world as a further
product of its ideation. These concepts shape the way we continue then to understand the
parts of nature outside of us. Distaso (Distaso 2004, 116) attributes this process to the
human faculty of spontaneity, ―which allows the absolute and unconditional I to give
form to a world in such a way that the world becomes objective and conditional.‖ It is
literally by way of the infinite capacity of the intellective nature to make sense of
intuition, and thus to produce finite activity, that time amounts to something that is born
of the very being of nature qua nature.
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Where is time‘s place generally in a philosophy of nature unfounded by a priori
concepts of time and space? Well, if by place we mean, ―place where,‖ either on the one
hand, a container or vessel that is a real self-subsistent being itself containing another
actual being, or, on the other hand, the outer limit of a material body actualized by the
body‘s presence in a particular part of space, then by no means is there a place for time in
the sense we have been speaking of time here. When time‘s existence comes out of a
philosophy of nature, time is nothing qua itself. By contrast, if by place we mean, ―place
by or in whom,‖ then time does have a place. Time‘s place is partially founded by us, as
an outcome of the way in which we interact with other beings in nature.
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Appendix 1

Translation of Chapter 2, F.W.J. Schelling’s
Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre (1796/97)83

Treatise Explaining the Idealism of the Science of Knowledge

[363]
I have heard the question before: how is it possible that such a preposterous
system of the so called critical philosophers not only could be conceived in a person‘s
mind, but also could hold sway there? Because I left this question unanswered in the
previous section, I will say something about it here. For, I am of the firm conviction that
no people not entirely bereft of reason have stated something in speculative things for
which there would be found no ground in human nature itself. Were it impossible to
elicit the source of speculative deceit, we would need to consider its entire abandonment,
keeping others away from doubt. In hindsight, we would be leaving—each of us—our
research to blind chance. A general distrust of human reason would bring us neither to a
clear opinion for ourselves, nor to a consensus with others. The reason to act at the
present is thus to disprove an inconsistent idea, to show the reason in the seemingly

83

The translation I provide here is my own, though I have benefitted not only from
Thomas Pfau‟s English translation (Pfau 1994), but also from the helpful advice of my
colleague Norman Schultz. In most cases, I chose to render the text as literally as
readability permitted. I alone am responsible for any missteps.
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irrational opinions. However, through this careful inspection it may be shown that such
people receive more honors than what they deserve.
The main theorem of critical philosophy [364] can be conveyed as follows: The
form of our knowledge comes from ourselves, the matter of the same thing, [i.e. our
knowledge], is given to us from outside.
It is yet advantageous, that this opposition will be compiled only generally. For
although in our knowledge itself both form and matter are intimately united, it is clear
that philosophy suspends this hypothetical unity in order to be able to explain it; and
likewise it is apparent that all philosophical systems, from the oldest times on, have
considered form and matter as the two extremes of our knowledge.
One soon found, that matter is the endmost substratum of all our explanations.
One did thereupon abstain to research the source of matter itself. But one also noticed
something else about things, what one could not more explain from the matter itself, but
which someone felt forced to explain (for example, general successiveness in nature,
particularly in things that could be purposive, on which hangs the order and system of the
outside world by way of a complete linkage from beginning to end). But these conditions
continue to hang together with the things themselves so much so that one is able to think
neither the things without these conditions, nor these conditions without the things. One
wanted thus from the understanding something of the highest essence (e.g. a creator of
the world) first to change over to these, so one realized not how this inseparable alliance,
through which no speculative art can be resolved, emerged between them. One thus
allows the things together with their conditions to originate from the creative power of a
godhead; no doubt alone one grasps, how an essence from the creative power of an
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outside thing itself can be represented, but not how it itself can represent another essence.
Or in other words: even if we grasp the source of a world outside ourselves, we fail to
grasp how the idea (Vorstellung) of this world came to be in us.
The last attempt thus must be to explain not how [365] outside things independent
from us came to be–for from these we do not understand, because they themselves are the
endmost substrate of all explanations of outside events–but how an idea of these things
came to be in us.
First the question must be determined. Clearly, it is not only the possibility of an
idea in us of outside things, but the necessity of the things that must be explained.
Further, not only how we ourselves will know an idea, but also, why we are therefore
compelled to relate it to an outside object. For, we hold onto our knowledge as real only
insofar as it corresponds with the object. (The old definition of truth: it is the absolute
correspondence of the object and of the knowing, has thereon long been able to suggest
that the object itself is not other than our necessary knowing.) For in speculation we are
able to separate the two, but in our knowledge there is an absolute meeting of them, and
even in the inability, the object is distinguished over a period of time from the idea of the
idea, establishing for the common understanding the ground of belief in an outside world.
The problem is also this: to explain the absolute correspondence of the object and
the idea, the being and the knowing. But now it is clear that as soon as we oppose the
object, as the thing outside of us, and the idea (and we do it, by posing the question),
absolutely no unmediated correspondence between the two is possible—hence the
attempts to mediate the object and idea through concepts, to consider that as cause, this as
effect. We never achieve with all of these attempts what we actually wanted, identity of
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the object and of the idea; for that is what we must presume and what the common
understanding has always presumed in all its judgments.
It is so asked: whether such an identity of the object and the idea is in general
possible? Simply put, [366] it is only possible in one case: if such a being that looked at
itself were to exist, then the one representing and that which is being represented, that
which is intuiting and that which is intuited, would exist at the same time. The only
example we find of an absolute identity of an idea and of an object is thus in ourselves.
What is alone unmediated, and through which one knows and understands before
anything else, is the I in us. I am compelled to ask with regard to all other objects,
through what place will the same being be mediated by my idea? But I am not primary
perhaps for a knowing subject outside of me, as is matter. I am primary only for myself;
in me is the absolute identity of the subject and of the object, of knowing and of being.
Since I know nothing other than through myself, so it is absurd, self-consciousness
requires still another predicate other than I. Precisely in this consists the essence or being
(Wesen) of mind (Geistes), that it for itself no other predicate has as itself.
Only in the self-intuition of a mind thus is identity from idea and object. That is, it
would have to, in order to demonstrate the absolute correspondence of idea and object, in
which is based the reality of all of our knowledge, prove that mind, in which it intuits
objects overall, only intuits itself. The reality of our knowledge is secured by this proof.
The question is, how does one prove it?
First it is necessary that one takes possession of that position, on which the
subject and object in us, the one intuiting and that which is intuited, are identical. This
cannot occur by virtue of a free action.
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Further: mind‘s name is I, that which only its own object is.84

[367]
Mind must be object for itself, which insofar as it is not originally object, but
absolute subject, for which all (even himself) is object. So it should be also. Object is
something dead, calm. Without the ability for self-action, object is only the object
(Gegenstand) of action. But mind can be conceived only in its action (one cannot dissent,
from which one says therefore, that he philosophizes without mind), mind is thus only in
the state of becoming. What is more, he is himself not other than an eternal becoming.
(Thus, one grasps the ongoing advancement, the progression, of our knowledge, from the
dead matter to the idea of a living nature). Mind must be an object for itself – not to be,
but – to become. Precisely therefore all philosophy begins with deed and action, and
mind cannot be (per se) originally object. It becomes only object through itself, through
its own action.
Now what object is (originally), is as such necessarily also something finite.
Because mind is not originally object, it cannot be originally finite in accordance with its
nature. So, must it be infinite? This also seems problematic because it is mind only
insofar as it is object for itself, i.e., insofar as it is finite. Thus it is neither infinite
without becoming finite, nor can it become finite (for itself) without being infinite. It is
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Mancher ehrliche Mann, der gegen das Bisherige sonst nichts aufzubringen weiß, wird
wenigstens das Wort Geist aufgreifen; die Kantianer (wenn sie diese Kritik ihrer
Philosophie beurtheilen) werden den Stab über sie brechen, oder sie über Dinge in die
Lehre nehmen, welche tief unter ihr liegen, zB daß sie dogmatisch verfahre, von dem
Geist als Ding an sich spreche usw Deßwegen habe ich mehrmals wiederholt, Geist heiße
mir, was für sich selbst, nicht für ein fremdes Wesen, also ursprünglich überhaupt kein
Objekt, geschweige ein Objekt an sich ist.
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simply neither infinite, nor finite. However, in mind is the primordial union of the
infinite and finite (a new condition of the mind‘s character).
From infinite to finite – no overpass! This was a proposition of ancient
philosophy. Earlier philosophers sought to conceal this transition at least through images,
hence the doctrine of emanation, a tradition from the most ancient world. Thus, the
inevitability of Spinozism from the inherited principles.

[368]

It was not until later ages that inane systems attempted to find intermediate links
between the infinite and the finite. But such can give between the two no before and no
after; this finds instead only finite things. The existence of finite things (thus also finite
ideas) cannot be explained by way of the concepts of cause and effect. With the insight
of this position begins all philosophy; for without it we have not one time a need to
philosophize – without it all of our knowledge is empirical, advancing from cause to
effect. The finite and infinite are united originally only in the being of an intellectual
nature. In this absolute simultaneity of the infinite and finite lies the being (Wesen) of an
individual nature (the ego). That it must be so follows from the possibility of selfconsciousness, through which alone mind is what it is. It is but also an indirect
(apagogischer) proof for that which is possible. For either we are originally infinite, so
we do not comprehend how in us was created finite ideas and a finite succession of ideas;
or, we are originally finite, so it is inexplicable how an idea of infinity, at the same time
with the ability from the finite to abstract, has come to be in us.
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Further: the mind is (sees) everything only through itself, through its own action.
Thus actions would have to be originally opposed to it (mind), or, if we consider the mere
form of which is given opposed actions, it would be originally infinite, the others
originally finite. But the two should be distinguished only in their mutual relationship
with each other.
Thus it is as well. Both of these activities are originally united in me; but I know
this only through it, that I summarize the two in one action. This action is called
intuition, the nature of which I believe to have explained in the foregoing section. With
the same intuition is consciousness still not there, but without it is no consciousness
possible. First in consciousness can I distinguish the two of those activities: the one is
positive in nature, the other negative, the one filled, the other a sphere bordered. Those
[369] are presented as activity from outside, these as an activity from inside. Everything,
what is (in the true sense of the word is), is only due to the direction of itself (this
expresses itself in the dead object, that is not, but only there exists, through gravitational
force and in the world system through the centripetal tendency of the world body.) Mind
is thus only by its direction of itself, for itself, through which it limits itself in its activity,
or what is more, mind is itself not other than this activity and this limit, both as
simultaneously thought.
By limiting itself mind is at the same time active and passive (leidend), and
because without this action there would be likewise no consciousness of our nature, so
would be this absolute unity of activity and passivity of the character of the individual
nature.
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Passivity is not other than negative activity. An absolutely passive being (Wesen)
is an absolute nothingness (a nihil privativum). Unnoticed, we have been led through our
investigations to the most difficult problem in philosophy. In us is no idea possible
without passivity, but even less so without activity. All philosophers have recognized
this. It appears now that our being and essence (Wesen) is based on this original unity of
activity and passivity, that it therefore belongs to our being and essence, ever present, and
as will be shown in the future, also present is this determined system of things. And
because everything finite is only graspable through opposed activities, but these are
originally united only in a mind, so it follows from the self, that all outside existence
comes forth and is apparent first from intellectual nature.
The intuition actively binds together activity and passivity. This is known, as I
put it in the previous section. The object (Gegenstand) of the intuition is thus not other
than the mind itself in its activity and its passivity. But the mind, which intuits itself,
cannot distinguish at the same time itself from itself—hence, the intuition of absolute
identity of the object and the [370] idea (hence, as it will soon be shown, the belief that
reality is in the intuition alone; for now still the mind does not distinguish, what is real
and what is not real).
But we know that we can distinguish the object and the idea, for from this
distinction we set out. (Without it there is no need to philosophize). In order to
distinguish the object and idea, we need to move beyond the intuition.
This we cannot other, as the way we abstract from the product of our intuition.
(This ability to abstract is thereby graspable because we are originally free, i.e. are
independent of the object. Further, since this ability is in opposition to the object
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(Objekt), i.e. practically speaking, can be voiced, so it is clear that a difference is possible
with respect to the intensity of the idea between different subjects—also that theoretical
and practical philosophy were not at all separated; for we would not be able to abstract at
all without free action, and we could not act free without abstracting. This will soon
become still clearer). Namely, we could not abstract from the product of the intuition
without acting freely, i.e. without the original practice (of mind) freely to repeat the
intuition; and conversely, we would not be able to freely repeat this action without at the
same time abstracting from its product. We could not thus abstract the action from the
product, without it opposing the free action (i.e. without giving it independence of our
action, self-existence); and conversely, we could not oppose the product of action to our
action, without at the same time being free to act (i.e. without abstracting from it). Now
only by our abstraction does the product becomes our action‘s object.
Only by my free action, insofar as it opposes an object, arises consciousness in
me. The object is now here, its origin lies for me in the past, beyond my current
consciousness, it is here, without my making. (Hence the impossibility to explain, from
the standpoint of consciousness, out of the origin of the [371] objects). I cannot act freely
in abstraction, without opposing the object to myself, i.e. without me feeling dependent
on it. The object was but originally only in the intuition, absolutely undifferentiated from
the intuition. Thus I cannot freely abstract, without feeling compelled in view of the
intuition, and conversely, I cannot feel compelled in view of the intuition, without at the
same time abstracting freely.
I am becoming me, but I am not conscious of the intuition as I am abstracting
from it. Thus I will not be able to be conscious of the intuition, without feeling myself
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compelled in view of the same. Conversely, I can feel myself in view of the objects (of
intuition) not compelled, without abstracting from it, i.e. without at the same time feeling
free. Thus I will also be conscious of my freedom, only insofar as I feel myself restricted
in view of the objects. There is no consciousness of objects without consciousness of
freedom, no consciousness of freedom without consciousness of objects.
By freely repeating the original practices of mind in the intuition, i.e. by
abstracting, concept arises. But, I cannot abstract, without at the same time intuiting with
consciousness, and conversely; so we are ourselves conscious of the concept only in
contrast to the intuition, of the intuition only in contrast to the concept.
But for that very reason, because we ourselves will only be conscious of the free
practice in the intuition in contrast to the same product (the object), it seems to us as
something from the abstracted object (Gegenstand) (standpoint of empiricism), the object
(Gegenstand) notwithstanding itself otherwise is as a product of this practice.
But because we freely repeat this practice (because we for example see figures
free in space, because the imagination can design the general outline of free objects
(Gegenstandes), thus it seems to us this practice is something that only comes forth from
our minds and that we only transfer to things outside of us (the standpoint of formal
philosophy).

[372]
But both (empiricists and formalists) will be conscious of the objects only in
contrast to the free practice of their minds; both also agree, the object is something
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independent of this practice, notwithstanding the object itself is nothing but this particular
practice.
In brief, because we ourselves are conscious of the concepts only in opposition to
the intuition, and we will be conscious of the intuition only in opposition to the concept,
so it appears (erscheint) to us the concept as dependent on the intuition, the intuition as
independent from the concept, the two notwithstanding are originally (before
consciousness) one and the same.
An action, in respect of which we feel free ourselves, we call ideal, one in respect
of which we ourselves feel restricted, real. The concept seems to us hence as ideal, the
intuition as real; but both only in mutual relationship with one another; for we are
ourselves conscious neither of the concept without the intuition, nor the intuition without
the concept.
Hence who remains from the standpoint of the mere consciousness, must
necessarily argue: our knowledge is part ideal, part real; out of it will arise an
adventurous system that can never explain how the ideal had become real or the real
ideal. One who stands at a higher vantage point finds that there is originally no
difference between ideality and reality, so that our knowledge is not in part, but at the
same time is entirely and perfectly ideal and real.
Originally the practice of the mind and the product of this practice is one and the
same. But we can be conscious ourselves of neither the practice thus of the products
themselves, without these opposing those, those opposing these. The practice, abstracted
from their product, is purely formal, the product, abstracted form the practice, through the
practice it has arisen, purely matter.
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Who thus only proceeds from consciousness (as a fact), will establish an
inconsistent system, by force of which our knowledge is a part, [373] from unsubstantial
forms, on the other hand will put together a wonderful ditty from formless things. In
short, such a system will come from a proposition, which we have established above (p.
363) as the principal thesis of the newest philosophy:

The form of our knowledge derives from us ourselves, the matter is given to us
from outside.

We know that originally form and matter are one, that we could differentiate the two,
only after both exist through one the same identical and indivisible action, we are familiar
with only the single alternative: either must both, matter and form, be given to us from
outside, or both, matter and form, must first come to be and spring forth from us.
We accept the first—matter is something that is in itself and originally real. But
matter is matter, only insofar as it is an object (Objekt) (an intuition or an action). Were
it something in itself, so it would have to be also something for itself; but this it is not, for
it only ever is to the extent it is viewed from a being (Wesen) outside it.
But suppose it were something in itself—although, it is absurd to say or even to
think such a thing—we might not even be able to know what it is in itself. It seems that
we would need to be matter ourselves in order to know it. But then, in order to know this
being (Seyn) necessarily, it seems actually that we would need to be immaterial. So long
as we presuppose that this being is something that precedes our knowledge, we do not
even understand what we are saying. Instead of further grasping around blindly at
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incomprehensible concepts, it is better to ask, what we alone originally understand, and
what can we understand? But originally we only understand ourselves, and because there
are only two conceivable schemas, one in which the matter is the principle of mind, and
the other, which makes the mind the principle of matter, so remains for us, that we want
to understand ourselves. Ultimately, this amounts to the contention that mind is not born
of matter, but matter is born from [374] mind: a proposition, whence the transition to
practical philosophy, to which we now go, can be very easily made.
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